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Abstract 
The primary focus of this research is an examination of the issues involved in 
the granting of access in an environment characterised by multiple users, multiple 
resources and multiple levels of access permission. Increasing levels of complexity in 
automoti\'e systems provides opportunities for improving the integration and efficiency 
of the services provided to the operator. 
The vehicle lease I hire environment provided a bas:s for evaluating conditional 
access to distributed, mobile assets where the principal rJedium for operating in this 
environment is the Smart Card. The application of Smart Cards to existing vehicle 
management systems requires control of access to motor vehicles, control of vehicle 
operating parameters and secure storage of operating information. 
The issues addressed include examination of the characteristics of the operating 
environment, development of a model and design, simulation and evaluation of a 
multiple application Smart Card. The functions provided by the card include 
identification and authentication, secure hash and encryption functions which may be 
applied, in general, to a wide range of access problems. 
Evaluation of the algorithms implemented indicate that the Smart Card design 
may be provably secure under single use conditions and conditionally secure under 
multiple use conditions. The simulation of the card design provided data to .support 
further research and shows the design is practical and able to be implemented on 
current Smart Card types. 
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1. Glossary and Explanation of Terms. 
1.1. Mathematical Terms. 
A Number of cells in on army 
8 a binary number 
C number of unique combinations from sampling I~ 
D a decimal number 
d the index generated by the selection algorithm 
dn average distance travelled by the drunk in Drunkard's Walk 
E encryption method 
Ei i'th bit of encryption method E 
F A User of a Resource administered by the proposed system 
G A Resource administered by the proposed system 
H Level of Access to a Resource administered by the proposed system 
K Key sequence 
Ki i'th bit of Key Sequence 
k an arbitrary constant 
L length of bit sequence necessary in Test T. 
M Movement of pixel Square in pixels 
M Message of arbitrary length 
Mi i'th bit in message 
N Number of steps taken in Drunkard's Walk 
N integer length of randomiser R 
n integer length of sample taken from randomiser R 
0 number of bits specifying the composite sequence ordering, 9l 
R Randomiser. random data sequence from which samples are produced 
R binary random string of length L:= KT, publicly-accessible. 
S Set of integers specifying absolute of discard values for selection algorithm 
S number of selections taken from randomiser R 
SP Start Point, initial entry into randomiser 
T Test-T, method of specifying the output of a random sequence generator 
u number of possible rotations of a basic sequence 
V size of a pixel square side 
W Keystream of length N 
X Plain text of length N 
x number of bits per side of pixel square 
xl specification of x * x-1 * ... 3 * 2 * l.a factorial number 
Y Cryptogram of length N obtained by adding X and W bitwise modulo 2 
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Z Secret Key 
rotution sequence 
~ Composite Sequence 
ffi Addition Modulo 2 
Ill constant equal to 2rr 
A length of step in Drunkard's Walk calculations 
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_________ _:Mc.c,u!!i-Rcso~~~:_:! __ ML~~-~-vel_ ~~~~~~--~Y.-~~C_!flS -··----------
1.2. Descriptive terms 
Absolute Method : method of specifying bits in a mndomiser by the index of the bit.:-;. 
(Sec Discnrd Method) 
Access control: restricting access to resources to privilt~ged cntilics 
Ancillary Systems: scpnrate systems which provide aid or functionality tn the operotor 
of fl vehicle eg. Ail·-conditioning, central locking, power windows 
Anonymity : concealing the identity of an entity involved in some process. 
Authorisation : conveyance, to another entity, of official sanction to do or be something 
Basic Sequence : a sequence of symbols used to create a larger sequence by rotation 
and concatenation 
Block Cipher: an encryption method that processes blocks of data, typically 64 bits, 
according to a specific algorithm 
CAN -Controller Area Network : a bus architecture using micro-controllers to 
administer the control and reporting of information in a mobile environment. 
Certification : endorsement of information by a trusted entity 
Confirmation : acknowledgement that services have been provided 
Complete Composite Sequence : a composite sequence that has one of each possible 
rotation of the basic sequence. 
Composite sequence : a sequence created by rotating and concatenating at least one 
basic sequence where a rotated sequence may be used more than once. 
Complete Ordered Composite Sequence : a Complete Composite Sequence that has, 
ordered from 0 to n-1, each rotated Basic Sequence. 
Complex Composite Sequence : a composite sequence created by rotating and 
concatenating multiple basic sequences of differing lengths. 
Complete Complex Composite Sequence : a complete complex composite sequence of all 
the rotations of all the basic sequences. 
Data Integrity :ensuring information has not been altered by unauthorised or unknown 
means 
DeBruijn Sequence: sequence such as '00011101' containing the set of overlapping 
three bit sequences '000', '00 1', '0 11 ', '111 ', '110', '10 1 ', '01 0', '100' comprising a 
complete binary representation from 0 to 23-1. 
Derived data : data drawn from other types of data 
DES- Data Encryption Standard :an iterative block cipher method. 
Discard Method : method of specifying bits in a randomiser indirectly by specifying the 
number of bits to discard between selections. 
ECU- Engine Control Unit: used to control the running of an engine, generally includes 
digital technology 
EEPROM - Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory : non~volatile 
memory used in IC cards. 
EMU- Engine Management Unit: same as ECU 
Entity authentication or identification : corroboration of the identity of an entity (e.g. a 
person, a computer terminal, a credit card etc.) 
External Systems : systems external to the vehicle which interact with or provide 
information to the vehicle. Eg Global Positioning Systems 
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Function Generator: a mathematical concept, a block level clescriptiun of a process 
where the input and output arc linked by the defined function. 
!Cl~: Internal Combustion Engi1w, where the cornhl1stion of the fuel is in enclosed 
space to maximise fuel cfficit·ncy 
ISO : International Standards Orgn.nisation 
Law of Large Numbers : the characteristics. of a group of samples will be same as the 
characteristics of the population 
MD5: a secure hash function from R. Rivest that has been available since 1992. 
Message authentication : corroborating the source of information; also known as data 
origin authenticatiml 
Non-Overlapping Sequences: taking bits from a sequence and using them once only. 
For example, with sequence 1001 the non-overlapping sequences are 10 and 01 
Non-repudiation : preventing the denial of previous commitments or actions 
Overlapping Sequences: taking bits from a sequence and using them more than once. 
For example, with sequence 1001 the overlappjng sequences would be 1 0, 00 and 
01. 
Ownership: a means to provide an entity with the legal right to use or transfer a 
resource to others. 
Privacy or Confidentiality : keeping information secret from all but those who are 
authorised to see it. 
'Random By Definition' : a term used to mean a sample that is considered to be random 
within the canonical or generally accepted meaning. This implies that the sequence 
is able to be tested to show a uniform random distribution but is in all senses ideal 
and not practical. 
Randomiser: a sequence of random or pseudo-random symbols 
Raw Data : data taken from the sensors before processing 
Revocation: retraction of certification or authorisation. 
Round Off Error: A round-off error is where some number close to the exact value is 
used instead of the actual number, for example, the use of 3.1416 instead of 
3.141592654 or other representations of greater precision. 
Run Length Encoding : a method of reducing storage space for information by encoding 
the data for length. Suited to systems where the data does not change often. 
Secure Hash Function : a method of reducing a larger block of data to a unique, shorter 
sequence which is linked to the text by a function. 
Selection : an unordered multiset with repetition 
Selection Key : a set of integers that consist of a Start Point and a Selection Set 
Selection Set : a sequence of integers used to specify symbols in the randomiser 
Sensor data : data taken from the sensors after processing 
Signature : a means to bind information to an entity 
Start Point : the initial position of the pointer in a circular buffer 
Stream Cipher : an encryption method that processes one bit at a time, usually by 
addition modulo 2 with a key stream bit. 
Timestamping : recording the time of creation or existence of information 
Unique Sequence : any selection without rt.placement of bits from the randomiser 
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Validation: a means to provide timeliness nf aulhorisnlion lo us1: or manipul<Jle 
information or rcsoutTcs. 
VMU -Vehicle Manngenwnt Unit :an electronic control sysh:m for a vehicle thnt 
manages I he l'ngine and ancillary sysh~rns and rnay provide interaction with 
external systems. 
Witnessing: verifying the creation or existence of informntion by an entity other than 
the creator 
2. Introduction 
2.1. Historical Perspective of Motor Vehicle Development 
Motor vehicle development is dependent on component technologies such as 
electricity and metal-working. The potential for powered vehicles was demonstrated by 
Trevithick's steam carriage in 1801 though smaller, lighter and more efficient engines 
for industrial and agricultural equipment provided the main impetus for development. 
Increased efficiency results when the fuel is burnt inside a closed space to 
reduce thermal losses. Internal combustion engines use liquid fuels which combine 
substantial energy with reduced storage space. The 'Four Stroke' internal combustion 
engine is most common where, in two revolutions of the crankshaft, fuel and air are 
drawn into a cylinder, compressed, ignited and the combustion products expelled to 
produce further rotation of the crankshaft. 
Further improvement in perfonnance required increasingly complicated 
mechanical and electrical engine control systems which are now being replaced by 
electronic components that control multiple systems. 
2.2. Basic Structure of Internal Combustion Engines 
The internal combustion engine requires a source of fuel and fuel ignition 
coupled with a suitable mechanical environment for sustained operation. Petrol engine 
ignition systems rely on mechanically driven components to generate and control the 
intensity, timing and duration of a spark to initiate fuel combustion in the closed 
cylinder. 
The engine-driven distributor provides a means of initiating, adjusting and 
distributing a spark to each cylinder in turn. The spark is created by altering the flow of 
electric current through a 'step-up' transformer which converts a high current, low 
voltage into a low current, high voltage which is discharged across an air gap to ignite 
the vaporised fuel. Distributor mechanisms provide fine variation on the timing and 
duration of the spark during different operating conditions. 
The carburettor is a fuel metering device where the vaporising of the fuel for 
delivery to the cylinders takes place. The vaporisation rate depends on the amount of 
air drawn through the carburettor which is controlled by the position of the throttle and 
the size and number of the metering jets. The air demand is produced by the rotation of 
the crankshaft which uses the cylinders to pump air through the engine. 
The basic components of the engine include a reliable electrical ignition system, 
a carburettor for fuel and speed control and power delivery mechanisms such as the 
crankshaft, gear box and differential. In recent y~ars, fuel control has developed to the 
point where complex emission control and engine management systems are in use. 
2.3. Electrical and Electronic Developments 
Electronics has provided means to improve the efficiency and performance of the 
internal combustion engine. The weakest point of the distributor, the switch contacts 
that interrupt the current flow, have been replaced with a transistor and the carburettor 
has been replaced with electronically controlled fuel injection. 
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Continuing automotive vehicle dt:vdopnwnt hw-; pnJdun:clthe I•:Jectronic Fuel 
Injection (EFI} systt•m which uses n small computer lo control engine pc:rforrnanct:. One 
of the major varinnts \\'HS developed by l~olwrt Bosch Gm hll. (Gregory, 1990, p8) 
The Boseh syslt'm wws dectronit: control systems to provide efficient operation 
from dnta provided by the engi1w sensor~;. The sensors me:1surc: air prcs:-.urc, 
temperature and now, throttle position, t~ngine operating ternperatun., exhaust ga!i 
o.xygen content and engine rotation. ((ircgory, 1990) 
Contillllt'cl development has made the fuel-injected, electronically-controlled 
engine very common in new cars. l~lectronic control of accessories such as air-
conditioning and access control has been added to the electronic suite in the vehicle. 
External systems may also interact with the on-board systems. 
Consequently, the controller is required to integrate functions such a~ 
authorising and monitoring vehicle usc and interaction \Vith electronic traffic control 
and management systems. This integration of on-board s_vstemz with external systems 
clearly sets the trend for integrated systems development. 
A range of topics will be considered in developing the model for the system: 
Access Control that identifies users and operating conditions; remote 
authorisation; security against theft from the vehicle and unauthorised usc. 
0 Event logging and short and long term data storage to report on vehicle operation. 
o Storage of abnormal conditions information such as oil or brake pressure failure. 
0 Administrative functions such as servicing scheduling, fuel usage and other 
functions. 
It is considered that provision for some of these options can be effected by 
setting limits and options within the software fitment to the Engine Management Unit. 
2.4. Research Justification 
Initial research into computer security methods indicated the possibilities of 
applying a developmental algorithm to a range of secure applications. Further 
discussion with Professor VM Cordonnier and Professor AC Watson highlighted the 
opportunities for research in multi-user, multi-resource, multi-level access systems 
typified by the administration of a fleet of lease vehicles. 
Many vehicles have integral electronic components and interaction with external 
and ancillary systems is primarily managed by computers. It is noted that the major 
issues in distributed, mobile computing are i·rlentif:c~tion and authentication of data 
and participants in the system operations. 
These issues are fundamental to the underlying legal and commercial structures 
in administering vehicle lease and substantial opportunities for further research may be 
determined. Additionally, management of the vehicle during operation, secure data 
processing and transferring of permission to use a resource must be addressed. 
Smart Cards provide computing facilities in a portable form with substantial 
inbuilt security features. 
The existing prototype environment is the result of continuing work on Smart 
Card control of motor vehicles already being undertaken by Professor Watson. The 
decision to implement the developmental algorithm on a Smart <~ard links this work 
with the wider lease environment. 
This research will support ongoing research in distributed computing and 
electronic commerce and provide data about using Smart Cards in the administration 
of mobile, distributed resources. 
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2.5. Research Methodology 
The prototype environment is constrained by continuing work in Smart Card 
control of motor vehicle performance being undertaken at l~dith Cowan University. 
Consequently, the provision of a working Smart Cnrd environment reduces the need to 
construction of prototypes. 
Much broad spectrum research is already taking place in automotive, 
communication and computer systems engineering. Exploration of the lease 
environment will identify the key issues and provide a basis to develop a design for a 
Smart Card application. 
Determination of the particular requirements of the lease environment will tie 
this research into the ongoing developments of Smart Cards in Electronic Commerce. 
Owing to the choice of an unproved developmental algorithm and associated 
processes a simulation of the design is necessary befnre beginning a prototype. The 
prototype will be the basis for developing an application which may integrate all the 
important characteristics of the design. 
The goal is a Smart Card application to provide authentication, identification, 
secure communications and data logging in a distributed, mobile computing 
environment. 
2.6. Scope of Proposed Research. 
2.6.1. Introduction 
The development of an integrated system to monitor and control access and use 
is limited by the requirements of the owner and user. 
The main avenue for research is the 'Multi-user, Multi~ Level, Multi-Resource' 
aspect of administering a loan or hire arrangement. A hire company may require that 
many people drive its vehicles under differing conditions. A cleaner must be able to 
access a vehicle but not drive it, a mechanic must be able to drive and service a vehicle 
and a customer must be able to operate the vehicle freely but not have complete control 
over the vehicle and its information. 
Starting from the relationships governing the granting of access and use of a 
vehicle, investigation of the use of Smart Cards to pro\'ide access, data recording and 
integration in a real-world environment will provide information for further development. 
The Owner- User relationship may be complex and the methods used to transfer 
all or part of the owner's privileges and administer the use of a mobile resource must be 
effective. This will rely on secure recording of any data necessary to support the 
administration of an agreement. 
Existing protocols for authentication and identification deal with a substantial 
part of the work necessary and need only be evaluated in the context of the research. 
However, the granting of permissions from an owner to a user is within the scope of the 
research. The Owner must be able to grant, modify or revoke access and usage 
privileges as required. 
Research will address using a Smart Card as an authenticating artefact, a 
physical token that permits access and usage and is able to communicate details to any 
authorised party. Additionally, the provision of a basis for further development of this 
project may be useful in other areas. 
2.6.2. Smart Cards 
Access control systems with security and flexibility to handle multiple users in a 
distributed environment have become necessary due to the wide range of options 
available to the owner of a number of vehicles. This environment is characterised by 
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distributed, mobile assets with a wide range of owner cmd user expectHiions which 
include safety, economy, reliability and security. 
Smart Cards provide computing power scpuratc from the usual computer and 
monitor combination. Though the banking and fimmce industries provided initif.lt 
development of Smart Cards and defined the common format, rcf":ent developments 
make Smart Card usc possible in a wide variety of activities. 
Access control and vehicle management based on a Smart Card may provide 
flexibility to the owner and user. A single card may be used to authorise usc, record 
data, purchase needs and provide security for the Owner, User and vehicle. At present, 
the use of access control systems incorporates burglar alarms and electronic keys that 
broadcast the access code from outside a vehicle. A technique called 'sniffing' uses an 
electronic device to detect and store the access control signals that enable an 
unauthorised user to simulate an electronic key to the vehicle. 
Current solutions to this problem include the use of 'Rolling Codes', a 
cryptographic protection of the access code where each iteration is different and a 
discernible pattern is difficult to d<:tect. 
Contact-less Smart Cards with reduced broadcast radius may provide a measure 
of security. Contact Smart Cards do not broadcast data and may provide greater 
security than conventional broadcast technologies but require that the card is placed 
into a card reading system before communication occurs. Reliability is a major 
consideration in both systems and contact cards and readers must withstand physical 
wear and tear. 
2.6.3. Data Logging 
Management of a complex and demanding distributed environment will rely on 
information from the operation of the resource for use in the resolution of a usage 
agreement. 
This data includes monitoring of vehicle operating parameters as well as time 
and duration of operation, location of vehicle and name of driver. The availability of this 
range of data may complicate the administration of the agreement, for example, a 
dynamic chnrging structure where the actual usage determines the costing. 
As an alternative to the 'unlimited kilometres' in some current agreements, the 
charge can be varied where the use occurs in town or country or at high or low speed. If 
the use occurs during excessive engine operating temperatures or low oil pressures 
then the user may incur a surcharge on the agreement. 
Consequently, secure logging of vehicle operating parameters to record usage is 
important. Secure logging of data may include secure physical storage and the use of 
cryptographic or information storage techniques such as compression. 
2.7. Summary 
0 The identification of the characteristics of the agreement and the needs of the parties 
to it is essential. Data must be verifiable at all stages of the usage period and 
securely stored. 
0 Smart Cards provide portable, secure computing power in a distributed environment 
with the ability to store and process data on or off-line. 
0 With ongoing broad spectrum development in automotive engineering, systems 
integration is becoming more common. Integration enhances efficiency and sak(y 
while providing opportunities for effective administration. 
0 Secure operation without imposing arbitrary limits on a user is needed and 
simulation must address the memory requirements and necessary data. 
0 Identification or development of a suitable mode£ must address the requirements of 
Smart Cards and distributed computing. 
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3. Review of Literature 
3.1. Introduction 
The research topic is titled 'Development of a Model for Smart Card Based 
Access Control in Multi-User, Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems'. 
Smart Cards are used to provide an intelligent token. 'In access control the card 
may be employed to open the door of a secure room or to obtain information from a 
secure database.' (Longley and Shain, 1987, pl75) 
Access control is defined as 'procedures to limit entry to ... or to limit use of a 
computer/communication system or computer stored data, to authorised personnel.' 
(Longley and Shain,l987, p2) 
Multi-User indicates use or access by many different users consecutively or 
concurrently. Multi-Resource describes varied resources available to users with 
differing requirements. Multi-Level refers to different levels of permitted access or use of 
a resource which may depend on user status or other qualifiers such as time of day. 
A typical application would be the hire or lease of vehicles and the associated 
management of information where identification, authentication and secure 
transactions are important. 
Identification of all parties to an agreement is necessary to reduce the 
opportunities for fraud and ensure that any mandatory requirements are met. Identity 
is the 'condition of being a specified person '(TCOD,1977, p533) 
Authentication must address continued identification of the user of a resource, 
the nature of the transactions and the data generated. Authentication is to 'establish 
the truth or authorship or validity or genuineness of [something]'. (TCOD,1977, p63) 
A transaction is considered as a business process carried through to completion, 
for example, an agreement resulting in a lease I hire contract. 
A transaction is '1. An event which results in a record being generated or 
updated in a data proces:3ing system. 2. The record so generated. 3. A set of exchanges 
between a terminal and a central processor.' (Chandor, 1981, p173) Additionally, a 
transaction is the 'Management of business' or 'piece of especially commercial business 
done.' (TCOD, 1977, p1231) 
Secure storage of information and access details is essential to the operation of 
the system. Secure means 'Safe against attack, .... reliable, certain not to fail or give 
way' in a general sense (TCOD, 1977, p1027) More specifically 'assuring the secrecy, 
integrity and availability of components of computing systems. The three principal 
pieces are ... hardware, software and data.' {Pfleeger,l989, p19) 
The basic automotive system being examined is the 4-stroke engine with a 
proprietary electronic Engine Management Unit (EMU). 
The conceptual supervisory controller will provide information to develop the 
basis of a design for an integrated Vehicle Management Unit {VMU) using Smart Card 
technology to administer system activities. 
3.2. Derivation of Automotive Control Systems. 
Initial development of Internal Combustion Engines came from the need for 
lighter, more efficient engines or power plants for mobile equipment and existing steam 
technology. (Strandh,1979, p 139) A classification system of the various types of power 
plant shows the characteristics and relationships of engine types. (Appendix 9.2) 
The development of automatic engine control systems has produced identifiable 
types of systems. Initial systems used basic mechanical devices with a human input to 
provide feedback and control. Among the earliest examples of automatic devices were 
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mechanical steam pressure regulators to reduce 1he need for human input. 
(Strandh, 1979, p184) 
Improved pcrformnncc required increased complexity of control systems. Purely 
mechanical systems gave way to hybrid clcctro-mcchanical control systems for a more 
complex array of ancillaries. Examples of this include 'Magneto'- (Motor56, 1956, p 1 1 8) 
and conventional 'Contact Breaker'- based ignition(Motor63,1963, pSI) in petrol 
engines, electrical lighting, fuel and performance monitoring equipment and accessories 
such as the windscreen wipers and hydraulic bmkcs. 
Many of these accessories arc electrical in nature and as early as 1921 
specialised texts describing theory, operation and maintenance of these accessories 
existed (Motor56, 1956). The increasing complexity of these systems provided 
opportunities for electronics to perform the control functions. Current-switching 
transistors increased the reliability and effectiveness of the ignition by increasing the 
current through the coil while reducing current through the points.(Motor63, 1963, p6 1) 
The increasing complexity of engines and associated electronics developed into 
the computerised control systems typified by the range of fuel injection products cited in 
Gregory. The development of Engine Management Units (Bosch93,1993, pp428-477) 
shows an increasing use of electronic technology and an increasing integration of 
vehicle systems to provide a safer, more economical vehicle. 'The development of the 
automotive diesel engine is governed primarily by requirements for clean exhaust, 
improved fuel economy, and the optimisation of driveability' (Bosch94, 1994, p186) 
Compression-Ignition engines (diesels), which do not use spark ignition, may benefit 
from 'Electronic Diesel Control' (Bosch93,1993, pp501-505). 
Substantial on-board computing power is coupled with numerous, complex 
sensing systems to provide control of vehicle characteristics. Security, safety and 
comfort systems include theft deterrent systems, safety systems (air bag, seat belt 
tighteners), navigation and communication systems, electrical locking and window 
control. The development and adoption of the Controller Area Network (CAN) standard 
for data communications throughout a vehicle emphasises the importance of digital 
control systems in automotive use. (Bosch93,1993, p776-778) 
The trend is clearly toward greater integration of systems. Computerised control 
systems are expected to provide a whole Vehicle Management Unit (VMU). As future 
trends may not be readily discernible it would be expected that such systems be flexible, 
reliable and efficient to permit their widespread use. 
3.3. Engine and Vehicle Management Units 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Engine Management Units (EMU) integrate the control functions of the disparate 
components of a vehicle power unit. The development of solid-state electronics has 
made it possible to provide rugged, reliable and versatile control mechanisms for the 
engine, transmission and ancillary systems of a vehicle. 
It is expected that the EMU will acquire additional functions and become an integrated 
Vehicle Management Unit (VMU) which will provide a wide range of functions to the user 
on demand or by configuration. 
3.3.2. Engine Types 
Internal combustion engines can be divided into classes by cyclic or continuous 
combustion, auto-ignition or external ignition, diesel, hybrid or Otto-cycle type and 
heterogeneous or homogenous mixture type. (Appendix 9.2) 
The main application is the cyclic combustion type which includes Diesel, hybrid 
and Otto-cycle engines which are commonly used in motor vehicles. The most common 
is the Otto·cycle (4-stroke), spark-ignition engine using petrol as a liquid fuel, followed 
by the two or four stroke compression-ignition engine using diesel fuel. 
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3.3.3. Ancillary Systems 
Ancillary systems range from instrumentation providing information and services 
to complex interactive systems providing aiel to the operator. These systems include 
cruise control, air-conditioning, power-steering, entertainment, sun-roof, window 
\\'inding, central-locking, adjustments to scats and mirrors, adjustment to suspension 
or transmission, navigntion information and others such as Closed Circuit TV for safety 
,·_-and monitoring of opernting conditions. 
The provision of these ancillary systems has increased the complexity of the 
control and reporting task. The workload in monitoring these additional systems can 
be lessened by integration of these systems into the vehicle control systems. 
3.3.4. External Systems 
A major external system is the management system responsible for the day-to-
day accounting of the vehicle operations by the owner I user. 
Other external systems such as traffic management systems and toll systems 
(Harrop, 1994, pp31-32), while essentially stationary, require information interchange 
with the VMU. These systems may provide weather, road conditions and routing 
information, electronic toll charging, theft and illegal use monitoring. 
For example, the SafetyCam (OD97, 1 997) system is in operation in New South 
Wales where imaging technology is used to record vehicle details at locations along the 
major highways. This information is used to monitor vehicle usage and traffic offences 
where a vehicle that passes a control point too soon is deemed to be speeding. Excessive 
hours on the road can be determined making log-book fraud difficult. Additionally, 
traffic offences such as using a mobile phone while driving a vehicle can be monitored. 
External systems that communicate with a vehicle exist for electronic logging of 
vehicle movements and characteristics such as gross weight. Weigh bridges can be 
used to provide control of vehicle loads and consequently minimise damage to roads. 
3.3.5. Trends in EMU development 
The extra load placed on the driver to integrate the information from various 
sources has provided impetus to the development of integrated Vehicle Management 
systems that allow the user to select options and configurations. 
The Cadec Systems 4000P has a proprietary 'Data Bridge' which 'is a 
communications gateway designed to cost-effectively Hnk the engine, its subsystems, 
the driver and the vehicle through an onboard computer to the company's home office 
and its remote locations.' {Appendix 9.22) 
The 'Safety Alert' system from Cobra Electronics Corporation is 'designed to 
improve highway safety by automatically transmitting warning signals to the radar 
detectors of motorists within 3/4 mile of the emergency or potentially hazardous site.'' 
(Appendix 10.22) 
An On board Electronic Scale marketed by Dynacraft provides accuracy of 1% 
and is used on vehicles with pneumatic suspension. The system can determine gross, 
payload and axle group weights' (Appendix 9.22) 
SCAN 'is an ultrasonic sensory device designed to assist drivers in safely 
changing lanes, backing up or docking ... The module visibly and audibly ialerts drivers 
to obstacles within SCAN's detection zone'' (Appendix 9.22) 
Satellite communications are catered for by Qualcomm's 'Enhanced Display 
Unit for the OmniTRACS satellite mobile communications system .. Used to send and 
receive text messages' it can be used with the on-board recorder and a smart card 
readerjwriter to allow drivers to store or retrieve data. '(Appendix 9.22) 
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Satellite navigation systems with on hoard computin~ to provide guidance to the 
user and proposals have been made for stolen vehicle imrnobilisers which can be 
activated by a mobile phone link to the vehicle. (,Jorws,l C)CJS) 
Personalisation of the vehicle to suit individual prcfcrenct:s mny involve many 
semi-automatic systems such as steering wheel height, seal position etc. Additionally, 
off-the-shelf engine management units can be fitted to an cxistin& system which permit 
dynamic alteration of the engine operating parameters which may he useful in 
optimising engine performance under changmg conditions such as amhient air 
temperature. (Wolf..JD, no date) 
3.3.6. Summary 
Increasing use of electronics has lead to computerised equipment and systems 
integration to reduce the workload on the driver and improve safety and efficiency. 
Vehicle management systems routinely include interaction with ancillary and 
external systems. Integration of the systems is occurring and the necessary standards 
are being put in place. 
o Programmability permits the user to select complex functions with simple actions, 
for example, cruise control of a vehicle. Modularity is where similar functions are 
grouped together for ease of maintenance and access. 
0 Provision of safety, security and comfort functions in addition to the engine and 
vehicle management functions is already well advanced. The practicality of such 
systems may depend on clearly defined standards to permit inter-operability and 
economic use of the systems. 
3.4. Data Storage Requirements 
3.4.1. Introduction 
Administration of any system, hardware, software or paper-based, requires that 
all relevant data is stored in a suitable form to permit analysis and verification. 
Identification of the sources and types of data coupled with analysis of which data is 
necessary for record keeping will permit an estimate of the data storage required. 
Additional functions or uses of the data may become apparent leading to the 
provision of efficient or novel facilities to the owner and user. 
The need for secure transactions and data processing is evident in a distributed, 
multi-level, multi-resource environment. 'Other applications where authentication [of 
information! is important are alarm systems, satellite control systems, distributed 
control systems and systems for access control.' {PRENA,1991, p2) 
3.4.2. Engine and VMU 
The problems determining data storage requirements relate to the requirements 
of the EMU, the ancillary and external systems. The most important consideration is 
the amount of information required by external systems such as management systems 
and depends on the amount of data required and the rate at which it is stored. 
Data-transfer rate is defined as the number of bits per second where a bit is a 
'Unit of information expressed as a choice between two possibilities' (TCOD,1977, p99) 
and 'One ofthe two characters (0 and 1) used in binary notation. Also signifies the 
smallest unit of data' (Chandor,1981, p25) A byte is taken to mean eight bits. 
A sensor with 8 bit resolution can provide 256 different values. Reading this 
sensor every second provides 3600 bytes per hour. Ten sensors would provide 36000 
bytes of data for every hour of operation. During long-distance use of a vehicle with 
multiple shifts over a week the data would be approximately 5. 77 Megabytes of 
information where a Megabyte is 1048576 bytes. 
Edith Cowan University 12 
• 
• 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, 
Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Acc~o;s S.r~~cms _________ _ 
Additional data such as driver details, accommodation, meals, date and time of 
operation, location, load and fuel usc mny ~;uhstanlially incre<Jsc this value. 
The number of sensors used with a VMU would b1~ vastly incrcaHed with the 
integration of ancillary mul external systt:ms sensors. J.cgnl requirements would also 
place constraints on which data is stored for nudit, mandatory IJusinesH and t~Jxation 
records and resolution of over-weight, over-speed find over-time complaints. 
This information cannot be stored in the limited memory of existing smart cards 
and some additional storage is necessary. Existing Smart Cards may have as much as 
8 kilobytes of EEROM and 20 kilobytes of ROM. (Hendry, 1997, p106) To deal with the 
data storage requirements data compression, large capacity memory storage and remote 
reporting are considered. 
3.4.3. Data Compression 
To conserve storage space and provide some coding of information various data 
compression algorithms can be applied. 'Data compression refers to the storage of 
data in as little space as possible. ' (Lew, 1985, p300) 
Run-length encoding of data converts a string of symbols such as 
'AAABBBAABBBBB' to '3A3B2A5B' where each consecutive occurrence of the symbol 
more than twice is encoded as the count and the symbol. (Sedgwick,l990, p320) This is 
a simple compression method and is suited to periodic recording of data that does not 
change quickly. Periodic temperature monitoring can record duration and change of 
temperature by the number an.:: value of the symbols. 
More complex methods include 'Huffman Codes' which store data based on the 
frequency of occurrence of each character where the most common character is stored 
in the least bits. (Lew,l985, p355; Kruse, 1987, p453) Different series of data may be 
encoded by different Huffman codes and unless the specific Huffmann coding is 
recorded and used to decode the sequence the data may be unintelligible 
(Sedgewick, 1990, pp325 ·330). 
Additionally, an l~rroneous bit in a Huffman coded sequence may cause error 
propagation and substantial delay may occur when the data has to be uncompressed or 
corrected for evaluation. 
3.4.4. Remote Reporting 
Remote Reporting could be achieved with a dedicated transmitter / receiver 
providing periodic updates of the data to a home base during operation. (Qualcomm 
Appendix 9-22) An alternative could be a mobile phone dedicated to vehicle use which 
could be periodically used by a VMU to report to home base or even provide 'panic 
button' or accident occurrence notification to emergency services. 
The GSM - Global System for Mobile Telephony is an important standard for 
mobile telephone systems. The individual phones are identified with a Smart Card 
which functions as the Subscriber Identity Module {SIM) (Hendry,1997, pplS0-152) 
External systems such as road toll collection may need to identify the vehicle 
and driver to determine a payment method and a traffic monitoring system may impose 
a speeding fine and notify the user with a message or tone inside the vehicle. A 
consideration with the automatic assessing of charges is whether the User will dispute 
the alleged event and use the system data for arbitration. 
3,4.5. Information available from EMU 
Information available from the EMU is principally viewed as information derived 
from sensor data after processing. Normally, the information is used to alter the engine 
characteristics for efficient running under the current operating conditions and to 
update information on the various displays. 
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The semmrs for the EMU provide coolant temperature, oil pn!ssurc and 
temperature, crankshaft position, engine rotation and r:1tc (l~t~volutions per Minute · 
RPM), exhaust gas oxygen content, fuel mass, air mass and !f:mpt!rHI.urc, throttle 
position and transmission range selection. (Gregory, 1990; Bm;ch93, 1993) 
The types of data arc: 
Raw Data data from the sensors before processing (Chundor, 1981, plSO) 
Sensor Data data from the sensors after processing 
EMU Data data generated by the EMU 
Derived Data data inferred from other types of dat'l 
Raw Data is the actual output of a sensor. The sensor output may be 
inadvertently modified by the characteristics of the sensor system and care must be 
taken to ensure that monitoring this data does not alter the quality of the data provided 
to the EMU. 
Sensor Data is the data up to the input of the EMU processor and may include 
on-board signal processing and conversion from analog to digital forms. The effects of 
monitoring such data must be carefully considered as unintentional changes may affect 
the smooth running of the vehicle. 
EMU Data includes the output signals to the control and reporting devices, that 
is, fuel injector signals and information to the display system for the driver. 
Derived Data is all data that can be inferred from the previous data. It may be 
deduced from engine rotation of 5000 RPM and a road speed of 0 Kilometres per hour 
(kph) that the engine is being 'revved' in an unloaded state and this may be considered 
an abuse of the vehicle. 
It is noted that all of these information types may be used to provide diagnostic 
and maintenance support. 
3.4.6. Information available from ancillary systems 
Automated systems may use Sensor, EMU and Derived data to alter the settings 
to account for temporary changes in the operation such as air conditioning, electrical 
load (heater, blower, headlamps), power steering load, engine temperature, transmission 
and clutch status. (Gregory, 1990, p24) 
Air-conditioning system information includes whether the compressor is 
activated or the fan is being used. The loading effects of compressor operation may 
affect engine idle speed depending on the amount of cooling or heating required. 
Variations in idle speed of the engine are sensed and controlled by the EMU. 
(Bosch93,1993, p466) 
For example, cooling the vehicle while the window is open could induce a 
predetermined level of cooling until the window is shut. Derived data could be 
generated from air-conditioning system, central locking and power window controller 
data. 
Information from the braking systems may be brake application, intensity and 
duration which could provide important insight into vehicle operations. Air pressure 
values for pneumatic brakes are important to the driver and brakes failing to release 
correctly may cause inefficient operating conditions or possibly an accident. 
(Bosch93,1993, p604) 
Suspension systems provide data about the current load, usage and state of the 
vehicle. Benefits include reduced energy consumption during braking and acceleration, 
reduced fuel consumption by reducing vehicle height with increased speed and 
enhanced stability during cornering. (Bosch93, 1993,p562) 
Air bag suspension on heavy vehicles may provide data about vehicle load 
distribution across each axle and whether the suspension becomes unsafe or 
fails.(Dynacraft Appendix 9.22) 
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Transmission systems provid1~ information about the current range selected and 
road speed which is used to ndjust engine operating parameters. i\utornatic 
transmission provides 'kick-down' and cfficit.·nt running mode!i. Kick-down is the 
automatic selection of a lower transmission range to tlllotimiSI! acceleration during 
overtaking. l~fl"icicnt running includes transmission modes where for long-term high-
speed driving the lowest range is rendered inoperative to reduce the load on the engine. 
Central locking systems may indicate whether the doors are correctly closed as 
well as locked which may affect the performance of the vehicle under certain operating 
conditions. (I3osch93, 1993, p725) For example, Transpcrth buses operating in Perth 
cannot be driven with the rear passenger doo! open as the brakes arc automatically 
applied until the door is closed. 
3.4.7. Information available from external systems 
At present, external systems are not plentiful, though the range of systems is 
increasing. For example, satellite navigation systems providing •lirectional guidance to 
emergency vehicle operators can be used to relay the position of the vehicle to a control 
system. 
Identification of vehicles and loads may be automatically registered as the vehicle 
passes a control point. Additionally, some information systems may not interact with 
the vehicle, such as traffic monitoring systems that detennine speed directly (radar or 
laser) or indirectly by video surveillance systems like SafetyCam. External systems 
represent a growing aspect of the opportunities provided by technology to optimise the 
operation of motor vehicles. 
3.4.8. Operational and Environmental Considerations 
A complete specification of memory chip development would have to take into 
account all the developments to date. However, a table provides an overview of the 
principal semiconductor memory device types. (Appendix 9.3) 
The principal considerations here are the ability of the chip to survive in hostile 
environments where temperatures range from -40C for operation in an arctic 
environment such as winter in northern Canada to + 130C (Bosch93, 1993, p 114) where 
fluids from an overheated engine have leaked out. Environmental testing is already a 
standardised procedure. The 'DIN IEC 68 - Environmental testing procedures for 
electronic components and equipment' is an industry standard. {Bosch93, 1993, p350) 
Exposure of system components to vibration, dirt, petrochemicals, hot liquids, 
accelerations and tampering f abuse from the user mean that the components need to 
be designed and selected for reliability, durability and maintainability. Additionally, if 
information is used for the resolution of usage agreements, then the storage and data 
must resist degradation, intentional or unintentional and from natural or unnatural 
causes. 
With the diverse electrical environment being subject to substantial changes, the 
design and selection of the chips must allow for wide ranges of supply voltage and 
current variation as loads are switched in or out. Additionally, very high voltages up to 
30 kilovolts are available from the ignition components {Bosch93, 1993, p447) and very 
high frequencies from communications devices such as mobile telephones and radios. 
In Australia, Citizen Band (CB) radios transmit from 26.965 MegaHertz (MHz) to 
27.405 MHz in the High Frequency (HF) band and 476.425 MHz to 477.400 MHz in the 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band (Smith,l996, p238). Mobile phones and GPS 
navigation systems the UHF Band which covers from 300 MHz to 3 GigaHertz (GHz) 
(Young,l979, pl87). 
To conclude, memory for use in the hostile and rapidly changing automotive 
environment must be physically robust. The amount and type of memory needs to be 
carefully considered in the light of ancillary and external systems and legal 
requirements. 
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3.4.9. Sensor and Interface Developments 
A sensor or 'Transducer' is part of the m<~asurcm1:nt syst1=m containing 'three 
major elements: an input device, n signal conditionin~ or processing device and <m 
output device.' (Cooper and l-lclfrick,J 'JBS, p348) 
The sensor or transducer i!'l a 'Device to convert variations in one quantity into 
those of another' (TCOD, 1977, p 123 I) and more specifically 'Any device that converts fJ 
non electrical parameter, e.g. sound, pressure, or light, into electrical signals or vice 
versa.' {Young, 1979, p540) 
Interfacing of the varied sensor signals to the EMU occurs throughout the 
system and different requirements exist. The range and capability of sensor systems is 
improving and 'smart' systems usc sensors with built·in processing power coupled to a 
serial bus Controller Area Network (CAN) (Bosch93, 1993, p776). Sensors with built·in 
microprocessors providing independent signal processing are clearly described. 
(BOSCH93, 1993, p 103) 
3.4.10. Data Storage Summary 
o Sensor development and integration is required because of the amount of 
information n1~eded to dynamically alter the operation of the vehicle to meet 
changing conditions. 
0 Substantial broad spectrum development is already taking place. 
0 Integration of systems is desired for safety, economy and ease of operation 
o Suitable standards and protocols for increasing the range and abilit.y of computers 
have been considered in the development of the range of sensors which incorporate 
facilities such as error detection and handling, fault confinement and fault 
tolerance. 
o Memory chips must be selected to meet stringent environmental requirements and 
implementation of the design will require a high level of engineering skill. 
3.5. Agreements and Contracts 
3.5.1. Introduction 
A vehicle owner may permit the use of the vehicle without supervisiun in a hirejlease 
agreement which is a 'contract legally binding on parties' (TCOD, 1977, p21). The 
contract consists of 'an agreement which gives rise to legal rights and obligations 
between parties to it and which will be enforced by the courts.' (Gibson & Fraser, 1995, 
p826) 
A contract transfers some of the Owner's rights over the vehicle to the User and 
must address the potential usage. More information than the distance travelled or the 
fuel used may be needed. 
3.5.2. Explanation of Terms 
3.5.2.1. Po .. eaaion and Ownenhip 
o Possession in law primarily means physical control over a resource. 
o Ownership of a resource means the rights to exclusive enjoyment of the property. 
(Gibson & Fraser, 1995, p642) 
3.5.2.2. Identification and Authentication 
0 Identification means 'Every subject must be uniquely and convincingly identified. 
Identification is necessary so that subject/object access request(s] can be checked.' 
(Pfleeger,1989, p283) 
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0 Identification is based on something: 
~· Known -PIN number, password or some secret knowledge 
•:. Possessed - artefact containing secret knowledge such <JS a Smart Cflrtl or implying 
identity such as a uniform ~~r identification document 
-:• Inherent - physical characteristics such as finger prints 
0 Identification protocols must be reciprocal, that is, able to be used to identify all 
parties to the agreement by any one party. Computational efficiency is desirable. 
(Menezes, Van Oorschot & Vanstone, 1997, pp387-388) 
o Authentication relates to entities and information. 'l;;ntity authentication is the 
process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) 
of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has 
actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence 
is acquired.)' (Menezes et al., 1997, p386) 
0 'Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is 
corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically 
unspecified) time in the past.' (Menezes et al.,1997, p361) 
3.5.2.3. Signatures and Authorisation 
A signature links information to a particular entity and may he used to signify 
assent or acceptance of an obligation. (Appendix 9.4) 
Mitchell, Piper and Wild suggest that ~he crucial properties of a written 
signature are that it is easy to produce, easy to recognise but difficult to forge' (IEEE92, 
1992, p330) 
Digital signatures must be easy to compute, easy to verify and have an 
appropriate lifespan. (Menezes et al., 1997, p30) A digital signature must also meet the 
requirements of a written signature. 
Authorisation is the conveyance of permission to another person to do or be 
something. 
(Appendix 9.4) Authorisation to use a resource must be clearly traced from the 
owner to the person with the right to use or possess it. 
3.5.2.4. Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation means that neither party to an agreement can deny 
accountability for an agreement. (Appendix 9.4) This means that an agreement cannot 
be altered except with the consent of the parties concerned and the agreement with any 
changes can be verified by an independent party. Consequently, recording of all 
information applicable to the agreement including changes and identities is important. 
The information must be stored in a manner that resists alteration yet is still readily 
accessible. 
3.5.3. Electronic Commerce Considerations 
In the past twenty years banks and other financial institutions have come to rely 
on electronic methods of transferring funds. These methods, while efficient, must 
engender confidence in the system by the users. 
Computer crime is 'any illegal, unethical or unauthorised behaviour relating to 
the automatic processing and for the transmission of di:tta' . {De Schutter, 1991, p3) 
Electronic funds transfer has many benefits but problems fall into four 
categories: 'issues of a legal and contractual nature, consumer information problems, 
general economic problems and social problems.' (OECD, 1989, p13) 
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Major concerns t•xist about the nature of the contract or agreement between the 
issuer and user of the card as unilateral variations to contracts arc possible. 
Information gathered to administer a contract may be used for purposes which mny 
disadvantage the parties to the cuntmct. The continued possession and usc of the 
information relating to the agreement raises questions about privacy and security. 
Recommendations nddrcssing these issues have been formulated. (01~CD,l989, pp130-
136) 
Usc of encryption technologies is subject to world wide scrutiny owing to the 
possibility of crime remaining undetected. Major concerns exist in the usc of 
encryption as an aid to confidentiality of personal data contrasted with the legitimate 
concerns of the services tasked with main tenancc of law and order. {COA, 1996, p3) 
Increased availability of electronic data processing equipment coupled with 
development of strong cryptographic methods has provided data security for the large 
amounts of data generated. The development of encryption. methods may be 
summarised as 'stronger, faster, cheaper' (COA, 1996, p27) 
Smart Cards have uses in identification and authentication of information and 
transactions. Uses as part of a cryptographic system and in anonymous transactions 
are considered. (Chaum,l991) 
3.5.4. Summary 
Contracts and agreements which rely on the law for validation must be 
meaningful in a legal sense, 
a Information used to administer the agreement must be suitable and verifiable. 
D 
0 Electronic commerce must meet stringent requirements relating to the gathering and 
use of information. 
3.6. Smart Cards and their Capabilities 
3.6.1. Introduction 
Rankl & Effing describe the first patent for an integrated circuit identification 
card in 1968 by Dethloff and GrOtrupp (Rankl & Effing, 1997, p3), which preceded the 
similar application by Arimura in Japan in 1970. (Zoreda & Oton, 1994, p 36) The 
Smart Card concept, a portable computer with a reduced set of capabilities and 
interfaces, has since overcome the technical problems and matured into a practical 
technology, 
'Smart Cards may have two forms; one for a set of banking operations and the 
other, termed an intelligent token, can provide access control, perform encryption and 
authentication operations, etc. A multipurpose Smart Card for banking and financial 
transactions might perform one or more of the operations: (a) electronic chequebook; (b) 
electronic wallet; (c) electronic purse; (d) electronic token; (e) telepayment; (f) internal 
transfer; (g) access; (h) remote banking; and (i) portable file.' 
(Longley and Shain, 1987, p317) 
According to Guillou, Ugon and Quisquater. the Smart Card can perform only 
five operations: 
!. !. Input data 
2. 2. Output data 
3. 3. Read Data from Non-Volatile memory (NVM) 
4. 4. Write or Erase in NVM 
5. 5. Compute a cryptographic function 
(IEEE92, 1992, p565) 
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Using Smart Canis for vehicle control is shown hy products such as the Driver 
Card Manager marketed by VDO Kienzle (OD97, 1997) and the ATMI':L(I<:A, 1997, p30) 
system for keeping data nbout vehicles on Smart Cards. 'Many of these applications arc 
demanding more and more 'intelligence' in the embedded micro ... '(I<;A, 1997, p30) and 
applications such as road tolling and parking arc readily availablc.(J-Icndry, 1997, p205) 
The limits imposed on the card by the component technologies have hampered 
the use of the card. For example, the average memory capacity of a Smart Card is 
measured in kilobytes and the interface is serial in nature reducing the bandwidth of 
the data transfer signals. (Zoreda & Oton,1994, p12) A common clock frequency of 
3.5712 MegaHertz results in a maximum rate of446400 bits per second.{Rankl & 
Effing,l997, p411) 
3.6.2. Types of Cards 
3.6.2.1. magnetic stripe cards 
Data is encoded on a magnetic stripe on the rear of the card. The data is 
formatted into tracks which are read when the card is 'swiped' through a card reader 
and information can be written to or read from the card. {Hendry, 1997, pp35-40) 
3.6.2.2. optical cards 
A 'Write-Once, Read-Many' storage device that permits a large amount of data to 
be stored. Operations are performed by a low power laser which reads the data by 
detecting the irregularities in the optical surface and writes by burning additional 
irregularities into the surface. (Hendry,1997, p 41) 
3.6.2.3. Chip cards - memory only 
Memory-Only Cards are analogous to a floppy disk in that any data stored on 
them can only be manipulated by an external system attached to the card reader. As a 
portable data storage device they can be used to transfer and store data. For example, 
patient records in a hospital where large amounts of data for each patient are recorded. 
(Zoreda & Oton,!994, p5) 
3.6.2.4. Chip Cards -with microprocessor 
Chip Card with a programmable microprocessor for managing and access 
control of data.(Zoreda & Oton,l994, p 233; Rank! & Effing, 1997, p13) Processor 
cards are analogous to a small computer excepting that there is no internal power 
supply or display. Memory includes Read-Only Memory (ROM) which is permanent, 
Erasable Programmable ROM which is for long-term storage that may change only 
under special conditions and Random-Access Memory (RAM) for short term storage of 
working data. 
3.6.2.5. PCMCIA C&rda 
The Personal Computer Memory Card Industry Association specifies standards 
which allow small memory cards and peripheral devices to be incorporated into a card 
format. Any type of semiconductor memory may be used and the storage capacity may 
be in MegaBytes. PCMCIA cards are used to transfer data between computers. 
(Hendry ,1997, p46) 
3.6.3. Standards 
The International Standards Organisation (IS0-081) publishes standards relating 
to the design and use of Smart Cards such as : 
ISO 7810 
ISO 7811 
Identification Cards - physical characteristics 
Identification Cards- recording technique (magnetic stripe cards) 
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Identification Cards- integrated circuit canis with contacts 
Banking- PIN management and security 
ISO 7816 
ISO 9564 
ISO 10202 
ISO 10536 
Integrated Circuit Canis - Security Architecture for financial transactions 
Identification Cards -contact-less intcgmtcd circuit cards 
The Centre EuropCen pour Ia Normalisation (CI*:N) publish standards such as: 
EN726 Identification Card Systems- multi-function cards 
EN 1038 Identification Card Systems - payphones 
EN1546 Identification Card Systems- lntcrsector electronic purse. 
3.6.4. Uses 
Smart Cards may be used in many areas : identification and electronic cash for 
electronic commerce (Chaum,l991) Password authentication (Chang, Hw.mg and 
Buehrer,1993) Personal Communications security (Cooke and Brewster,1994) Multi-
function cards (Cordonnier,l991) and Cryptography (Vedder,1992; Konigs,1991) among 
others. 
Use of a Smart Card in the development of the proposal may require all these 
activities. Additional uses may be determined but the principal area of development is 
the multi-level, multi-resource, multi-access environment for vehicle hire or lease. 
3.6.5. Summary 
Consequently, the basis for the Smart Card based identification, authentication, 
authorisation and recording system is defined. Smart Cards will function as a key for 
user access to any permitted function while recording the actions and providing 
information to administer a usage contract. Additionally, Smart Cards will provide 
secure access to stored data and a basis for the development of an integrated VMU. 
3. 7. Existing Protocols for Information Transfer 
3. 7 .1. Introduction 
The development of the proposed research relies on using either existing 
_, protocols or developing a new ones to ensure that the information used is handled 
correctly. Fraud and other unwanted outcomes may result from a poorly implemented 
protocol. 
To counter this problem it is essential to use existing protocols which have been 
exposed to critical analysis and appear to have well-described characteristics. Due to 
the limited time available existing protocols will be used wherever possible as 
development and validation of a new protocol wuuld require substantial resources. 
Consequently, only the relationships between the User, Smart Card and 
Resource will be discussed. 
3.7.2. Existing Protocols and Algorithms 
This list identifies some of the existing methods. Identification of suitable 
protocols is needed. 
3.7.2.1. Identification 
IJ Feige-Fiat-Shamir 
lJ Fiat-Shamir 
o Guillou-Quisquater 
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a Schnorr {Schneier, 1996) 
3.7.2.2. Signatures 
o RSA 
D Rabin 
0 Merkle (Menezes et al., 1997 l 
' i, 
'.I 
3.7.2.3. Eh:ctronic Fund• Trana~fer 
o Secure Electronic Transfer {Whyte, 1997) 
3.7.2.4. Encryption 
o Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) 
D Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
0 Public Key 
D Stream Cipher 
3.7.2.5. Haoblng 
o MD4 
o MDS 
0 Snefru 
o RIPE-MD (Schneier, !996) 
3.7.3. Summary 
As far as practical, existing protocols will be used to minimise the amount of 
developmental work needed. 
3.8. Cryptography and Data Security 
3.8.1. Introduction 
Cryptography is a generally available and applicable method of securing data 
and granting or restricting access to a system. Confidentiality, Data Integrity, 
Authentication and Non-repudiation are the goals of cryptography. (Menezes et al.,1997, 
p4) 
Cryptographic protection must take into account the likely threat to the 
'Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability' (PRENB, 1991, p 6) of the data. A 'Cost-
Benefit' analysis should be made to determine the costs of providing protection and the 
risks and costs of any losses. (Pfleeger, 1989, p 466) 
The requirements of secure transactions in an electronic and computing 
environment are important and many texts exist addressing the requirements. 
(Schneier, 1996; Sebeny and Pieprzyk, 1989; Denning,1982) 
The design requires the use of Smart Cards to provide the User with services to 
permit the operation of vehicles in a 'multi-user, multi-level, multi-resource' 
environment. This environment must include accurate and reliable information about 
the hire f lease agreement and the actual use of the vehicle for the resolution of the 
agreement. 
Any assessment of cryptographic functions requires an understanding of 
randomness and the means of quantifying it. (Knuth, 1973, pp1-170; Lew,1985, pp266-
267) This is a complex field and will only be addressed in a manner commensurate with 
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the complexity of the design. Any assessment of the efficiency or practicality of the 
proposed system must address the operation of the system und cryptographic protection 
provided. 
3.8.2. Hardware 
Hardware systems to provide cryptologic activities arc split between dedicated 
hardware or computers and microprocessors that can be configured to perform 
cryptographic functions. The hardware systems range from small add-on items which 
apply a form of stream cipher on a data stream to dedicated, purpose-built electro-
mechanical and electronic machines. 
Configuration of a general PC to perform cryptographic functions requires 
suitable software though this may include specific add-on cards or systems. Hardware 
based Data Encryption Standard (DES) systems (Kahn, 1996, p981) are available and 
one of the main reasons for dedicated hardware is higher processing speed. Schneier 
cites a Digital Equipment Corporation prototype chip processing 1 gigabit per second 
compared with 'a software implementation of DES on an IBM 3090 mainframe can 
perform 32,000 DES encryptions per second' where each block is 64 bits and this 
equates to approximately 2.05 megabits per second. (Schneier, 1996, p278). 
3.8.3. Smart Cards 
Applications of Smart Cards to commercial enterprises such as banking employ 
a cryptographic environment readily implementable on the card itself.(Rankl & 
Effing, 1997, p66) Smart Card Standards include ISO 8372 describing cryptographic 
modes of operation, ISO 10202 describing security architecture for chip cards and ANSI 
3.92 Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) {Menezes et al., 1997, pp645- 656) This applies 
cryptographic security to transactions that can be performed off-line and remotely. 
Smart Cards exist incorporating adthmetic co-processors and algorithms for 
solving common cryptographic problems coupled with a full range of security devices. 
(Hendcy,1997, p84) 
3.8.4. Application Specific Integrated Circuits tASICs) 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits are purpose-built chips to provide 
specific complex functions. Cryptographic applications, which are by nature complex 
transformations of data, are available as ASICs. 
The United States has developed two chips to implement a national secure 
communications standard. The 'Clipper' chip is an NSA-designed, tamper-resistant 
VLSI-cl1ip designed for encrypting voice conversations; ' {Schneier, 1996, p591) 
The 'Capstone' chip includes the Skipjack algorithm in four modes, a public-
key Key Exchange algorithm, the digital signature algorithm, the Secure Hash Algorithm 
a general purpose exponentiation algorithm and a general purpose, random-number 
generator that uses a pure noise source. (Schneier, 1996, p594) 
Additionally, ASICs provide many implementations of special purpose 
controllers. (EA 1997, p 10 I ) 
3.8.5. Software 
Software for cryptographic applications can range from the simple, 'home-made' 
variety to the complex systems employed by government and big business. In the last 
20 years public debate and awareness of cryptography and the necessary techniques 
has increased. It has ceased to be the province of the military and government agencies 
and become a wide-spread adjunct to the use of modern communications devices. 
(Schneier,1996; Denning, 1982) 
Software exists to provide encryption & decryption, hashing, identification and 
authentication and other methods to carry out secure electronic transactions. A 
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selection of cryptographic software is readily available (Schneier, 1996, pp623-673) and 
may be purchased in floppy disk format quite cheaply. 
Schneier provides 30 symmetric algorithms, 3 public key algorithms, 8 one-way 
hash functions and 4 complete cryptographic systems as well as various software and 
references. Th~ references include 'Defence Trade Hcgulations', the 'DoD Orange Book' 
and the 'European Computer Security Green Book'. (Schneier, 1996, p760) 
The legal position of these methods depends wholly on the use to which they arc 
put and the country in which the activity takes place. The Aus1ralian position is set 
out in the 'Review of Policy relating to encryption technologies' published by the 
Commonwealth of Australia Attorney General's Department. (COA,J996) 
3.8.6. Algorithms 
3.8.6.1. Introduction 
Algorithms need to be selected to provide for secure data storage, data transfer 
and other functions as needed. Hashing and encryption algorithms need to be 
assessed in the context of the proposed method. 
3.8.6.2. Secure Hashing 
The hashing algorithm, MDS, is a readily available method and the availability of 
the source code complete with test data means that it can be tested in any 
implementation. (RFC1321, 1992) Rankl & Effing suggest that the minimum needed for 
an Assembly language version of a hash function would be 4 kilobytes.(Rankl & 
Effing, 1997, p84 I 
Additionally, usable MD5 software can be down-loaded from the Internet. 
(Gnomeworks, 1998) 
3.8.6.3. Electronic Funds Transfer 
The purpose of Secure Electronic Transfer (SET) is to provide confidentiality of 
information, ensure payment integrity and authenticate both merchants and 
cardholders. (SET96, 1996 p3) SET uses the RSA algorithm. 
A computationally more efficient implementation called 'LITESET' is being 
developed. 
(Hanaoka, Zheng & Imai, 1998) 
3.8.6.4. Lease Agreemea.t 
This is to be developed to implement the proposed simulation project. It is a 
simple exchange of authentication, identification and transaction details coupled with 
an electronic signature or validation. 
3.8.7. Summary 
IJ Cl)'ptography is a readily available and cost effective method of securing 
:- i information. 
IJ Cryptographic functions can be implemented on Smart Cards. Smart Cards can be 
used as a component of a cryptographic system. 
IJ Legal restrictions may apply on the use of cryptography and associated materials. 
IJ Verification of algorithms is essential to the ongoing development of the 
developmental algorithm 
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3.9. Summary of Literature Search 
o Substantial broad spectrum development is already taking place. 
o The trend is toward greater safety and efficiency of vehicle usc by increasing the 
number and capabilities of the microcomputers in a vehicle. 
o Safety and security arc of great importance. Safety in operations and security in the 
data transfer and administration of the vehicle requirements. 
o Integration of the desired and necessary systems is proceeding but appears to be 
piecemeal. A clear integration and development regime is needed and currently 
standards are being put in place to ensure inter-operability 
o Multiple function Smart Cards are being developed. 
o Any algorithm used in the proposed environment will need to be verified before use. 
Verification may lead to certification. 
0 A single card implementing all the necessary functions to control a vehicle in a 
distributed environment is not currently available. 
3.10. Research Questions 
3.10.1. Introduction 
As a result of the literature search it is apparent that there is a need for an 
integration of some of the themes inherent in Smart Card based access to vehicles. 
Broadly speaking, the opportunity for a secure, multi-function card to control all access 
is evident. These questions are quite broad in their scope and the subsidiary issues 
and conclusions are covered in Section 7.3 of the thesis. 
3.10.2. Questions 
1. What are the characteristics of aM Users, N Resources, P level access environment 
and which authentication model, if any, could effectively represent this relationship 
in a real-time, distributed computing environment? 
2. Investigation into the requirements of authentication and digital signatures to 
determine the technical considerations that may have a bearing on the security of 
the proposed model? 
3. What requirements are necessary for untamperable electronic data storage for short 
and long term storage to assist in resolution of disputes in the transaction cycle? 
4. What data from the operation of a prototype is of importance in effecting the 
proposal and which security issues need to be addressed? 
4. Overview of System Design 
4.1. Introduction 
Developing a practical design requires an understanding of the Smart Card 
development process coupled with electronic, automotive and software engineering, 
systems design and analysis of the information transactions. The most immediate 
limitations are memory storage requirements and the rate at which information can be 
stored and transferred through the system. 
An estimate of memory storage requirements depends on the actual hardware 
configuration. Listing all the sources of information that a system might use and the 
information transfer rates can be used to estimate the system characteristics. 
Transactions are any operations involving the transfer of data within the design 
and characterise the uses of the system. 
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4.2. Initial Hardware Design Of Complete System 
In figure 4-1, the Engine Management Unit (EMU) uses microcomputer 
technology to control the engine and transmission. The EMU processes information 
from the sensors on the engine and transmission to determine the necessary fuel 
quantities and ignition timing to achieve efficient usc while responding to changing user 
needs. 
The proposed Supervisor Unit (SU) is required to supervise the EMU and process 
the additional information necessary to administer the use of the vehicle. It is 
expected that the roles of the EMU and SU will merge and all activities affecting vehicle 
usa e will be controlled bv the Vehicle Mana ement Unit VMU . 
Ancillary 
+--> Supervisor Unit Smart Smart Systems Authentication ___, Card 4--ol Card 
/' ldcntilication Reader 
1 EMu r Constraints 
/I Secure Data-logging External L Engine Trans. / Systems 
Figure 4-1 Schematic of Complete System 
A secure environment is needed to store user identification and associated 
constraints, vehicle usage and authentication of transactions to assist in administering 
the usage agreement. 
Ancillary systems are part of the vehicle controlled by the VMU and include 
comfort, safety, security and convenience systems. External systems which interact 
with the VMU may include traffic management systems, toll collecting systems, satellite 
navigation and emergency vehicle systems. 
The detailed design of the VMU will not be addressed within this project as the 
design of a Smart Card system addresses many of the main requirements which include 
secure access to the VMU and its information. 
Smart Cards for use in the design may have as little as 2 kilobytes and as much 
as 20 kilobytes of data storage. (Hendry,l997, p106) The data transfer rate with a 
Smart Card is limited by the implementation and this can be as low as 9600 Baud, 
where one Baud is equal to one data bit per second. A fundamental clock frequency of 
up to 5 Megahertz is expected but this is modified by the Elementary Time Unit and 
other time units defined in the applicable standard. (Zoreda & Oton, 1994, p 78) 
A complex VMU will have multiple data flows and the data transfer rates are 
limited by component technologies and external implementations. 
Memory on the VMU can store substantial amounts of data but the data must be 
communicated to some user system. An alternative to the slow rate of transfer in the 
Smart Card is to use the greater transfer rate of a mobile phone and modem to 
communicate between the VMU and a remote base station. The use of the Mobile phone 
and Modem will not be addressed in this design. 
4.2.1. ~ennory Storage 
Alternatives to the use of custom made components to implement the proposed 
system include a Motorola 68hcll microcontroller with up to lMbyte of external flash 
memory which has excellent power-off memory retention. (Hands, 1997) Articles in 
commercially available magazines also address the issue of adding memory to micro-
controllers.(Sibigtroth, 1997) 
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4.2.2. Prototype Hardware Basis 
A prototype system can be developed on a Personal Computer (PC). A card~sizcd 
PC provides a 50 megahertz 486 processor and all the facilities to perform the on-board 
supervisory functions and administer the ancillary and external systems. This option 
allows software to be written in a high level language and permits rapid development of 
the system on standard computers and compilers. (OK! DATA, 1997) 
The initial prototype configuration would be a PC without peripherals such as a 
hard disk drive, floppy disk drive or even a monitor. The initialisation of the system will 
be from the onboard Basic Input Output System (BIOS) and a program stored in non-
volatile memory. The data storage requirements would be a non-volatile, re-writablc 
memory component such as flash memory. 
Alternatively, solid-state disc drives are available to permit almost normal 
operation of a PC based prototype for the VMU (Circuit Cellar , 1997, p36). 
The data handling can be simplified by using a serial data bus which will reduce 
the amount of wiring necessary to install the system. Flash memory with serial 
Input/Output (I/0) is available (Cantrell, 1997) from Nexcom and offers 4 or 8 Megabit 
Chips with substantial write protection to prevent data errors. 
4.2.3. Prototype Software Basis 
A software simulation of the design will help determine the necessary data to be 
processed to meet design objectives. The principal component of the system is the 
Smart Card which is expected to provide a User with secure access to the system. 
Additionally, the Smart Card may be used to provide additional functions relating to the 
operation of the Vehicle in a distributed, Multi-user, Multi-resource, Multi-level 
environment. 
4.3. Analysis of a Transaction 
4.3.1. Limitations 
Identification of the parties to an agreement is outside the scope of the research. 
It is, however, covered by existing protocols. The most common method used to 
identify a person requires documentary evidence such as a Driver's Licence with some 
form of picture and address details, a birth certificate or official document such as a 
passport. 
Transfer of funds in a distributed environment is covered by existing protocols 
such as Secure Electronic Transactions (Whyte, 1997). 
Consequently, identification of the Smart Card and storage of its details together 
with the transactions necessary will be covered. 
The Entity Relationship diagrams describing the relationships are included in 
the Appendix 10.6. 
4.3.2. Description of a Possible Agreement Structure 
Generally, Person A and Person B negotiate some type of agreement which may 
be informal or formal. An informal agreement may be a short-term loan and a formal 
agreement may need a written contract to make it valid or enforceable. 
Any agreement may need to be evaluated to ensure that it is complete, binding 
and meaningful The agreement may need to be authenticated to a third party, 
Authentication must ensure that the agreement record is not changed except by mutual 
consent of all the parties and the changes cannot be concealed from an auditor. The 
assumption is that any or all of the parties to the agreement may not be honest and an 
observer may not be well-intentioned or accurate. 
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In figure 4.2, Person A and Person B intend to agree about the usc: of a resource 
in the custody of Person A and an agreement listing the permitted options and 
obligations is drmvn up. 
Should B attempt to ~vade responsibility for usc of the resource hy claiming that 
A has unilaterally altered the contract then A relics on a copy of the contmct signed by 
8, and an independent witness, C, who is acceptable to both A and 13. 
Authentication of the agreement between A and 13 involves examining the 
signatures of both parties and the credentials and identity of C who is expected to give 
b. d I rd· f I d . an un mse report on t ·,~ va 1 1tY o t 1e agreement an stgnaturcs. 
-" Agreement' J -( 0 /'-..... I II] ) 
T IDA ri Hash' 
__ __1 I Agreement 1- Hash 1----- - - Authentication L 
J.. IDB ..--. 0Y y@]) 
-
"--
Figure 4-2 Agreement and False Agreement Schematic 
Should A or 8 conspire with C to act against the other party, C relies on an 
unblemished reputation to support the acceptance of an 'unbiased' opinion. The 
malpractice is effected by claiming to D, an arbiter, that if Cis reliable then so is the 
person supported by C. Person Dis defined as an independent arbiter, such as a court 
of law. 
A problem exists if either party has a means of substituting a different hash 
value during the signing of the agreement. If a hash value from a different agreement is 
substituted then fraud is possible. If it can be demonstrated that the agreement has 
been falsified it may be possible to seek compensation or void the agreement. 
One method of addressing this issue is to take a secure hash value of the 
agreement and store it as a witness when the validity of the agreement is doubted. 
Should A and 8 separately keep this information it can be used to prove that the 
agreement has not been altered by either party. 
A secure hash function takes a digital representation of a document and 
subjects it to an algorithmic process to produce a much shorter digital representation, 
typically 128 bits. Desirable properties of the secure hash algorithm are 'one to one', 
'one-way' and simple processing. The process is 'one-to-one' if any two different 
documents will never produce the same hash sequence. The output sequence is a 'one-
way' function of the input sequence when, while easy to compute, it is computationally 
infeasible to reverse the algorithm to determine the input sequence. 
An electronic signature is a binary sequence that is legally accepted as 
representing the assent and identity of a person in a transaction. Methods of obtaining 
an electronic identification sequence exist but rely on the initial identification being 
performed subject to meeting certain conditions. Methods of initially determining the 
identity rely on existing documents such as a Driver's Licence with a recent picture or 
birth certificate. 
In figure 4.3, an acceptable agreement is hashed to provide a hash sequence. 
This hash sequence is used to stimulate the individual Smart Cards to obtain an output 
sequence which is used as a signature. These signatures and the serial numbers of the 
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Smart Cards arc appe~ded to the agreement and it is hashed again. The final hash 
value generated is retained by the parties to the agrccmcnl. 
If the signatures are incorporated into the agreement and hashed without a 
copy of the signature being kept then it becomes harder to alter the agreement and still 
find an acceptable hash value. Comparing the agreement hash value and the signed 
agreement hash value may reveal some information about the agreement and the 
hashing process when the change (signature) is known. 
A party may be able to re-create the agreement hash value, personal signature 
value and the final hash value and usc this information to determine the signature of 
the other party. This information may be used to reconstruct the signature algorithm 
use dbthh fl b d oy e ot er partv to permtt a a se stgnature to e generate . 
I Agrccmcm _ J 
l 
L H"h Mothod I 
I Smart Card I t" ~ Smart C"d 2 I 
~ 
------Contract 
+ Signature I +Serial I 
+ Signature 2 + Serial 2 
l 
I Hash Method_] 
l 
Hash Value 
Figure 4-3 Signature Proce•• 
All parties to the agreement must be able to verify the hash value produced. A 
standard hash method can be chosen in the terms of the agreement and all parties can 
then obtain their own copy from different certified sources. Each party can then use it 
to verify the agreement before signing and this can detect the substitution of misleading 
hash values in the transaction. 
When a copy of the digital signature of each party to the agreement, including 
the witnesses, is included in the agreement and hashed, the hash value should show if 
even a single character of the agreement had been altered. A commonly available 
method might be MDS, a secure hash function from R Rivest that has been available 
since 1992. (RFC1321, 1992) 
4.3.3. Validation of a Communication between Parties 
Communication between remote parties requires identification which can be 
achieved by possession of some specific piece of information. A password is a subjective 
identity check where its possession implies approval. Unauthorised possession of the 
password confers access to the system and security requires a series of different 
passwords that can be used once and discarded. 
Bilateral identity checks using a symmetric cryptographic method requires that 
each party has the same key information and algorithm to successfully decrypt a 
message to prove their subjective identity. 'Symmetric algorithms ... are algorithms 
where the encryption key and the decryption key are the same ..... As long as the 
communication needs to remain secret, the key must remain secret.' (Schneier,1996, 
p4) Distribution of the key information is a substantial problem in managing a 
symmetric cipher system. (Schneier ,1996, p 177) 
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Ir all parties share secret information then identification is implicit in the ability 
to answer questions about the secret information. 
Identity validation could result from the interrogator asking a question about the 
secret information at random without knowing the answer beforehand. The respondent 
must supply the answer to the question and the interrogator then generates the correct 
answer from the secret information and compares the two answers. 
If the interrogator docs not know the answer beforehand it is more difficult to 
detect the answer by illegal or unauthorised means. The process must be secure 
against guessing the answer to a question from knowing previous questions and 
answers. Ir the questions are generated by a random sequence it may be very difficult 
to predict the questions and answer them. 
Continuous validation of the communication can be made by periodically 
interrogating the respondent about the secret information to detect substitution. For 
example, after a remote logwin to a computer system is made the legitimate user is 
disconnected and access is assumed by an unauthorised user. The legitimate user may 
accept this event as a normal system error and not report the problem for some time. 
4.3.4. Design Requirements 
A design is proposed in figure 4A where the Smart Card is configured as a 'anew 
towone' function generator which provides a unique binary sequence in response to any 
unique sequence being supplied to it. This would permit each Smart Card to be used 
as a signature generator after being assigned to a person or corporation by any 
acce table means. 
[X Function Generator 
f(X) 
Figure 4-4 Schematic of Propo•ed Function Generator 
X' I 
To enable a transaction to be remotely validated a copy of the randomiser details 
on the Smart Card must be kept. A company that issues a Smart Card must keep a 
copy of the randomiser and selection algorithms for each unique card. Families of cards 
using the same selection algorithms and f or randomisers can be created to reduce 
storage requirements. 
External storage requirements may be as little as two kilobytes per card which 
would require approximately 2 Gigabytes for a population of one million cards. 
However, supporting data may raise this value substantially. 
4.4. Proposed Implementation of a Smart Card Function 
Generator 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The Smart Card function generator must generate a binary sequence output in 
response to a binary sequence input. The function must be complex and difficult to 
predict to provide a measure of security to the information processed. 
There is no requirement for an input sequence and output sequence to be of the 
same length. The function must be 'onewtowone' where each unique input sequence 
produces a unique output sequence. 
This requires that the output sequence is equal to or greater than the length of 
the input sequence and the algorithm is thoroughly validated wherever possible. An 
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exhaustive search is likely to be computationally infeasible and certification must rely 
on mathematical proof. 
4.4.2. Description of method. 
The Randomiser is a random binary sequence stored in a circular buffer able to 
be accessed at any point and traversed in either direction. 
In figure 4.5 the Selection Method specifies a Start Point in the circular buffer to 
select the first bit and a Selection Set of integers to specify the number of bits to move 
or discard between each subsequent selection. 
A positive value for the move or discard number specifies movement in one 
direction and a ne ative values ecifies the o osite direction. 
l1. Start Poind 
Figure 4-5 Schematic of Selection Method 
{I"SCicct I bit I 
3. Discard 2 bits 
or move 3 bits 
4. Select I 
A Start Point value greater than the size of the buffer bits will be constrained by 
the modulo division of the Start Point by the size of the buffer. Consequently, there 
are many ways of specifying the same starting bit. The move or discard values in the 
Selection Set are also constrained by the length of the buffer. 
While permitting an infinite number of ways of specifying the selection of the 
next bit, there is a limit on the number of unique sequences that may be chosen. With 
the constraint that no bit in the buffer is ever used twice in each sequence, the size of 
the problem reduces to the number of combinations of bits taken from the buffer 
without replacement. 
This is achieved by ensuring that the total number of bits selected or discarded 
is less than the length of the buffer and the direction of buffer traversal is never 
reversed. Under these conditions no bit is used twice but the option exists as desired. 
With these conditions, the maximum number of Sequences, C, is a simple 
combination of n bits taken from N Randomiser bits and is specified by 
C ~ N! 
n!(N- n)! 
Equation 4·1 
A combination is defined as an unordered multiset without repetition 
(LEW,l985, p46) 
If it is intended that any bit may be reused by the Selection Method then the 
number of sequences is much larger as this amounts to selection with repetition. The 
number of selections, S, of n bits from N bits is specified by 
S ~ (N +n-1)! 
n!(N -I)! 
Equation 4-2 
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A selection is defined as an unordered multiset with repetition. (I..ew,l985, 
p264) 
Localised non-randomness in a sequence is defined as any sub-sequence that is 
strongly patterned. For example, taken in isolation, the sequence '0101010101010' 
appears predictable and the sequence '101101000000000000101' appears to have an 
atypical sequence of zeros in the centre while the other sub-sequences appear to he 
'101'. 
It is expected that while each sample taken from a population may exhibit 
localised non-randomnes:;; the characteristics of a large number of samples will exhibit 
the characteristics, as a group, of the population. For example, taking samples of 4 
bits from a random population, the sequence '0000' should occur approximately once 
every 16 samples. 
The statistical concept of the 'Law of Large Numbers' describes where the 
characteristics of a group of samples will tend to be similar to the characteristics of the 
population as the number of samples increases. 
Briefly, the Law of Large Numbers can be described as 
"For example, the act may be flipping a symmetrical coin, A may be the 
event "heads", and it is assumed that the probability of heads, 1/2, is the same 
from one flip to next. It is also assumed that every trial is independent of(in no 
way affected by) every other trial. Now after n trials of the act, the proportion of 
times A has occu"ed is p. It can be proved (the proof is so difficult there is no 
point presenting it here) that p gets closer and closer to P(A) as n becomes larger 
and larger. We can make the proportion of times A occurs as close as we want to 
P(A), the probability calculated from the sample space, by performing the act 
enough times. So P{A) tells what will happen in the long run if we actually 
performed the actions under the conditions laid down above." (Glass & 
Stan1ey,1979, p202) 
To ensure a thorough distribution of the samples, the Start Points should be 
uniformly distributed across the randomiser interval and the Selection Sets should vary 
in size and content to ensure that all bits are usable. 
4.4.3. Constraint on Generating All Possible Sequences 
Analysis shows that the largest number of unique samples from the population 
is a simple combination of Sample bits from Peculation bits. 
Combinations of Size n taken from population of N Uniaue Seos 
Sample N 2000 N 4000 N- 10000 2" 
n- 128 1.3986 * 10205 3.857 * 10244 8.1243 * 10295 3.4028 * 1038 
n• 256 5.2468 * 10330 3.734 * 10411 3.0654 * 10515 5.2468 k 1077 
Table 4-1 Number of Combinations compared against unique sequences 
In Table 4.1, the number of combinations of n bits from N is substantially 
greater than the numb~r of unique n bit sequences specified in binary, which is given by 
the limit, 2n. 
Consequently, the total number of bits, T, to be examined would be the number 
of combinations, C, multiplied by the number of bits, n, in the sample. 
T=Cxn 
Equation 4-3 
The composition of the population may mean that repetitions of some binary 
sequences occur and it is considered computationally infeasible to enumerate all the 
samples or calculate simple statistics such as a frequency distribution for any 
reasonable size population. 
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4.4.4. Brcmcrmann 's Limit 
Enumeration of all the possible samples from any reasonable size population 
becomes infeasible owing to the amount of bits to be examined. McNeil and Freiberger 
cite 'Bremcrmann's Limit' which can be used as an approximation of the magnitude of 
the task. 
Relying on quantum theory, he JBremermann] first determined how much 
information the most efficient computer imaginable could process each second. He 
found that, for each gram of mass, no data processing system - brain, machine, 
anything- could handle more than twice ton bits per '-.~cond. 
He tl1en asked, "What if a computer were as big as the earth, and it had 
laboured on a single problem since the earth was born? How many bits could it 
processr His answer was 1 09J , usually called Bremermann 's Limit It is a 
huge figure -
1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~ooa~~~ 
000,000,000, 000,000,000, 001), 000,000,000,000,000,000,000. (McNeil and 
Freiberger, 1993, p166J 
Representing this number in a binary form: 
lo~ (Bremermann's Limit) = 
lo~ {Bremermann 's Limit) = 
log2 (Bremermann 's Limit) = 
log10(1 * 10 93) J log10(2) 
93 1 0.301029995 
308.9393128 
Consequently, enumeration of all possible binary sequences is infeasible as 
Bremermann's limit of 1Q93 can be approximated by 2309 . 
4.4.5. Distribution of Samples. 
Every unique combination froin a population can be enumerated by the decimal 
equivalent of the symbols selected. 
In Table 4.2 showing a three bit sequence !A,B,C) there is one way of taking no 
symbols, three ways of taking one symbol, three ways of tal< j t\\'0 symbols and one 
way of taking three symbols. Each sample can be indexed by the three bit binary 
sequence from 0 to 7 where each '1' in the sequence identifies the bit selected. 
Tallying each sample by its decimal value to determine the dis\:·ibution of the 
combinations will characterise a population. Using a population of six bits with a 
sample of three bits yields 20 different three bit sequences (from equation 4.1) and these 
samples can be tallied by their binary values from 0 to 7. 
In Table 4-3, the resulting totals of each sequence characterise the population. 
To specify all the possible randomisers (26) and the possible sequences (20) would mean 
that 1280 possible 3 bit sequences must be enumerated. This can be specified by the 
pair (I,J) where I is the decimal value of the population and J is the decimal value of the 
sample. The range and domain of these pairs can be arranged in an array where the 
Index 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Binary 
000 
001 
0 I 0 
0 I 1 
100 
I 0 1 
I 1 0 
I I I 
Sample 
--C 
-8-
-BC 
A--
A-C 
AS-
ABC 
Table 4·2 Enumeration of Samples 
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elemf!nts are the tally of each sample. 
A-population of '000000' would produce 20 sequences of '000' and could be described as 
(0,0) = 20. A mixed sequence of 1 'sand O's would produce a different distribution. 
There is an apparent symmetry about the horizontal and vertical axes which 
would reduce the amount of work in characterising the array. 
Decimal Value 0 I 2 3 4 5 
Value Binary 000 001 010 0 II 100 101 
0 000000 20 0 0 0 0 0 
I 000001 10 10 0 0 0 0 
2 000010 10 6 4 0 0 0 
3 000011 4 12 0 4 0 0 
4 000100 10 3 6 0 I 0 
". ... ". ". .. . ... ". ". 
61 111101 0 0 0 0 0 4 
62 111110 0 0 0 0 0 0 
63 111111 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4-3 Characterisation of a Sample Space (64,8) 
The number of cells in the array is calculated by : 
A= Columns X Rows= 2 N ~ n 
Equation 4-4 
6 7 
110 Ill 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
... ". 
6 10 
10 10 
0 20 
where N "' number of possible unique sequences and n = number of bits 
sampled. 
In equation 4.4, the number of all possible sequences, A, is increases 
exponentially for linear increase in the size of the population or sample. Consequently, 
analysis of large sequences becomes impractical for any reasonable value of N. 
4.4.6. Summary 
a The proposed method offers ease of use and space efficiency as advantages 
compared to the existing methods. Additionally, the running speed of the 
application is considered to be faster than existing block cipher methods and 
comparable to existing stream cipher methods. 
a Starting with the theoretical 'Provably-Secure Strongly Randomised Cipher' 
(Maurer90) and developmental work (Shaw, 1993). The implementation of the 
proposed method addresses the recommendations (Maurer,l990, p372) relating to 
broadcasting the randomiser and the difficulty of selecting the bits. 
a While the theoretical method is provably secure under certain constraints, the 
proposed method is provably secure under one constraint only. The constraint is 
single use of the randomiser which ensures that the proposed method meets the 
requirements of a 'One-Time Pad'. However, multiple use of the proposed method 
may be conditionally secure and evaluation of this is beyond the scope of the 
research. 
a Additionally, the theoretical method requires a very large randomiser which is 
difficult to store and transport.(Menezes et al., 1997, p170) 
a The precise description of both methods is covered in the next chapter. 
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4.5. Construction of Randomisers. 
4.5.1. Introduction 
The size of randomiscr required by the theoretical method is of the order of I * 
IQH bits and algorithmic generation from a smaller sequence may, under certain 
conditions, be indistinguishable from a complete randomiser produced by a random 
process. 
Non-deterministic sequences cannot be generated a second time even with 
identical generator setup conditions. Generally, the sequence must be retained and 
copied as needed which imposes storage and transport constraints on the user. Non-
deterministic methods are generally based on physical phenomena. 
Deterministic sequences are able to be repeated with the same initial setup 
conditions. 
Consequently they can be reproduced by specifying the algorithm and the setup 
conditions and are economical to transport and store. 
Generation of deterministic sequences include hardware, software and biometric 
methods. 
4.5.2. Non-Deterministic Construction 
Methods of generating random binary squences in a non-deterministic fashion 
are generally based on physical phenomena. 
Examples include: 
1. elapsed time between emission of particles during radioactive decay; 
2. thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor; 
3. frequency instability of a free running oscillator; 
4. the amount a metal insulator semiconductor is charged during a flXed period of 
time; 
5. air turbulence within a sealed disk drive which causes random fluctuations in disk 
drive sector read latency times; and 
6. sound from a microphone or video input from a camera 
(Menezes et al.,l997, pl72) 
Thermal noise is a form of white noise that is caused by the random thermal 
agitation of electrons in resistive components.(Young, 1979, p 342) Bassein describes 
an electron noise amplifier that is economical and simple to construct. (Bassein, 1996, 
p489) Another noise generator can be made by configuring a serial port on a PC and 
connecting to it a simple circuit that samples the noise input from a radio. (Appendix 
9.7) Additionally, a circuit to sample 256 values through a PC parallel port is readily 
implementable when connected to a suitable random source. (EA, 1997, pSI) 
'Sampling diode shot noise' and time between decay of radioactive particles can 
be used as well as the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) implementation of a Metal 
Insulator Semiconductor Capacitor. Comparison of the charge between two capacitors 
can produce a random result. (Agnew ,1987, pp77 -81) 
However, small random sequences up to 1000 bits can be produced by methods 
such as Keystroke timings, hardware functions and cryptographic conversion. 
(Roberts,l995, pi OS) 
4.5.3. Deterministic Construction 
Deterministic methods include hardware, software and hybrid systems. 
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Hardware methods include the Linear Feedback Shift Hcgi:-;ters (LFSRs) which 
are described (Schneier, 1996, pp369-379) and analy!>cd. (Barker, 1984) Variations on 
the theme nrc described by Schneier (Schneier, 1996, pp380-388 ; Zcng <!l al., 1991, p8-
16) 
Softwan• Methods include Linear Congruence Generators and implementations 
of a LFSR. (Knuth,1973, pp9-25; Schncicr,l996, pp369-362) 
Processes upon which software random bit generators may be based include: 
1. the system clock; 
2. elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movement; 
3. content of input/output buffers; 
4. user input; and 
5. operating system values such as system load and network statistics. 
{Menezes et al.,1997, p 172) 
Many deterministic methods are cyclic in that the output sequence is likely to 
repeat during a long run. The length of the cycle is an important characteristic in 
measuring the performance of a pseudo-random sequence generator. 
Methods of 'De-Skewing' the sequence can include applying a secure hash 
function to pseudo-random sequences to 'distil the (true) random bits from the sampled 
sequences.' (Menezes et al.,1997, p172) 
4.5.4. Hybrid Construction 
The proposed method is a hybrid which is not as space efficient as deterministic 
methods but has the advantage of being able to generate and store very large sequences. 
The use of random sequences rotated according to some simple algorithm may be 
indistinguishable from a sequence generated from a random process under some 
circumstances. 
An operation, ROT{), rotates a sequence of symbols without loss of data and is 
used to generate deterministic changes. With a Basic Sequence of '123', ROT(l) gives 
'231', ROT{-1) on '231' gives '123' and ROT{3) on '123' gives '123'which is identical to 
ROT( D). 
The three unique sequences, 123-231-312 (enumerated from 0 to 2), are 
concatenated into a Complete Composite Sequence containing one example of every 
rotation. Concatenation of these sequences can be performed 3! or six ways and each 
Complete Composite Sequence can be concatenated to produce a much larger sequence. 
The rotation operation preserves some characteristics of the Basic Sequence. If 
P(O) denotes the probability of obtaining a zero for any one bit sample of the Basic 
Sequence then P(O) is the same for the Rotated Basic and Composite Sequence. 
A concern would be whether it is practical to determine the Basic Sequence and 
rotation order to permit the reconstruction of the complete randomiser. Two methods 
are practical : inspection and analysis. 
Inspection detects obvious similarities by simple observation and is limited by 
the characteristics of the observer. It may be impractical to monitor 1000 bit 
subsequences in a larger sequence. Analysis is any method that applies an algorithm 
which produces a result for evaluation. For example, statistical analysis of sequence 
characteristics or a specific algorithm that halts on a valid solution. 
If a contiguous sequence of bits is selected from the Composite Sequence then 
there may be enough information to determine the Basic Sequence, however, selecting 
individual bits widely dispersed throughout the Complete Composite Sequence may 
make this difficult. 
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If an incomplete Composite Sequence is analysed, the JJH.sic Sequence and 
rotation sequence may not be readily determined and it may be impractical to 
determine by inspection or analysis \\'hethcr the sequence is Handom or Composite 
The randomiscr may be constructed for complexity with more than one Basic 
Sequence, rotated according to a predetermined selection of values to make analysis 
more complex. For example, using sequences of different length denoted by A,B,C ... ,z 
a Complex Composite Sequence can be described as Al7, Zl:l3, B6 ... Y19. 
A Complete Composite Sequence created with this method could meet Maurer's 
stated requirements \Vith a Basic Sequence of 1 • 10 11 bits or 1.25 • ww bytes. The 
information necessary to construct this randomiser is the Basic Sequence and the 
sequence of numbers identifying the order and rotation of the concatenation operation 
and this information is much smaller than the Complete Composite Sequence. 
A concise description of the method is covered in chapter 5. 
4.5.5. Summary 
0 Randomisers may be of deterministic, non-deterministic or hybrid construction. 
0 Construction of very large randomisers raises difficult generation, storage, search 
and transport issues. 
a A deterministic generator must produce output sequences that are indistinguishable 
from non-deterministic sequences. 
4.6. Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials 
4.6.1. Introduction 
Initially, the generation of large exponential and factorial numbers provided an 
understanding of the accuracy achievable when dealing with very large numbers of the 
order of 1Q30o, However, being able to specify and generate a large sequence of digits 
was of some use in implementing the developmental algorithm. For example, in 
appendix 11.8, 21000 = 
107150860718626732094842504906000181056140481170553360744375038837035 
105112493612249319837881569585812759467291755314682518714528569231404 
359845775746985748039345677748242309854210746050623711418779541821530 
464749835819412673987675591655439460770629145711964776865421676604298 
31652624386837205668069376. 
These sequences provide long but easily specified sequences of digits for use in 
selection algorithms 
The calculation of factorial numbers constitutes some challenges due to the 
exponential nature of the numbers produced and the errors occurring due to the nature 
of the calculations. 
Operations using logarithms may underestimate the number due to truncation 
caused by the method of generating the logarithms. For example, log 10 10 is 1 exactly, 
but, logiO n is irrational as n is irrational and any representation of n will incompletely 
estimate it. However, where n is the basic unit in which all other quantities are 
expressed any gain in accuracy may be lost in converting to other units. For example, 
ro = 21t is more precise than the decimal notation w = 6.28318. 
4.6.2. Methods Used 
Three methods of calculating large factorial numbers were considered. 
Calculations use Stirling's Approximation to Large Factorials, computer based 
sequential addition of logarithms and integer methods. 
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4.6.2.1. Calculation using Stirling's Approximation : 
Stirling's Method of calculating large factorials is a well known method in usc for 
many years. (Spiegel, 1972, p 114) 
Nlz ../2 llN*N"•e-" 
Equation 4-5 
log N!~ 1/2 log(2 N)+ 1/2 log(ll)+ N log N - N loge 
Equation 4-6 
A logarithm of an irrational number is a source of round-off errors. All 
logarithms are real numbers excepting the comparatively few integer logarithms. Unless 
the exact logarithmic value for a number is calculated and used, any calculation relying 
on logarithms may not estimate the correct result owing to 'rounding errors' or 
truncation. 
4.6.2.2. Calculation using Sequential Addition of Logarithms: 
Sequential addition of logarithms uses the additive properties of logarithms to 
perform the multiplications. The calculation model is 
N 
log N!~ L log i 
i=l 
Equation 4-7 
Addition of logarithms avoids the problems of multiplying real numbers and is 
relatively fast. The largest number able to be calculated is limited by the integer 
component of the logarithmic sum. For example, the logarithm 1234.56 evaluates to 
3.6307 * 1Qil34 and in 32 bit numbers, the largest exponent would be 232 -1 and 
consequently, the largest number that can be calculated by this method is 
approximately 9.9 * 1Q42949&7295 
Logarithms generated by software methods are subject to errors and to extend 
the accuracy of the calculations more accurate logarithmic values are needed. 
Generation of logarithms requires the use of the geometric mean which needs a square 
root function and may give results with limited precision due to the nature of 
calculating the square root. 
4.6.2.3. Calculation of Logarithms 
The algorithm for generating a logarithm of a number (McLeish, 1991, ppl71~ 
173) is 
D Start with any two numbers and their known logarithms 
D For a new and unknown logarithm, work out the arithmetic mean of the two earlier 
logarithms 
D For the unknown number work out the geometric mean of the numbers 
The arithmetic mean is calculated by summing the two numbers and dividing by 
2. 
The geometric mean is calculated by multiplying the two numbers together and 
taking the square root. 
For example: GM = geometric mean, AM = arithmetic mean 
Numbers 
100 1000 
GM = 316.22766 
100 316.22766 
GM = 177.827941 
Logarithms 
2 3 
AM= 2.5 
2 2.5 
AM= 2.25 
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100 177.827941 
GM = 133.3521432 
2 2.25 
AM= 2.125 
(McLeish, 1991, p 173) 
The logarithm of 133.35214432 is 2.125. 
Munro gives an algorithm for calculating Square roots: 
Algorithm 2.8 to calculate to some given accuracy the positive square root of a 
positive real number. 
Input: k, real; k > 0. 
(we wish to find the square root of k) 
e, real; e > 0. 
Output: y, real. 
(y is the final approximation to ..Jk) 
method: give x a value; any positive number will do. 
i ~ 0 (give i the initial value 0) 
repeat 
x <- (x + k/x)/2 
io(-i+1 
until x is close to ..Jk 
Y<-X 
What does close mean? 
x is close to ..Jk may be refined to 
(1x2-kJ ::;e) is true 
or (I x- the previous xI :::; e) is true 
(Munro, 1992, p36) 
( x is the current approximation to ..Jk) 
It can be seen that calculating square roots requires addition and division with 
the root being a real number. 
4.6.2.4. Calculation by Integer Methods 
Large factorials can be obtained by performing iterative integer operations on 
numbers and storing the results. These numbers are considered to be more accurate 
than either of the preceding methods. 
Integer calculation of large exponentials and factorials requires substantial 
computer time and memory. Using a repref.entation of integers that requires one byte 
per digit, at least 4N bytes of storage and working space are needed to calculate and 
store Xo =Xi * X2. For example, Xi = 1234 and X2 = 1001 gives Xo = 1235234 which 
shows that two four digit numbers multiplied together produce a seven digit number 
totalling 15 digits in all. 
Digits are represented as one byte short integers though only values of 0 to 9 are 
used and the numbers are stored in reverse order in a sequential file. Multiplication 
occurs from the least significant digit at the beginning of the file by sequential file 
access and any 'carry' digits are appended to a file. This uses conventional file access 
routines. More space efficient methods such as Binary, Binary Coded Decimal (BCD), 
Octal or Hexadecimal may be time consuming to process. 
A typical hard drive may contain 2.1 Gigabytes of data and consequently limits 
the size of the largest number processed with it to approximately 525 MegaBytes or x.xx 
1r 10525000000 • 
4.6.2.5. Calculation of Large Exponential• of the Form 2" 
Large exponentials are easily calculated using the same iterative integer methods. An 
approximate check on the accuracy of the numbers generated was performed by 
comparing the value given by logarithms and the value given by direct calculation. For 
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example, in Appendix 11. calculating 2wnn by logarithms gives 1000 • log 2 which is 
301.029995664 or 1.0715 • 10 :w1 
4.6.3. Summary 
0 The methods listed have differing characteristics which may ind·;cate uses. 
0 The fastest but least accurate method is Stirling's Approximation. 
0 Sequential summation of logarithms is slower but much more accurate. It is 
limited by the representations of real numbers on the computer being used. 
Additionally, different data types may alter the precision and accuracy of the 
numbers generated. 
0 Direct Calculation is the most accurate method but is very slow. The major 
requirements are memory and this limits the speed by requiring the operating 
system to swap large amounts of data between files and RAM. Use of a RAMDlSK 
to speed up the process is limited by the amount of usable RAM. 
0 Calculation of large factorials and exponentials files can be expedited by use of 
stored pre-calculated numbers. For example, to calculate 1001!, the file 1000! Is 
multiplied by 1001 and the results stored. The results are included in the Appendix 
10.8. 
4. 7. Test 'T' for Randomness 
4.7 .1. Introduction 
A method called the 'Test-T' was implemented as an aid to estimating 
'randomness' in a binary sequence generator. The test uses the established idea of 
measuring the relative probability of the occurrence of bit patterns of varying lengths 
and comparing them against a theoretical value {Bassein, 1996, p483). Implementation 
is relatively easy however, interpretation of the results may rely on substantial 
statistical knowledge. 
This test is similar in construction to the 'Universal Test' (Maurer,l990) that 
calculates the average logarithm of the time interval between successive occurrences of 
the same subsequence. 
The results of both tests can then be used to assess the performance of the 
Randon 1 Sequence Generator. 
1.:1 Test-T the theoretical value for each bit pattern is the probability that each 
sequenct: would appear assuming a random sequence of almost infinite length is 
examined. 
The decision to take overlapping or non-overlapping samples of the sequence is 
important. Overlapping sequences simulat~ a binary source with memory, where the 
output bit is dependent on the preceding bits. Non-overlapping sequences simulate a 
random number generator where each group of bits represents an integer in binary 
form. 
The concept of the 1'est-T' leads to the establishment of a classification system 
which can identify important characteristics of random or pseudo-random sequence 
generators. 
4.7.2. Methods Used 
4.7.2.1. Univenal Teat 
An implementation of the Universal Test is available in the Crypt-X package and 
a simple implementation in Pascal is provided in the appendices. 
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The Universal Test (Maurer, 1991, p89) is implemented <lS an array of integers 
where the index to the array is the binary value of the! scquenc1: tested. The array is 
cleared and a selection of samples from the generator is taken and the array is pre-
loaded with the time each binary value appeared. The time unit is defined as one 
sample and consequently the number of samples taken denotes the elapsed tirnc. 
The pre-loading for a number of samples ensures that there is a reasonable 
chance that all the array components are non-zero. The test proper uses the decimal 
value of the sample as an index to the array which stores the previous time of 
occurrence of the value. Comparison of the time of the sample with the previous time in 
the array permits the logarithm of the difference between them to be stored in an 
accumulator. The logarithm is summed until the end of the test when it is averaged by 
the number of samples taken. This average logarithm is generally close to n-1 bits for a 
random source. 
In figure 4.6, the count prompts the generator to produce a binary sequence. 
The value of the binary sequence is used to index the array to store the count until the 
pre-loading is complete. 
When the test starts, the number records the amount of samples tested. Each 
binary sample value points to the array where the count of the previous occurrence is 
stored. The previous count is subtracted from the current count and the logarithm of 
the result is stored in an accumulator. On completion of the test, the value in the 
accumulator is divided by the number of samples tested to produce the average 
lo~arithm. 
Count Generator Index I 
T l 
I May (Index] of Count I 
1 
I Logarithm Sum I 
l 
4j Number Average Logarithm 
Figure 4-6 Schematic of Universal Test 
The average logarithm is the average 'distance' between occurrences of a 
particular binary sequence. If the generator is random and the samples are uniformly 
distributed then the average logarithm approximates n -1. 
For example, using 8 bit samples the array will be indexed between 0 to 255. 
Eight bit samples from the generator are used to index the array to store the count. In 
a uniformly distributed sample from a generator a sample value of '0' is equally likely to 
followed by '0' or any value to '255'. 
The average distance between these two equally likely values is 128. Log2(128) 
= 7 which is n - 1. Any persistent or substantial difference between the actual and 
predicted logarithms can be used to characterise a generator. 
4.7.2.2. Teot·T 
In Figure 4-7, a simple model to permit a basic description of randomness was 
developed. Instances of each bit pattern are recorded by dedicated counters. The 
assumption is that random sequences of binary digits of extreme length are available. 
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-Figur.e 4-7 Schematic of Theoretical Test-T for Raadomneas 
In this population of nearly infinite size each pattern of binary digits will be well 
distributed throughout the population and the probability, P, of each pattern will be 
specific. (Peterson, 1998, p 179) 
While a sequence may produce a probability P(O) = P{l) ""0.5 for single bit 
samples it may not produce a probability result of 0.25 for each two bit pattern. 
Using non-overlapping samples: 
S = 1100110011 => P(OI = P(l) = 0.5 
S => (10) 101){10} 1011 => P(011 = P(10) = 0.5, P(OO) = P(11) = 0 
These results can be described as, 'the sequence passes Tl, a test for one bit 
patterns, but fails Tl, a test for 2 bit patterns' and there are insufficient bits to evaluate 
TJ, a test for three bit patterns. 
Using the Test-Tit is not possible to perform a complete range of tests and 
consequently no sequence can be considered truly random as it is possible for a 
sequence to pass test Tk but fail test Tk<~. 
In Table 4-4, an indication of the resources necessary is the total number of 
accumulators needed. 
Accumulators R uired 
n 2" Sum 2n+l 2n+l-2 
I 2 2 4 2 
2 4 6 8 6 
3 8 14 16 14 
4 16 30 32 30 
5 32 62 64 62 
Table 4-4 Accumulators needed for Test T 
Table 4.4 shows that for each number of bits, n, the number of individual 
accnmulators needed is 2n . For five bit tests the number of accumulators needed is the 
sum of the powers of2, which equates to 2n+l- 2. The exponential increase in the 
number of accumulators needed limits the amount of testing that may be performed. 
N N * 2n Bits Re uired 
2 2 * 22 8 
32 32 * 232 1.374 * 1011 
64 64 * 264 1.1805 * 1021 
128 128 * 2128 4.3556 * 1Q40 
Table 4·5 Number of Bits required to perform Test T" 
Additionally, in Table 4-5, a limitation on the Test-T is the amount of bits 
necessary to perform the test with any confidence. 
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Using non-overlapping samples, the minimum number of hils to test is n * 2" to 
obtain a valid measurement. For example, using 2 bit sf:quences we need to test at 
least 2 * 21 or eight bits. This will be the minimum possible to obl<tin a probability of 
0.25 for each two bit sequence though testing a million bits may improve the precision 
of the result. The exponential increase in the number of bits needed ensures that it is 
not practical to perform the Test~T for large values of n. 
Using the Test·T, a classilication system based on the size of the sequence tested 
and the number of unique symbols available is possible. 
A proposed standard notation is described below. The superscript, a, defines the 
largest test evaluated, the subscript, b, the number of unique sequences available from 
the generator, X is the enumeration of a specific output sequence and m is the number 
of symbols of generator memory : 
mTb' X 
A 1T21 generator is a binary source with memory of 1 bit, that is, the output bit 
is dependent on the previous bit. Further discussion of the classification scheme is 
Section 4~8. 
Results from testing a fair coin can be listed as: T21 H = 0.497 and a fair die, Tr, 1 
3 as 0.1659. 
For example, a single, fair, six-sided die would be classified as a Tr,l generator as 
it produces only 6 unique symbols, one at a time. Additionally, two fair dice, a Tr,2 
generator passes a test for two symbols, that is, every pair of symbols is equally likely. 
It is noted that the two six~sided dice produce 6 2 or 36 different sequences as they are 
independent of each other and would pass TJ6 1 , a test for individual symbols from an 
alphabet of 36. 
A fair coin tossed in conjunction with a fair die to obtain 12 unique pairs of 
symbols would meet the requirement ofT121, implying that the product of the notation 
subscripts can be summed. For example T61 * T21 = T 121 giving 121 or twelve unique 
symbols. 
4.7.2.3. Results 
An implementation of the Test-T produced the following results for runs of 
various length. In Table 4-6, four runs were processed of 1000, 10000, 100000 & 
1000000 bits. The one bit and two bit patterns were generated and the results 
tabulated. The generator appears to prefer 1 's slightly more frequently than O's during 
shorterruns. VI bl th td I d I'd a ues eow e expec e va ue are un er me . 
Bits 0 I Averae:e 
1000 0.49200000 0.50800000 0.50000000 
10000 0.49870000 0.50130000 0.50000000 
100000 0.49948000 0.50052000 0.50000000 
1000000 0.50016100 0.49983900 0.50000000 
Table 4·6 SingiP Bit Results 
In Table 4-7, the two bit patterns show similar preferences, however, the long runs seem 
~ '00' d . h h h' h ~ to avour compare Wit s ort.er runs w tc avour ones. 
Bits 00 01 10 11 Average 
1000 0.2380000 0.25400000 0.25400000 0.25400000 0.25000000 
10000 0.2478000 0.25090000 0.25090000 0.25040000 0.25000000 
100000 0.2495900 0.24989000 0.24988000 0.25064000 0.25000000 
1000000 0.2502500 0.24991100 0.24991100 0.24992800 0.25000000 
Table 4·7 Two Bit Results 
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A major concern with this simplistic test is the setting of limits for the values 
and interpretation of the results. These must be determined carefully to permit a 
classification to be made. 
4.7.3. Summary 
Q The Universal and Test-Tare easily implemented in software, however, 
interpretation of the results may require additional information and testing. 
D A classification which is able to clearly identify a random sequence generator by its 
output characteristics may make specification and selection of a random sequence 
generator efficient. 
0 Methods of assessing random generators for classification are not dealt with in 
detail. 
4.8. Classification Scheme 
4.8.1. Introduction 
A method of specifying clearly the characteristics of random symbol generators is 
proposed as an aid to selection and classification of generators. The classification 
method must simply identify important characteristics for random generators to permit 
a specification to be made that does not rely on often misunderstood statistics. 
Ideally, a system designer should be able to specify a type of random sequence 
generator and permit the final selection to be made during implementation. 
An introduction to the concept of 'Combinational Calculus' using the proposed 
classification system is provided to describe the common practice of combining random 
generators into a composite generator. This work is to be developed further and 
validated and consequently is neither complete nor rigorous. 
It can be shown that generators can be combined using logical operations and 
the description can provide an operator with a summary of the composite generator's 
characteristics. It is possible that this concept can be extended and used to describe 
aspects of complex systems which contain random sequence generators. 
4.8.2. Explanation of Classification Method 
Two fair six-sided dice 01 and 02 arc defined as D1 = {a,b,c,d,e,f} and 02 = 
{g,h,ij,k,l}, both of which are classified T6 1 and two fair coins are defined as C1= {m,nl 
and C2 = {o,p} both of which arc classified T21. The Vf' specification means that the 
sequences produced by each artefact are random. 
For example, the sequence '01011010', while obviously patterned has the 
probabilities of P(O) = P{1) = 0.5. This does not necessarily mean the generator of the 
sequence is random but it passes test T21. However, the probabilities for T22 are P(OO) 
= 0, P(01) = 0.5, P(10) = 0.5 and P(11) = 0 and this means that the generator 'fails' test 
T22 . Passing test T21 is implicit in passing test T22 and failing T22 may mean that the 
sequence examined is insufficient to determine the result. 
Consequently, no test can be certain that a sequence is random. 
Logical operations may be used to describe the use of more than one generator 
to produce specific results. Being able to describe clearly the effects of combining two or 
more generators makes it easy for decisions to be made without substantial statistical 
knowledge. 
4.8.3. Classification Relationships 
{ 0} = the empty set. A means logical and, v means logical or 
Logical NOT negation 
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Cl={mvn) ifCl=m thcnNOTCl=n ifCl=nthcnNOTCI=m 
D 1 = { a v b v c v d v e v f I If D 1 = a then NOT D 1 = b v c v d v e v f 
Logical AND* 
Dl 11. 02 = {aAg v aAh ... v bAg .... vftd! => T1,l A T,l = Tt,l ~ T11 1 =T.1r,1 
ClA Dl = 1 mAa v mAb .. v nAa., .. vnAf} => T£,' A T21 = Tr,l • T11 = T 12 1 
where aAg is considered to be one symbol. 
D 1 AND NOT 01 = I (a11.(b v c v d v e v f)) v ... v (fA( a v b v c v d v c)) I => I e I 
= {a-a" b-b A ... A f- 0 = Tr, 1 - T6 1 = To 1 = {0 I 
D!/Dl = {aja,bjb ... eje,f/n = i!,l,!,l,l,ll =ill= Identity set. 
Dl A (02- 02) = {a+g-g, ... ,f+g-gl = {a,b,c,d,e,f} T 12 l - Tr,l = Tr,t 
Dl • 02 / 02 = 'f62 / T6 1 = T6' = {ag,ah,ai, .... fj,fk,fll / {g,h,i,j,k,l} = {a,b,c,d,e,f} 
D2/(Dl/Dli = D2/ I= D2 
Logical OR 
DlvD2={avbv .. vl{ =>(DIACI)v(D2AN0TCI)=>(To 1 Am) v (To 1 An) = 
'f61 AT21 ='f61 +T21 =T]21 
equivalent to using a fair coin, Cl, to specify either Dl or 02 in each throw. 
Cl v Dl = {m v n I v {a v ... v f} => (DlA C2) v (CIA NOT C2) => (T6'" m) v {T2' 
An)= T8t 
equivalent to using a fair coin, C2, to specify either Dl or Cl in each throw. 
x' means that this term is NOT x, that is, not included. In any set of two symbol terms, 
one symbol terms are not part of the set. 
each term can be considered expanded, a=> [a,b',c',d',e',f] and b => [a',b c' d' e' f] 
then ag => [ag,b'g,c'g,d'g,e'g,fg] = ag 
agfg => [ag, b'g, c'g, d'g, e'g, fgj / g => [a,b',c',d',e',f] :::> [a] 
(Dl A D2 )/D2 = (ag,ah,ai, .... fj,fk,fll j {g,h,ij,k,li = (a,b,c,d,e,n 
Ta61 /T61 = T61 
4.8.4. Summary 
0 Classification schemes for random symbol generators permit a standard 
classification of the output of either single or composite generators. 
D 
o Construction of a composite generator can be specified from two or more different 
generators according to simple rules. 
4.9. Visual Testing of Binary Sequences 
4.9.1. Introduction 
Assessment of the characteristics of a random bit generator may require 
substantial test preparation and assessment of substantial amounts of data. An 
effective method of detecting faulty generators is required which should be easy and 
efficient to apply. 
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Graphical methods are proposed for initially assessing a random bit generator. 
After preliminary assessment specific statistical methods can he us1:d. 
A generator may have a 'memory'. This means that the output is clcpcndent on 
a number of previous output symbols. For example, a 'binctry memory less source' 
produces statistically independent bits and a source with a memory of one will produce 
bits dependent on the previous bit. Memory in a generator means that overlapping 
samples are taken. 
Non-overlapping samples mean the generator output is being tested for 
statistical independence. For example, a three bit generator with overlapping samples is 
a binary source with memOl)' of two bits and non-overlapping samples means it 
implements test T11 l for three bit sequences. 
This simple graphical method may show some characteristics of the generator 
but any test for randomuess must meet stringent requirements. The graphical 
methods were confined to whole pixel values used to eliminate the need to perform 
geometric calculations such as Sine and Cosine with the attendant floating point 
calculations and round-off errors. 
4.9.2. Methods Used 
4.9.2.1. Single Bit Sequences. 
This test applies to binary memory less sources, defining an array of 2k + 1 
integers to plot the output characteristics of a single bit generator. All array values are 
initialised to zero and the array index is set to the central position, k + 1. From this 
position, the array index is incremented if the randomiser bit is a '1' and decremented if 
the bit is a '0'. After modifying the index, the integer in the array position is 
incremented and the run is terminated when the index is moved outside the anay. 
In figure S-8, an individual trace represents a single test run on the same 
generator and the cumulative totals for each array position are kept. The cumulative 
values describe a line which encloses an area between the horizontal axis and the trace. 
While some traces appear to follow an approximate bell cutve distribution, the center of 
the area under the line may be to one side of the centre line. 
Flpre 4-8 BIDCie Bit Sequence Trace 
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Randomly distributed symbols should he evenly, if not syrnrm:trically, distributed 
about the centre of the army. A center line consistently to one side of the central axis 
may be considered evidence of a preference hy the gencn.tor for a particular value. 
Additionally, should the trace lack symmetry then this may be considered a 
chamctcristic of the generator. 
Example for mcntory-J,~ss single bit generators. 
ForK "' 3, an array is defined where X denotes the central position. Starting 
from this position lllO\'C to the right if the bit is a '1' and left if the bit is a '0' and 
increment the count in each array position on entry. 
A. Random sequence = 1: 0000000 
123X321 
B. Random sequence = 101011 0022000 
123X321 
c. Random sequence = 1010100110011 0263000 
123X321 
D. Random sequence = 10100011001001 3431000 
123X321 
In example D the final 0 moves the trace outside of the array and stops the 
process. It is noted in examples C and D that the digit '0' is slightly more numerous 
than '1' and the trace shows a preference for that side. 
If the values were graphed it would show an approximate bell-curve with the 
centre of the curve being displaced in the direction of the pref~rred digit. Results can 
be seen in Appendix 9-20. 
4.9.2.2. Mapping considerations o£ Multi-bit generators 
The mapping of multiple bit sequences to pixel values can be made without 
trigonometric values such as the sine and cosine of an angle. The method encodes the 
directions in binary format to ensure that no data is lost when converting the random 
sequence to the graphical environmt!nt. 
In figure 4.9 each of the directions from the origin '+'is the decimal 
representation of the b" f 0 2 1 ma y se uence rom to "-
28 29 30 31 0 I 2 3 4 
27 s 
26 14 IS 0 I 2 6 
2S 13 7 0 I 3 7 
24 12 6 + 2 4 8 
23 II 5 4 3 5 9 
22 10 9 8 7 6 10 
21 11 
20 19 18 17 16 IS i 14 13 12 
Figure 4-9 2,3,4 and S bit direction encoding 
The center is defined by the '+'symbol and the 2 bit sequence directions by 
0,2,4,6 adjacent to the '+'. Three bit sequences are enumerated by 0 - 7 adjacent to the 
'+'sign. 
In Table 4-8, the size of the square of pixels increases by a binary exponential 
factor. It can be seen that the difference between 3 bit and 4 bit pixel squares is 2. 
Between 4 bit and 5 bit pixel squares the difference is 4 and so on. 
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Index No. Of Bits direction pixel difference 
s square 
I 2 4 2 I 
2 3 8 3 2 
3 4 16 5 4 
4 5 32 9 8 
5 6 64 17 16 
6 7 128 33 32 
Table 4-8 Differences in Pixel squares 
It is possible to calculate the size of the pixel square side, V, necessary for n bit 
resolution by the following formula. 
" v = z + L zn-3 
i=3 
Equation 4-8 
For ann= 8 bit sequence, the pixel square size= 2 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 +32 = 
65 pixels. This pixel square would have two sides of 65 pixels and two sides of 63 pixels 
totalling 256 pD.:els. The line representing the direction of the trace can be drawn as a 
line segment 33 pixels long starting from the origin to the periphery. 
Algebraic methods using the known relationship of the numbers of pixels in the 
sides of the pixel square can be used where two sides are X pixels long and two sides 
are X - 2 pixels long. The required number of pixels in the pixel square will be two to 
the power of the number of bits examined. 
2n = 2x + 2(x-2) 
2n /2 =x+x- 2 
2n /2 + 2 = 2x 
2nj4+1 =x 
Equation 4-9 
For example, 8 bit samples give 
256 = 2x + 2{x-2) 
65 =X 
Limitations include the size and resolution of the screen, for example, a screen of 480 * 
640 pixels would be able to support a target of a maximum of 480 * 480 pixels and 
starting from the origin only 7 * 33 pixel line segments would be needed to reach the rim 
of the target set at a radius of 231 pixels. 
Movement size is the integer value of the square size divided by 2. 
M=Jx12L 
Eq'.:.ation 4-10 
For example, a screen of 640 by 480 pixels would be able to support a square 
target of a maximum of 479 * 479 pixels. Using a '9 by 9' square, and starting from the 
origin, only 27 steps are needed in a specific direction to cross the rim of the target set 
at a radius of 231 pixels. 
This method of graphing the output of the Generator is commonly described as 
the 'Drunkard's Walk', where the notional inebriate takes a step away from a point in a 
random direction as often as required. The trace produced represents the path taken 
and characterises the randomness of the directions chosen. The largest binary 
sequence that can be plotted is limited by the size of the target and the size of the steps. 
For much larger binary sequences, the inebriate takes one step away from the 
origin and is then magically transported back to the origin to take a second step. After 
a number of iterations, the steps of the inebriate are plotted by making lines to map 
direction to the screen. This display of the rays traced would characterise the 
generator. 
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4.9.3. Summary 
0 Visual testing methods permit rapid characterisation of a variety of sequence 
generators. 
a Evaluation is limited by the amount of information generated by the test. 
a Very large numbers of bits may be tested very quickly. 
a Results are listed in appendix 9-20 
4.10. Simulation of Drunkard's Walka 
4.10.1. Introduction 
A 'Drunkard's Walk' is a mathematical paradigm to explain the output of a 
random sequence generator with the behaviour of a mythical inebriate. The steps 
taken by the inebriate, where direction is defined by the random sequence, are traced 
for analysis. 
A simulation of a Drunkard's Walk was used as a method of detecting the 
characteristics of random sequence generators by observing the trace produced from 
plotting the output of the generator as steps in a Drunkard's Walk. Initially, the 
directions were encoded for 2 bit, 3 bit and 4 bit sequences and the behaviour 
observed. Directional preferences in the sequences may be observed, that is, the graph 
may show a preference for a particular side of an axis through the origin. 
In the 'Drunkard's Walk' paradigm the drunk walks away from the origin taking 
each step in a random direction. The average distance da travelled by the drunk after a 
number of steps, N, of length, /~, is given by 
"" = ;Jfi 
Equation 4-11 
(KAYE,l993, p54) 
Solving for N, the number of steps needed to travel the average distance, 
N=(';)' 
Equation 4-12 
The average number of steps needed to travel a particular distance is the square 
of the average distance divided by the length of step. For example, with da = 200, and I~ 
= 1, N is 40000. If the average number of steps differs substantially from this value 
it may indicate that the generator is biased or not random though this may take many 
runs of the generator to establish. Kaye mentions 'Many random walks are required 
before the measured average distance converges on the theoretically predicted value' 
(Kaye,1993, p55) 
4.10.2. Concerns in Simulation of Drunkard's Walks 
4.10.2.1. Direction 
The selection of direction not magnitude of the steps poses problems when 
simulating the trace on a computer. Digitisation of direction would introduce 
quantisation error when using real values. For example, in the real world, an itinerant 
inebriate would have an infinite choice of directions. However, most simulations limit 
the directions and apply probabilities to each one. 
With pixels selected as the dimensional unit each peripheral pixel is the same 
'distance' away from the origin regardless of the size of the direction-encoding square, 
that is one 'step'. 
Edith Cowan University 48 
Develqpment of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, 
Multi-Resource, Multi-Lcv~~~ccss S~'ite~~ 
4.10.2.2. Overlapping venu• Non-overlapping Sample• 
Multiple bit generators which produce overlapping samples behave as a binary 
source with a memory, where the direction depends on the previous bits. For example, 
a two bit overlapping sample is the output of a single-bit generator with a memory of 
one bit. 
Non-overlapping samples arc the equivalent of a multiple symbol generator. For 
example, a four bit generator will produce 16 unique output sequences and these can be 
encoded as hexadecimal characters. 
4.10.2.3. Squue venu• Round Target• 
With a circular real-world target, the size of the step docs not alter with the 
direction. Most simulations use a single step size and define the number of directions 
to permit the exercise to work. Using a very large number of directions with specific 
probabilities may make the solution of the problem very difficult. 
In Ph:el Space, it does not matter if the pixel is not square, as long as each step 
in a particular direction is always the same length in pixels. This can be visualised as a 
non-Euclidean space where the magnitude of a standard length varies depending on 
absolute direction and I or location. If all entities within this space comply with the 
same conditions then, subjectively, a unit step in any direction has the same length 
while to an observer outside of the space, objectively, it can be observed that step 
lengths differ depending on direction. 
Figure 4.10 shows the periphery of the targets is the same number of steps from 
the origin in any permitted direction and consequently, within the definitions given, the 
square in pixel space behaves as a circle for the purposes of the proposed tests. 
real pixel 
Ff&ure 4-10 Compari•on of Real and Pixel Baud Walb 
4.10.2.4. Errors in Repre•entation. 
A major concern is that the use of a circular target may introduce an error when 
a square target is necessary due to the underlying data structure of pixel squares. 
Using a round target may underestimate the generator characteristics due to the 
target area being irregular. While the target looks like a circle to the observer in real 
space, using pixels as the basic unit means that it is not a circle. 
In the real world, if the actual target is a square and a circle is inscribed inside 
the square then the relationship of the respective areas is given by the area of the circle 
divided by the area of the square. 
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Using equation 4. 13, when the radius of the drde is I 00 then the circle area is 
31415.92 and the square area is 40000. The relationship between them is 0.78539 or 
approximately 79% which is equal to 1t /4 of the area of the square. 
The circular ·.argct, in pixel space, is then smaller than required and the trace 
terminating at the periphery is actually terminating earlier than if a square target is 
used. I if the square target is the equivalent of a circle in pixel terms 
]· . 
~~== 
The picture on the left expresses the relationship between the Square target and 
the circular target in the real world. The picture on the right expresses the circular 
target, the white area, as it would be seen in pixel space where the square actually is a 
circle in pixel space. 
The relationship is between the two areas in pixel space is approximately 78%. 
4.10.3. Summary 
o Drunkard's Walk Simulations are easily implemented. 
o Multibit representations of direction may require substantial resources and a very 
large test display area. 
0 Apart from some simple statistics generated evaluation of the results requires 
further research. 
0 Results are included in the Appendix 9-19. 
4.11. Ordering Paradigm 
4.11.1. Introduction 
As testing a complex function with a large range of inputs may be infeasible it is 
important to develop a simpler test that will give some assurance that the function 
generator is not flawed. Comparison of the function input and output sequences is to 
provide some assessment of whether the function is one-to-one. 
4.11.2. Methods Used 
The concept of a randomness in a binary sequence implies that for each bit in 
the sequence, the probability of the next bit being either the same or different is equal, 
that is, there is no preference for one value or the other and no dependency on previous 
bits. 
It is considered that comparison of the similar length input and output binary 
sequences of a function generator would show if any relationship exists between them. 
Hamming 'weight' and 'distance' are concepts covered in Error-Detecting Codes 
where 'the Hamming Distance between two words is defined to be the number of 
positions in which the words differ' (Peterson,l960, p 7) and the 'Hamming Weight' of a 
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sequences 'is defined to be the number of non~zcro compuncnts' (Peterson, 1960, P30) 
For example, for the words 11010 and 10001, their Hamming Weights arc three and two 
respectively and the Hamming Distance between them is three. 
It is proposed that the average Hamming Weight and Distanr.e may he a useful 
indicators of the transfer function describing a particular process and specifically where 
an input sequence is processed into an output sequence according to some unknown 
function. 
An arbitrary binary sequence of n bits is defined as ~ , and X; is an instance of 
~ . An operation f() can then be performed on X; an yielding f(X; ) or X'i 
X';= f(X; I 
Equation 4·14 
For example, with X; of 0101 processed by f() to obtain 1010 as the sequence X';. 
The Hamming Distance of these two sequences is 4 and the Hamming Weight of both 
the sequences is 2. 
It is suggested that the Average Hamming Distance between input and output 
sequences may provide a measurable characteristic off() when each unique value of x;, 
thatisf 0 21 · d ·n rom to "· , IS p rocesse sequentla:Jy. 
Reference F(x)Rotate F(x)Left shift + 1 
In out Wt. Output Wt. Distance output Wt. Distance 
1 000 0 000 0 0 001 1 1 
2 001 1 010 1 2 011 2 2 
3 010 1 100 1 2 101 2 3 
4 011 2 110 2 2 111 3 1 
5 100 1 001 1 2 001 1 2 
6 101 2 011 2 2 011 2 2 
7 110 2 101 2 2 101 2 2 
8 111 3 111 3 0 111 3 0 
Total 12 Total 12 12 Total 16 13 
Avg. 1.5 Avg 1.5 1.5 Avg. 2 1.75 
Table 4·9 Comparison of Input and Output Sequences 
For example, using a complete set of 3 bit binal)· sequences in order from 000 to 
111, that is from 0 to 23-1 or 7 and defining f() as a rotation without loss of data of one 
bit such that the sequence 010 becomes 100, then all other sequences of 3 bit length 
are processed. 
In Table 4-9, comparing the bitwise similarities between input sequences and 
output sequences for complete range of inputs gives an average value for all 8 sequences 
of 1.5 which is half the number of bits. Additionally it is noted that the function f(x) is 
'one~to~one' in that there is a unique output sequence for each unique input sequence. 
Using a function that shifts the sequence left by one position and increments the 
result by one it is noted that the function is not 'one-to~one' and the average value of 
matches is 1.25 which may indicate that for functions that are not 'one~ to-one' some 
change in the bitwise matches may be detected. 
This characteristic may be of value in determining if a function is likely to be 
'one-to-one' for functions of much greater complexity and length, especially when it is 
impractical to generate and test all possible unique sequences. 
Considering a function generator that applies an algorithm such as the block 
cipher Data Encryption Standard (DES) which uses a 64 bit key to encrypt a multiple 
sequences of 64 bit blocks. It is noted that the number of unique input sequences and 
key sequences are both 264 or 1.844 * 1019 and that generating and comparing all the 
unique sequences may be infeasible. 
For an individual message, X*, with all possible unique key sequences, K to the 
encryption process, the output from the encryption process may be determined. 
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X'; == f(X• , K, ) 
Equation 4-15 
In an encryption the relationship between the input and the output must he 
'one-to-one' and 'one-way', that is each unique input must produce a unique output and 
it must not be practical to determine the input from knowing the output. 
4.11.2.1. Example of Average Hamming Distance 
For sequences of n bits the Average Hamming Distance will be approximately 
equal to half the number of bits if the process f(x) is uniformly distributed. 
AHD • n/2 
Equation 4-16 
To explain the concept further, Table 1 shows two separate messages, X1 = 1 010 
and X2 = 1011, arbitrarily encrypted by function K where K; is an instance of K and the 
resultant encryptions, K;X1 and K;X2 compared with the message for matching bits in 
each position. 
In Table 4-10, the first sequence the average Hamming Distance per bit is 17/32 
or 53.127% and in the second sequence that is 13/32 or 40.625%. It is considered that 
any substantial or persistent deviation from the 50% nominal value is indicative of some 
type of flaw in the process. 
For example, an encryption, K11 , is defined such that each bit in the message, X 11 
, is inverted, then for all ~ , the average Hamming Distance is n, the number of bits in 
the message Xa. Conversely, an encryption, Kb , such that no bit in the message, Xa , 
is ever inverted and no change is .nade to the message, means for all~ the average 
Ham . D' t . 0 mm 1s ance 1s 
X1- 1010 Bits X2 1011 Bits 
i Function kiXl HD; Wt. Function k;X2 HDi Wt. 
I kr 0101 4 2 kr llOI 2 3 
2 kr llOI 3 3 kr 1001 I 2 
3 kr !Ill 2 4 kr 0010 2 I 
4 kr 0000 2 0 kr 1110 2 3 
5 kr 0111 3 3 kr 0101 3 2 
6 kr 0011 2 2 kr 1010 I 2 
7 kr 1010 0 2 kr lOll 0 3 
8 kr 1011 I 3 kr 0001 2 I 
No. Of bits 32 17 19 No. of bits 32 13 17 
Avg. 4.25 4.75 Avg 3.25 4.25 
Table 4-10 Simulation of Ordering Paradigm 
The long term behaviour of a particular encryption method may be examined 
with this method. In Table 4-10 the average values show that the function may not be 
one-to-one and further testing may be needed. 
For example, after 1 * 106 iterations of an encryption method, 1{.;, on a message 
Xc , the Average Hamming Distance per bit may be of 0.65 and this characteristic may 
be significant to the user. 
4.11.2.2. One to One Function 
A simple example of a one-to-one function occurs when the bits of the input are 
transposed. 
If a bit in the input goes to more than one bit in the output then it is no longer a 
one-to-one function. By summing the number of similarities between the input and 
output the average Hamming Distance can be calculated. 
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Figure 4·12 Transposilion diagram for a One-to-one Function 
For functions where the number of bits is much larger, for example, n = 1 * 1 or, 
the amount of work to tabulate the comparisons of outputs and inputs increases 
exponentially according to 211 and it may not be feasible to generate all inputs and 
outputs for analysis. Consequently, some kind of sampling or testing regime needs to 
be developed. Figure 4.12 shows a diagrammatic representation of a one-to-one 
function. 
4.12. Summary 
4.12. 1. Hardware Design 
0 The initial design is practical but will require substantial prototyping. 
4.12.2. Analysis of a Transaction 
0 Electronic transactions present opportunities for fraud. 
0 The proposed implementation specifies a procedure to follow to minimise the 
opportunities for fraud. 
4.12.3. Proposed Implementation of Function Generator 
0 The proposed method is simple to implement 
0 Limitations are the size of the randomiser and the amount of memory needed to 
manipulate the bits 
4.12.4. Randomiser Construction 
0 NonMDeterministic Randomiser:;! must be very large to be used in the implementation 
0 Deterministic Randomisers may not have sufficient length or complexity to provide 
security to the proposed method 
0 A hybrid method of constructing Deterministic Randomisers may address the length 
and complexity issues 
4.12.5. Large Numbers in Calculations 
0 Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials is constrained by accuracy and 
speed. The more significant digits used the slower the calculation and the greater 
the precision. 
0 Expansions of large factorials and exponentials provides long sequences of integers 
for use within the implementation 
4.12.6. TestT 
0 The TestMT is practical and easy to implement but needs to be validated before use. 
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4. 12.7. Classification Scheme 
CJ The classilication scheme proposed provides a means of characterising random 
sequence generators by their outputs. 
CJ The scheme may also provide means of specifying the combination of random 
sequence generators 
4. 12.8. Visual Testing 
CJ Visual testing can be implemented easily and used to look for flaws in a wide range 
of random sequence generators. 
o Target size and shape need to be considered in running the tests. 
CJ Using Overlapping or Non-overlapping samples depends on the nature of the tests 
desired. 
4.12.9. Ordering Paradigm 
!J Bitwise comparison of the input and output sequences of a function generator can 
be used to estimate function characteristics. 
t:J The Average Hamming Weight and Average Hamming Distance of a process can be 
used to characterise a function. 
5. User Identification Based On A One Way Function 
5.1. Specification of Design Objectives 
5.LL Introduction 
It may be practical to legally assign a particular Smart Card to a person by 
recording the unique aspects of the card and the identity of the responsible person. 
Once this is achieved the person can use that card as the equivalent of their personal 
'seal' or signature. 
These signatures may be valid because the User and the card are positively 
identified and the User has to initiate the card at the correct part of the transaction 
cycle and record the results. The actuation of the card signifies the User's assent to the 
transaction. Each generated signature must be unique to guard against misuse yet 
still be attributable to the specific User to prevent fraud. 
5.1.2. Method Used 
This can be achieved by programming into the permanent memory of the Smart 
Card an array of random bits and a selection algorithm_ For a long random sequence 
there is a very small probability of another sequence being close to it in content. Smart 
Cards using this concept can be unique even when many millions of them are created. 
Groups of cards with identical randomisers may differ in the selection algorithm or vice 
versa. 
The number of unique randomisers available to fit the allocated memory space is 
very large. For example, a randomiser of 2000 bits is one of a set of 22ooo or 1.148 * 10 
602 possible randomisers. Smart Cards may contain up to 20 kilobytes or 163840 bits 
of permanent storage (Rankl & Effing,l997, p430) which will contain the program and 
randomiser as well as any additional applications. 
The Smart Card must store a copy of all input sequences with the output 
sequence generated so that the user can automatically keep the summary of the 
agreements for future reference. 
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Additional activities such as validation of agreements and secure 
communications with this method arc desirable. 
5.1.3. Summary 
0 Each Smart Card must be unique in some way to identify the card and must 
possess unique properties that can be used to provide a unique signature or 
validation of transactions. 
a The Smart Card must be associated with an individual by means of a photograph 
and personal details or other method. 
a The Smart Card must use some form of personal actuation such as a pin number or 
biometric identification. 
a Sequences produced by the card must be unique and repeatable. 
a A Smart Card must be physically secure against illicit operations to discover its 
contents. 
a Additional functions may include hash and cryptographic algorithms. 
5.2. Description of a Smart Card Design 
5.2.1. Introduction 
It is practical to specify the characteristics of a Smart Card to meet these 
requirements. The card must be physically secure and legally assignable to a person or 
company. It must implement the algorithm and store transaction details. 
Additionally, it must implement secure hash and data encryption methods and produce 
a serial number to identify the card uniquely. 
The major requirement is memory rather than processing speed, as many hash 
values are 128-256 bits and may take less than a second to transfer even at Smart Card 
serial speeds. The memory must be divided physically into Read Only Memory (ROM) 
which cannot be determined without destroying the chip and Random Access Memory 
{RAM) to store the working data and summary information. It may be necessary to store 
the summary data in a 'write-once, read-many' (WORM) memory or Electrically Erasable 
Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) so the card can act as a receipt by storing 
the input sequence used to stimulate it. 
An encryption algorithm is used to encrypt digital data for storage and 
transmission. 
A symmetric cipher requires that a copy of the key is available at both ends of 
the system. The sender and receiver must share this information which is as 
confidential as any message it is used to encrypt. 
Figure 5·1 describes the proposed design for a Smart Card. The control 
functions are indicated by dotted lines; the data flows by solid lines. 
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Figure 5-1 Schematic of Proposed Smart Card Design 
The Smart Card input sequence may be used to generate a key for a Block 
Cipher such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). As the output sequence is unique 
to each Smart Card, the input sequence can be transmitted as the message header with 
the encrypted message. 
A 'Block Cipher' is an algorithmic method of processing ftxed-length blocks from 
a message. (Schneier, 1996, p270) The DES algorithm performs a substitution and 
shuffling of the bits according to a preset algorithm for 32 iterations and then selects 
and processes the next block. A typical block is 64 bits and a typical key could be as 
short as 64 bits or as large as 196 bits in a DES variant such as 'Triple-DES'. 
A 'Stream Cipher' (Schneier,1996, p197) is an algorithmic method of processing 
a message one bit at a time by performing 'addition modulo-2' with the key sequence. 
The security of the Stream Cipher rests solely on the characteristics of the key sequence 
which must be at least as long as the message being encrypted. 
The Smart Card output sequence can be prolonged to provide a key sequence 
and this implies the ability to produce sequences of varying lengths or the ability to use 
selected portions from the output sequence. 
Where provision exists for Smart Cards to be used on public phone terminals it 
is considered possible but not immediately practical to encrypt messages with the Smart 
Card. Personally encrypted secure communications on public carriers may be 
implemented separately with the data on a lap-top or a digital voice message being 
encrypted before being transmitted. Limitations in the Smart Card data transfer rates 
may make real-time voice encryption difficult to implement. 
For example, a standard sound file format on many PCs is the Wave' file 
identified by a '.WAV' suffix to the file name. Software is readily available to capture a 
sound sample and off-line processing is relatively straight forward. Sampling at the 
minimum rate of 11025 eight bit samples per second (monophonic) produces a file of 
661500 bytes per minute of sound. Speech is able to be compressed substantially 
with proprietary compression software such as 'PKZIP'. Research shows that 
approximately 300 seconds (5 minutes) of speech can be compressed and stored on a 
single 1.44 Megabyte floppy disk. Off-line encryption of this compressed data file is 
readily achieved. 
The card should produce a digital serial number which can be compared against 
the markings on the card. Additionally, a second serial number can be generated from 
the randomiser which will identify the randomiser on the card. 
Access control to the card may use a password or biometric identification. 
Biometric identification is difficult at present to implement but advances in technology 
may produce fingerprint recognition or some other method that is able to be 
implemented on a Smart Card. 
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The card must be able to usc at least one publicly available hash function or 
produce a hash value of an input sequence. 
All transactions must be able to be securely stored and if necessary securely 
transmitted on public carriers. 
Memory size and access speed arc the major criteria in selecting a Smart Card to 
produce this application. 
The current state of development of the Smart Card with the memory available 
and the low rate of data transfer may mean that some of these functions are impractical 
though changes in the available technology may alter this. 
5.2.2. Summary 
0 A method of generating validation sequences or electronic signatures is necessary for 
some forms of electronic commerce. 
1:1 The method must minimise opportunities to commit fraud and provide security 
against misuse 
1:1 The proposed design addresses the following issues: 
•!• Card identification 
-!• Card User identification and secure access 
-!• generation of hash, validation and signature sequences 
-!• key distribution in a symmetric cipher system 
-!• record keeping 
1:1 Implementation requires 
(<. The users of the method must be able to confirm the results of the process at any 
time. 
-!- The transaction must be recorded and any changes must be detectable. 
•!- Restriction of the opportunities for misuse 
1:1 A practical specification for a Smart Card design incorporating multiple functions 
depends on the software simulation to provide information for a prototype hardware 
implementation. 
1:1 Implementation of some functions may be impractical due to 
1:1 Development time and capabilities of the Smart Card 
5.3. Description of the Theoretical Method 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The theoretical method 'A Provably Secure, Strongly-Randomised Cipher' 
{Maurer,1990, p361) proposes 'provable security .... based on the availability of a very 
large publicly accessible string of random bits'. The criteria for provable security are 
that the randomiser is substantially larger than all the plain text encrypted with it and 
that the key information is the starting point within the array of randomised strings 
blocks used to produce the key string. 
Maurer concludes with two recommendations and a conjecture. One 
recommendation relates to developing the randomiser in time, requiring an opponent to 
process a substantial part of the randomiser to be reasonably certain that the 
decryption of the message is correct. The second recommendation is that the selection of 
bits from the randomiser is made more difficult thereby permitting the shortening of the 
Randomiser and rendering an application more feasible. Furthermore, Maurer states: 
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~Finally, we would like to point out that ntndomization ledwiques similar to 
those presented in this paper may be useful for tlw construction of pntctical ciphers, 
even when the randomizcr is not sufficiently long to guarantf:e H n~asonahle lower 
bound on the enemy's computational effort rcquin~d to hreak the ciplwr or when tile 
randomizer is replaced by a pseudo-random sequence" (Maurer, 19fJO, p372) 
5.3.2. Description of the Theoretical Method 
This section makes substantial reference to the original paper by Maurer. 
(Maurer,l990) 
Random variables are denoted by capital letters, whereas the corresponding 
small letters denote values taken on by these random variables. 
A binary additive stream cipher 
B = publicly accessible binary random string consisting of K blocks of length T and 
total length of L= KT bits. The blocks are denoted by R[k,O], ... ,Rfk,T-1] for 1 $ k $ K. 
(length approximately 1010) See Table 6-1. 
W = [W1, ... , WN I binary Keystream of length N 
~ = [X1, ... , XN] binary Plain text of length N 
Y = (Y 1 , ••• , Y N I binary Cryptogram of length N 
~ = [Z1, ... , Z" J a secret key where Zk E ]0, ... , T·ll for 1 $ k 5 K specifies a 
position within each block of B. Chosen to be uniformly distributed over the key space 
S~ = 10, ... ,T-1}" The number of bits to represent the key is K log2T. 
The cryptogram y is obtained by adding ~ and W bitwise modulo 2: 
Yn=Xn$Wn forlSnSN 
Equation 5-1 
R 1,0 R[l,ll ... R l,T-1 
R[2,0 R[2,11 ... R[2,T-1[ 
... ... .. . .. . 
... ... ... .. . 
R[K,O] Rl_K,I] ... R(K,T-1] 
Table 5-1 Description of Randomizer ~as a two dimensional array 
of Length= K * T 
Keystream W, a function of key~ and randomiser B is the bitwise modulo 2 sum 
of K subsequences of length N within the randomizer starting at positions specified by 
the secret key. Each block (row) of R is extended cyclically, that is, each rO\~' is reduced 
moduloT: 
X 
WN = L E9R[k,(n ~I+ Z.)mod 1] 
k=l 
Equation 5·2 
for 1 < n < N where LEB denotes summation modulo 2 ~ ~
' Zl R(I,ZI+OJ R(I,ZI+IJ ... R(I,ZI+N-1] 
Z2 R(2,Z2+0] R(2,Z2+1] ... R(2,Z2+N-I] 
... ... ... ... .. . 
... 
RiKZK+OJ R.IKZK+IJ 
... . .. 
ZK ... R[K,ZK+N-1] 
:EE9 wo WI ... WN-1 
Plain xo XI ... XN-1 
Y=WEilX YO Yl ... YN-1 
Table 5·2 Description of Cryptogram Y = W E9 X from Randomizer R with Secret 
Key~ 
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The keystrcam, W, described by equation 5.2, is the bitwise modulo 2 surn of K 
sub-sequences of R which arc of length N, that is, WI is I he sum modulo 2 of U[J ,Z 1[ , 
R[2,Z2[ .... , R[K,ZK[ where ~<D indicates sum modulo 2. (See Table 5-2) 
For example, where K = 50 and T = 1om and N = 2 10 {approximately 1• I 0'1) 
gives a keysize of only 3320 bits, that is 50 JogJ JOJ'1 • The legitimate user must only 
examine 50 randomizcr bits per plain text bit while an enemy has to examine, even \Vith 
an optimal strategy, perhaps 1/4 of all the bits per plain text bit. This giw:s M = KT/4 = 
1.25*1021 bits in total or 1.16 • 10u bits per plaintext bit. The chance of gaining more 
information about the plaintext is not greater than tom • (l/4P0 which is less than 10 
n .(Maurer, 1990, p368) 
5.3.3. Implementation of Theoretical Method 
A trial implementation with a randomiser of 1 * 1 or. bits demonstrates the case of 
the theoretical method but ignores the requirement for a randomiser of much greater 
size. A method of meeting this requirement with deterministic construction is discussed 
later. 
The arrangement of the randomisers in an array of K sub sequences of length T 
is easy to simulate in software. The secret key, ~. indicates the start of the sequence of 
bits selected from each block of the randomiser. 
The index within each block, reduced modulo T, is shO\vn by a dotted line in 
each block which permits the randomiser block to be viewed as a circular buffer. If the 
blocks are rotated to line up each bit indexed by the secret key ~ then the bits in each 
block can be read vertically and summed modulo 2 to generate key string W. 
The implementation divides a randomiser file into blocks of equal length and 
then fills a two dimensional array with contiguous bits from each block. Each column 
within the array is summed modulo 2 to produce a key bit which is used to encrypt a 
message bit. The security of the method relies on the qualities of the randomiser and 
the secret key. The use of numerous randomiser blocks to provide multiple bits for the 
creation of a ke ' bit serves to hide the structure ,)f the randomiser from anal\' sis. 
I 
I 
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Figure 5·2 Schematic of Theoretical Randomiser Construction Method 
Repeating Maurer's analysis, where K = 10 and T = 1 os and N = 210 
(approximately 1024 bits) gives a keysize of approximately 166 bits, that is 10 log2 10s 
. The legitimate user must only examine 10 randomizer bits per plain text bit while an 
enemy has to examine, even with an optimal strategy, perhaps 1/4 of all the bits per 
plain text bit. This gives M = KT /4 = 2.5 *1 0 5 bits in total or 244 bits per plaintext bit. 
The chance of gaining more information about the plaintext is not greater than 1 os * 
(1/4)10 which is less than 10-2. 
5.3.4. Summary 
1:1 Implementation with a small randomiser is practical but the ease of implementation 
is offset by the loss of security. 
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!J A small randomiser compromises the security of the method by reducing the 
analytical workload and increasing the likelihood of randomiser bits being reused. 
!J The effective working life of the cipher would depend on how much information 
about the randomiser is released with t.•ach decrypted message. 
D A much larger randomiser is constrained by the amount of time and resources 
needed to store and search the array for the relevant bits. Consequently a trade-off 
between size and practicality is needed. 
5.4. Description of the Proposed Method 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The theoretical method is limited in implementation by the size of the 
randomiser required and the key information is proportional to the number and size of 
the blocks used. Speed and memory constraints may make the implementation 
impractical. 
The proposed method is developed from original research for an undergraduate 
project where a circular buffer of binary data of length 5 * 1 O'J bits is traversed and bits 
are selected or discarded according to a simple algorithm. The algorithm needs to 
specify a Start Point in the Buffer and a method of selecting the necessary number of 
bits. 
The benefits of the proposal include use of a smaller randomiser, key size is not 
directly related to the size of the randomiser and the speed is comparable to Maurer's 
method. 
5.4.2. Description of Proposed Method 
A random binary sequence B = [Ro. R1, ... , R;-;.!] is generated and stored in a 
randomly accessible medium. A constraint of g is that it is substantially larger than 
any message it is used to encrypt, that is N >> n. lt may help in understanding the 
proposal by imagining the randomiser as a circular buffer able to be entered at any 
point and traversed in either direction. 
Given a binary message, M = [Mo. M1, ... , Mn·2, Mn.i], a key, K = [Ko. K1 .... , Kn·l, 
Kn·l J, the encrypted binary message,~= [Eo. E,, ... , En·l, En.!], is generated by bitwise 
addition modulo 2 of M and K (where$ is addition modulo 2). 
En=MnEBKn for1 $.n:5N 
Equation 5-3 
To produce the binary keystream, K, the indices of the selected bits in the 
Randomiser, g, are specified by the Index Sequence,! = [10, h, ... , In·l, 10 . 1]. 
If an arbitrary integer starting point in R denoted by SP and a sequence of 
integers.§ = [So ,s,, ... , 8;.2, S;.J) are defined then the Index Sequence,!, to Randomiser, 
R. can be generated where Io = SP, l1 = SP +So, ... ,IN= SP +so ... + sx. The values inS 
are either part of the absolute index of a bit in R or indicate the number of bits to 
discard between bits which are selected. 
The key generation algorithm is defined as 
Ki = R.1 mod N 
Equation 5~4 
where dis the index of the bit in R reduced modulo N, that is lx = d: 
1. Absolute Mode 
n 
d = SP+LSti·lmodil 
i= 1 
Equation 5-S 
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or 
2. Discard Mode 
n 
d = SP + L Sli-1 mmlil • i 
i= 1 
Equation 5·6 
The selection mechanisms employed in this method arc easily implemented and 
it is submitted that they meet the requirement or making the bit selection method more 
difficult and so permit a shorter randomiser to be used. (Maurer,l990, p372) 
5.4.3. Implementation Example of Proposed Method 
5.4.3.1. Definitions 
Random binary sequence B (Ro, R~o ... , RN.i] 
Plain binary message M (Mo, Mt, ... , Mn-1] 
Encrypted binary message ]:; = [Eo, Et, ... , En·l ] 
Key binary sequence 
.K = [Ko, K1. ... , K,.i[ 
Integer Index sequence ! = [Io. It, ... , In-tl 
Integer Selection sequence § = [So ,St , ... , Si .I] 
Integer Starting Point SP 
where N is the size of the randomiser E, n is the size of the message M to be 
processed and N >> n . An arbitrary integer, J, indicates the number of values used in 
the selection set.§. SP and S.~ are constrained modulo N. 
To produce the binary Key Sequence K = [Ko. , K~, ... , Kn-1, Kn-l ] from the 
Randomiser, R, the indices of the bits to be selected are specified. This is accomplished 
by using the Index Sequence, ! ""[Io. It, ... , In-d-
An arbitrary starting point in R is defined by the integer SP and a sequence of 
integers§ = [So ,8 1 , ••• , Si .t] can then be used to generate the Index Sequence,!, 
where Io = SP, It= SP +So, h = SP +So + St, ... In= SP +So+, ... ,+ Sx. 
The index for each bit in R, denoted by Ii , is defined as h = d mod N where 
1. Absolute 
The seier.tion method where the absolute index of the bit in R is specified. (Using 
equation 5.5) 
n-1 
d = SP + L S!i·t mrnlil 
i=l 
Given N = 60, n = 6, j = 3, SP = 10, .§.= (5, 7, 2] then 
! = (SP, SP + So, SP +So+ St , SP + So + 81 + 82 , SP + So + St + S2 +So , SP + So + 
8 1 + 8 2 +So + s, [ = [10, 15, 22, 24, 29, 36[ 
and 
K = [Rio, R It, R h, R h, R 14, R Is] = [Rw, R1s, R22, R24, R29, R36]. 
As an example: (hyphens inserted for readability, selected bits underlined) 
R = {101001010l-0100110101-0Q1Q1011Q0-10111l0101-1010100110-1010101001) 
K = {110001} 
2. Discard 
The selection method where the relative index of the bit in R is specified, that is 
the number of bits to be discarded between selections. (Using equation 5.6} 
n-1 
d= SP+LS!i-tmollj)+t 
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i=l 
Given N = 60, n = 6, j = 3, SP = 10, .§. = [5, 7, 2[ then ! = [SP, SP + Su + 1, SP + So + 1 
+ S1 + l, SP +So + 1 + St + 1 + S1 + 1, SP +So + 1 + St + 1 + S1 + 1 + Su + 1, SP +So + 
I + St + 1 + S1 + 1 + Sn + 1 + St + 1] 
! = [10, 16, 24, 27, 33, 41) and .IS= [Rw, R11,, RH. Rn, R:1,1, Rn] 
As an example: {hyphens inserted for readability and selected bits underlined ) 
R = jiO I 00 10101-0 I 00110 I 0 1-00 I Q I 01100-1011110 I 01-10 I 0 I 00 II 0-101 0 I 0 I 00 II 
J:;=jiiOIIIj 
It can be seen that the same selection regime can produce two different Key 
sequences depending on the mode selected. 
If the Randomiser is considered to be generated by a non-deterministic or 
random source then any reasonable sample of the Randomiser is itself random. An 
unreasonable sample would be choosing bits to meet a predefined objective such as 
selecting l's half as frequently as D's. This biased method is generally not suitable for 
statistical sampling. 
It may help in understanding this process if it is considered to be another 
sampling regime to be compared with the traditional cluster, strata and other types of 
statistical sampling, i.e. a pseudo-random sampling. 
5.4.4. Summary 
0 The proposed method is easy to implement and uses only one bit to encrypt each 
plain text bit. 
0 Key size is constant regardless of the size of the randomiser. The smaller 
randomiser is easily stored and traversed. 
IJ The security of the proposed method depends on the qualities of the randomiser and 
the minimisation of the reuse of the bits. This can be achieved by limiting the uses 
and by varying the startpoint and selection algorithms. 
5.5. Simulation of Theoretical Method Using Proposed 
Method 
5.5.1. Introduction 
The theoretical method can be implemented by the proposed method with the 
simple modification of choosing a sequence of bits and summing them modulo 2 to 
generate a single key bit. The secret key z; in the theoretical method is a set of integers 
used as Start Points. The number of bits used to generate a key bit, V, and§= [1] are 
used to select consecutive bits in absolute mode. 
Each key bit in .K = [Ko. , K~o ... , Kn.2, Kn. 1 ] is the sum modulo 2 of V bits in R : 
1'-l 
K, = I E!lR[Z,. + i] 
1'"0 
Equation 5-7 
5.5.2. Description 
The simulation in the Absolute Mode entails a set of Start Points, H = jSPo , SP1 , 
··- , SPk J equivalent to the vector Z and Selection Set, S, = {1}. However, if the K 
segments of the randomiser are connected linearly into a ring buffer of length KL the 
indices of the chosen bits are determined with the proposed Method. See Table 5-3. 
The theoretical method is considered to be a simple implementation of the 
proposed method which meets the requirements of a stream cipher application. Proof 
of security does not necessarily follow from Maurer's paper as the proposed method 
encapsulates the theoretical method. 
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SPu R[ I ,SP,+O[ Rj 1 ,SPu + lJ ... ll[I,SPu+N·II 
SP, R[2,SP,+OI R[2,SP, +II ... R[2,SP, +N-Il 
... ... ... ... .. . 
... ... 
RiK,SP,., +II 
... 
R,IK,S,+ N-Il SPn RJK,SP, +OJ ... 
~w WI W2 ... WN 
plain XI X2 ... XN 
WffiX Yl Y2 ... YN 
Table 5-3 Specifying Start Points 
Zl Z2 ZJ Z4 z5] Z6 
Rl R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
12 13 14 15 16 
Figure 5·3 Maurer's Randomiser As Part Or A Ring Buffer 
In figure 5.3, theoretical randomiser segments are concatenated to produce a 
ring buffer. The Z flags show the bit specified by the Key Z in each Randomiser 
segment. The I flags show that each value in Z can be described by an index calculated 
from the start of R 1. 
Table 5.4 shows that each Index flag can be calculated from the start of the B 
and S shows Start Point and Selection Set in the Absolute Method 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
Randomise Rl R2 R3 R4 RS R6 
r 
Key Zl Z2 Z3 Z4 zs Z6 
I= Zl Rl+Z2 RI+R2+Z3 Rl+R2+R3+ Rl+R2+R3+ Rl+R2+R3+ 
Z4 R4++ZS R4+RS+Z6 
s- SP SP+SI SP+Sl +S2 SP+Sl+S2+ SP+Sl+S2+ SP+Sl+S2+ 
S3 S3+S4 S3+S4+S5 
Table 5-4 Calculation of Indices 
Figure 5-4 Schematic or Randomiser Construction 
Each block of E is numbered in sequence from 1 to K, that is, E = (Rl + R2 + , ... , RK] 
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In figure 5.4, the same randomiscr block is copied and concatenated to produce 
the randomiser. Tht• rota lion of each block by the secret key value aligns the repeated 
blocks to permit bit selection. This method is equivalent to using each secret key value 
as a start point in the randomiscr. 
5.5.3. Summary 
0 The proposed method can easily reproduce the theoretical method and provides 
more opportunity for varying the key generation algorithm. However, the selection of 
contiguous bits is considered to be detrimental to the security of the method and 
should be avoided where practical. 
D While the User may encrypt a message many times using different Selection 
Algorithms and sum them modulo 2 there may be little benefit in this. 
5.6. Commentary on Security of the Proposed Method 
•1 ;. The only provably secure method in general use is the One-Time-Pad, (Schneier 
PlS) which whilst secure needs to transmit as much randomiser as the message to 
enable a message to be processed. The randomiser must be random and secret, that is, 
known only to the authorised users. The main criterion is that the randomising data is 
only used once ever. 
Maurer addresses the secure randomiser by specifying a large publicly available 
randomiser that provides the basis for part of the security of the method. The main 
consideration is that using multiple bits to encrypt each message bit obscures the 
actual structure of the randomiser and makes the reconstruction of the key generation 
method from a known message much harder. 
The proposed method is provably secure, if and only if the selected randomiser 
bits are used once. Multiple use of the randomiser makes the method conditionally 
secure and the main mechanism for ensuring security is to limit the number of uses per 
randomiser. The use of different randomisers, selection sets and start pnints add to the 
method's security as it is practical to vary the components easily. 
The key size of the Theoretical method is proportional to the number and size of 
the blocks. The key size of the Proposed method is constant and not proportional to 
the size of the randomiser. 
5.6.1. Implementation on a Smart Card 
Implementation on a Smart Card is practical and the limited use of a small 
randomiser with a complex selection method permits conditionally secure usage. The 
card can be changed rapidly if it is considered to be compromised or life-expired. The 
costs of implementation may be reduced if a standard card can be configured by the 
user. Randomisers on cards can be produced and publicly distributed so the users 
need to share Selection Sets and Start Points. 
5. 7. Smart Card Fraud 
If a Smart Card is used repeatedly then it may be possible to collate all the 
outputs for analysis to reconstruct the algorithms and randomiser. Fraud or 
unauthorised access may not be easily limited if the reconstruction compromises the 
system. A substantial break in the system may not be detected until after a major 
fraud has been discovered. The loss of business reputation and the costs of repairing 
the damage may make the continued viability of the system impractical. 
Estimations of the costs of fraud are proportional to both the number of cards in 
circulation and the number of uses of each card and a simple model is proposed to 
explain this. 
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The model uses estimations of the costs of the Smart Card and the costs of the 
implementation. 
5.7.1. Fraud and Costing Model. 
The estimation starts with a Hardware Cost which covers all the hardware 
needed to set up a system of readers and cards The Hardware Cost includes Card 
Costs, Reader Costs, Installation and Support costs. 
Card Costs include a discount for quantity. The price per card reduces to 50% of 
the nominal card cost for bulk purchases. 
Nominal Card Cost= $5.00 
Card Cost= Nominal Cost* 0.5 +(Nominal Cost* 0.5)/sqrt(number of cards) 
Total Card Cost = Card Cost * Number of Cards 
Equipment Costs cover the number of readers needed and include a discount for 
quantity. The price per reader reduces to 50% of the nominal cost for bulk purchases. 
Nominal Reader Cost = $50 
Number of Readers =roundup (sqrt(number of cards/ 3) 
Reader Costs= Nominal Cost* 0.5 +(Nominal Cost • 0.5jsqrt(number of readers) 
Equipment Costs= Reader Costs* Number of Readers 
InstaHation Costs include the costs of cabling and accessories. 
Nominal installation Cost = $5.00 
Installation Costs= Number of Readers* Nominal Cost+ 0.10 * (Number of Cards* 
Number of Readers) 
Support Costs include ongoing costs of supporting a system. 
Nominal Support Cost = $0. 10 
Support Cost= Number of Readers* Nominal Cost+ sqrt{number of cards* number of 
readers) 
Total Hardware Cost includes all costs in setting up and running the system. 
Total Hardware Cost= Card Cost + Equipment Cost + Installation Cost + Support Cost 
Hardware Cost Per Card= Total Hardware Cost Number of Cards. 
Hardware Costs Per Card 
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Using this model, the initial setup of the system is expensive but the costs per card 
drop quickly. 
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5,7,2, The Cost Per Usc for a Smart Card 
Nominal Cost Per Usc"' 0.05 + (0.05/sqrt(numbcr of uses)) 
The Cost Per Card Per Usc includes all the costs associated with multiple cards in 
regular usc. 
Cost Per Card Per Use = (Hardware Cost Per Card/ number of uses) + Cost Per Usc + 
0.01 * sqrt(Sqrt(number of Cards* number of Uses)) 
The usage costs increase with the number of uses and the number of cards in 
circulation. 
Fraud Cost Per Card per Use is proportional to the number of cards and the number of 
uses. 
Nominal Fraud Cost of 0. 90 
Fraud Cost per Card Per Use =nominal cost* sqrt(sqrt(uses) * sqrt(cards)) 
These equations estimates are graphed in figure 6-6 to estimate the fraud costs 
er card er use. 
Fraud Cost Per Card Per Use 
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The costs of fraud increase with the number of cards in circulation, which 
permits an adversary to learn more about a system and also with the increase in uses 
which permit greater opportunities for fraud or errors. 
Fraud Costs for a small number of cards used only once rise steeply as the 
possibility of fraud using inside information is likely. 
With a large number of cards in circulation and many uses per card, the number 
of people who may commit fraud increases proportionally. Off-line transactions would 
be susceptible to small-scale frauds due to the lack of validation during the 
transaction. 
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5.7.3. Summary 
0 Using the estimations of the model approximately 500 uses per card is acceptable in 
keeping the costs of fraud per card usc down. l;or example, given a transaction limit 
of $500 per day, it would take only one fraudulent transaction to give an average 
fraud of $1.00 per usc on one card. 
0 A card may be used infrequently and 500 uses is considered to give about two years 
of use to the private user. This is estimated at once per working day, which is 5 * 48 
* 2 or 480 uses. 
5.8. Construction of Randomisers. 
5.8.1. Introduction 
A limiting condition of the Theoretical Method is the substantial length of the 
randomiser needed. A small modification is proposed which addresses this issue and 
hence allows a practical implementation of a large randomiser. 
The size of the readily accessible randomiser is of the order of 1 * 1021 bits (1.25 
* 101:2 Gigabytes) and the constraints on storing and searching this sequence are 
substantial. HO\vever, a large randomiser can be produced deterministically from a 
smaller sequence and under certain conditions it may be indistinguishable from bits 
selected from a sequence produced by a random process. 
If the randomiser is developed over time, that is broadcast publicly, the 
legitimate user need only listen when the necessary component is being broadcast \Vhile 
the unlawful user must copy and process all the randomiser incurring a substantial 
penalty in time and space terms. 
For example, the randomiser could be widely distributed on a sequential set of 
Compact Discs and the legitimate user could collect only the necessary portions. 
However, the unlawful user must collect all the disks and be prepared to process all of 
them to decrypt the message. For example, CO's are commonly used to distribute 
software with magazines. Additionally, random sequences are also available. 
(Peterson, 1998, pl79) 
5.8.2. Deterministic Construction of Randomisers 
An operation, ROT{u), rotates a binary sequence of n bits by u bits without loss 
of data. For example ROT(1) on '101' gives '011 ', ROT(·l) on '011' gives '101' and ROT(3) 
on '10 1' gives '1 01' which is identical to ROT(O). If x is an integer rotation value then u 
= x mod n and n unique sequences can be generated by rotating the Basic Sequence by 
u from 0 to n·l. 
A Complete Ordered Composite Sequence of n 2 bits can be produced by 
concatenating the n rotated sequences in order from 0 to n·l. However, concatenation 
can be performed in n factorial ways giving many possible Complete Composite 
Sequences. 
For example, an 4 bit Basic Sequence produces four different rotated sequences 
and concatenation produces a 16 bit Complete Composite Sequence as one of 4 
factorial or 24 possible 16 bit sequences. This process can be repeated with the 24 
possible Complete Composite Sequences being concatenated, giving 24 factorial or 6.2 * 
10 23 possible sequences of 384 bits and so yielding a sequence of any desired length. 
It is noted that the ROT() operation preserves some of the characteristics of the 
initial sequence. If P(O) denotes the probability of obtaining a zero for any bit in the 
Basic Sequence then ROT() does not alter P(O) in any of the rotated sequences, 
consequently, a Complete Composite Sequence or sequence comprising complete rotated 
sequences retains this characteristic. 
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A DeBruijn sequence has the characteristic of containing the complete set of 
overlapping binary sequences for some integer value. A simple example of a De Bruijn 
sequence of n = 3 is '00011101' (Jobnsonbaugh, 1984, p127) which contains the set of 
overlapping three bit sequences '000', '001 ', '011 ','Ill', '110', '101', '010', '100' that are 
a complete binary representation from 0 to 2:1-1. 
It is noted that performing HOT() on the DeDruijn sequence docs not alter this 
characteristic and the De Oruijn sequence can be considered as a circular bit buffer. 
Usc of a De Bruijn Sequence for large n may be limited by the costs of generation and 
storage. 
For example, using the eight bit DcBruijn sequence '00011101 ',the operation 
ROT(i) for values 0 to 7 can be performed and concatenated sequentially to get a 
Complete Ordered Composite Sequence with ordering= [0,1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7! (hyphens arc 
inserted for ease of reading) : 
00011101-00111010-01110100-11 101000-11010001-1010001!-010001 11-10001110 
Obvious subsequences such as '000' and '111' occur frequently though this may 
not be readily apparent in some of the possible factorial orderings. For example, a 
Complete Composite Sequence with Ordering= [6,3,0,1,2,4,5,7] 
01000111-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-10100011-10001110 
Given a Complete Composite Sequence, to\, generated by the rotating and 
concatenating the Basic DeBruijn sequence, a sub-sequence X' is extracted containing 
at least 5 complete Basic Sequences. Extraction of a smaller sub-sequences to\" and to\"' 
from N is made to demonstrate the difficulty in determining the Basic Sequence with a 
reduced sample. (Note the hyphens '-'indicate boundaries of rotated Basic Sequences 
for ease of understanding) 
~ = 01000111-11101000-00011101-0011 1010-01110100-11010001-10100011· 
10001110 
W = 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-101 
~" = 1000-00Q111Ql-0011 
N"' = OorN'"=01 
There is not enough information in N" to readily determine the Bask Sequence 
and a number of short, separate subsequences such as N"' provide little information 
about the Basic Sequence. 
While structural similarities in the Composite Sequence exist due to the well 
ordered nature of the Basic Sequence, a random Basic Sequence with a randomly 
ordered set of rotations may make it more difficult to determine the Basic Sequence and 
ordering. 
For example, a random integer, D, is converted into binal)' notation to get a 
Basic Sequence, B of length n. By choosing a random sequence of Rotations, IJt, a 
Composite Sequence, N, can be constructed by rotating and concatenating B by IJL 
Given D = 179, B = 10110011, n = 8 and ~H = [04618975] where IJli is 
constrained modulo n, a Composite Sequence, N, is generated such that : {hyphens 
used for ease of reading) 
For reference, a Complete Ordered Composite Sequence using IJI = 
[0, 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7] 
IOIIOOII-01100111-IIOOIII0-10011 101-0011 1011-01110110-11101100-1101100! 
then a Composite Sequence N using ordering IJt = [0,4,6, 1,0, 1,7,5] 
N = 10110011-00111011-11101100-01100111-10110011-01100111-11011001-01110110 
N = 10110011-00111011-11101100-01100111-10110011-01100111-11011001-01110110 
N * = 111011-11101100-01100111-1011 N * = 11101111101100011001111011 
The sub-sequence '101' appears 8 times, the sub-sequence '1001' appears 6 
times and determining if any binary sequence is composite may involve more than a 
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cursory inspection. Determination of the Basic and l~otation Sequences to describe the 
incomplete Composite Sequence, !'{ * may be difficult. 
If a substantial but undetermined number of small sequences arc selected 
consecutively there may be enough data to identify the Basic Sequence (at least n bits 
and preferably much more) though determining the rotation details of the Composite 
Sequence is still difficult. Usc of single widely separated bits may make it difficult to 
obtain any information about the 13asic Sequence and it may be a non-trivial exercise to 
reconstruct the Composite Sequence. 
5.8.3. Testing to Determine a Basic Sequence 
To determine the length of the Basic Sequence, n, it is necessary to examine all 
the bits in the Randomiser repeatedly to find the largest value for n that is acceptable. 
For a Complete Composite Sequence the number will be the square root of length, 
however, for an incomplete Composite Sequence this number will be greater than the 
square root of the length of the sequence. 
5.8.4. Determination of Basic Sequence 
A Composite sequence is constructed from sub-sequences and a Complete 
Composite Sequence contains every possible rotated sequence in some order. A 
Random sequence is non-deterministic. 
Given a randomiser of length 1 * 106 bits, \Vhich may be composite and 
complete it is examined to determine if it is Composite. Starting with the smallest 
reasonable Basic Sequence of 2 bits, determine if the 2 bit pattern is repeated in the 
randomiser and after a number of iterations of the test, as yet undetermined, make a 
decision to stop and try another sequence. Testing blocks of bits for similar numbers of 
zeros and ones may become time consuming even with an optimal testing strategy. 
One possible method could be: for each n, select at random a number, k, of n bit 
samples from the sequence. Analysis of these k s('quences of n bits should indicate 
similar values for P(O) where P(O) is the probability of obtaining a zero for any bit in the 
sequence. 
For example, using a portion of a randomiser treated as a circular buffer, N', and 
k = 2", and random vector [6, 35, 23, 28] tests can select four two bit samples. 
~· • 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-0 Ill 0 I 00-110 I 0001-10 I 
Counting from the left, the sequences selected 10,11,01,01 produce a value for 
P(O) of 0.375 and P(l) of 0.625. It is noted that '00' is not represented. 
This test may be very difficult to implement due to the necessity of determining 
when to stop testing and what should be the acceptable limits on the calculated values. 
Additionally, whether the results of the test are conclusive or should further tests be 
implemented to determine the rotation sequence. 
Alternatively, starting from the beginning of the sequence, select overlapping 
sequences of n bits. For every integer value between 1 and k discard a bit and repeat 
the selection. Determine the number of 'ones' in each sub-sequence and look for a 
match at intervals of n. If there is a match, generate every non~overlapping n bit 
sequence from the start and count the number of bits until the value changes. The 
value will be repeated for every rotated sequence of the Basic Sequence. 
For example, using a sequence N' and the number of blocks, k = 2 * n 
note: matching numbers that are n values apart are a possible basic sequence size. 
W • 111-11101000-00011101-00111010-0!!IOI00-11010001-101 
n=B 
11111101,11111010,11110100,11101000,11010000,10100000,01000000,10000001, 
00000011, 00000111, 00001110, 00011101, 00111010, 01110100, 11101001, 11010011 
7,6,5,1:,3,2,1 ,2, 
2,3,3,1:,4,4,5,5 4 matches at intervalS then try each 8 bit sequence. 
1111110100000011101001110100111010011010001101 7,2, 
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11111010 00000111 01001110 10011101 00110100 01101 6,3, 
11110100 00001110 10011101 00111010 01101000 I 101 5,3, 
11101000 00011101 00111010 01110100 11010001 101 • 4 4 4 4 4 
11010000 00111010 011 10100 11101001 10100011 01 • 3,4, 
10100000 01110100 11101001 11010011 01000110 1 2,4, 
01000000 11101001 11010011 10100110 10001101 • 1,5, 
10000001 11010011 10100111 01001101 0001101 • 2,5, 
The Basic Sequence length is apparently 8 as the value 4 is repeated for each block in 
the sequence. It is also shown that the partial block size at the beginning :s three bits. 
Appendix 9-20 contains the worked example. 
5.8.5. Summary of Test 
0 This test identifies the correct Basic Sequence size which produces~ sequence of 
matching values for each n bit block. Additionally, it determines the partial block 
size at the beginning of the sequence. 
0 The Basic Sequence is relatively easily determined for small values of n. The 
alternatives to make this more difficult are large sequence sizes or increased 
complexity. Large sequences will only increase the work load in a linear fashion 
and an optimal strategy may quickly determine the Basic Sequence size and rotation 
ordering. 
o The work load for a Basic Sequence is approximately equal to the number of 
sequences generated, A, plus the number of additions, 8, plus the number of 
comparisons, C, plus generating further n bit sequences, D, +further comparisons, 
E. 
Work load = A + B + C + D + E 
Equation 5-7 
0 For n = 8 the values are A= 2 • n, B = 2 • n, C = n, D = c1(2 • n) and E = c2(2 * n) 
where C1 and C2 are some arbitrary value. Work load= A+ B + C + D + E = Sn + 
c1(2n) + c2(2n) where a linear increase inn produces a linear increase in the Work 
Load. 
5.8.6. Increased Complexity 
A Composite Sequence can be constructed for increased complexity with multiple 
random Basic Sequences of varying length rotated by a random selection of values. This 
will break up the relationships between consecutive blocks and the solution may 
become non-trivial. 
For example, a Composite Sequence constructed from Basic Sequences of 
differing lengths such as A, 8, C may be ordered as specified by IJt 
=!A3,C2,C1,B1,A5,82,CS]. These sequences may be sub-sequences of a larger random 
sequence broken up into arbitrary sized pieces and assigned an identifier. 
Given Basic Sequences A • [0101110[, B • [01100110001[ and C • [101J a 
Complex Composite Sequence, ~ , can be produced. 
::; = 1110010-110-011-11001100010-1001011-10011000101-110 
A Complete Composite Sequence for A would have 49 bits, for 8, 121 bits and for 
C 9 bits. There would be 21 possible rotated sequences that could be concatenated 21! 
Times. Use of larger random sequences of the order of 1 * 1011 bits may make the task 
of determining the basic sequence very difficult. 
Any random or deterministic sequence can be treated in like manner and it may 
be a non-trivial task to detennine whether a portion of the sequence is deterministic 
(composite) or random. Any portion produced by sub-sequences smaller than a Basic 
Sequence may be indistinguishable from a random sequence under any reasonable 
test. 
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5.8.7. Testing a Complex Sequence 
Using the eight bit DeBruijn sequence '000 Ill 0 1', as sequence A, '0 I 0' as 
sequence Band ~ll =JAO, AI, Bl, A2, A3, A4, AS, A6]. 
~ • 00011101-00111010-I00-01110100-IIIOI000-11010001-IOIOOOII-OIOOOIII 
By inspection, a repeated sub-sequence is 1 Ito 10 and this may be a part of the 
Basic sequence. The format displayed below shows the number of I 'sin the first n bit 
sequence and each consecutive sequence discards the leading bit. However, testing for 
8 bit patterns which are expected: 
:!: • 00011101 00111010 10001110 10011101 0001 ... 0111• 4,4,4,5 
4. 00111010 01110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
4. 01110100 1110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
5. 11101001 110101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
5. 11010011 10101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
5. 10100111 0101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
:!: • 01001110 10100011 10100111 0100 ... 0111 • 
5. 10011101 01000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
±· 00111010 10001110 10011101 ... 0111 • 
5. 01110101 000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
5 • 11101010 0011101001110100011010001101000 1101000111 
4. 11010100 0111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
3. 10101000 111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
3. 0101000111010011101000110100011010001101000111 
1•1010001110100111 0100011 ... 0111 • 
4 • 01000111 010011101000110100011010001101000111 
4,4,5 
4,4,5 
4,5 
The interpolation of a simple three bit sequence into an ordered rotation 
sequence hides the basic sequence structure. The test may detect the Basic Sequence 
depending on the application of the test and the observations drawn by the user. 
However, while a User may visually determine the Basic Sequence in this example, a 
test implemented on a computer may need to be complex. 
Detailed explanation of the method is provided in the Appendix 9.21. 
5.8.8. Specification of a Complete Composite Sequence 
A Complete Composite Sequence can be specified in n2 bits, however, the 
information needed to generate a Complete Composite Sequence is the Basic Sequence 
and the rotation and concatenation sequence, IJt. This will be n bits for the Basic 
Sequence plus n rotations specified in binary format. Ordering information, 0, 
0 = n + (n log2 n) 
Equation SMS 
Specification of a Composite Sequence in this manner is more efficient for large 
values of n even allowing for the work in generating the Composite Sequence. The 
larger the Randomiser simulated, the more efficient the specification, S, of the 
Composite Sequence becomes: 
S 0 n+nlog,n 
= 71" = ,z -
Equation SM9 
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To determine the limit on S as n increases: 
Using L 'hopital's rule (Grossman p448) for the indeterminate form oo/oo, divide 
through by n 
log211 (I + ---- -) 
lim 11 -7 ooS :::: lim 11 -)> oo -----'-1'-1 -
II II 
Equation 5-10 
limit n -7 cc 1 /n"' 0 
As n increases toward infinity the limit on S tends toward zero. 
For example, if n = 8 then each rotation can be specified in a minimum of log:.m 
or 3 bits and there are 8 possible rotation numbers in the set :11 ={0,1,3,2,6,5,4,7} and 
using Equation 5.8 this information can be stored in a minimum of S = 8 + (8 * 3) or 32 
bits which is 0.5 of the length, n2 or 64, of the Complete Composite Sequence 
A Basic Sequence of 1.37438 * 1011 or 237 bits (17.1798698 Gigabytes) can 
produce a Complete Composite Sequence of 1.88894 * 1022 bits by specifying the 
rotation sequence. This Complete Composite Sequence can be specified in S = 1.37438 
* 1011 + (1.37438 * 1011 * 37) bits. This evaluates to 5.22267 * 1012 bits (652.83375 
Gigabytes) which is substantially less than the Complete Composite Sequence of 
1.88894 * 1022 bits (2.361175 * 1012 Gigabytes). There are 237 factorial ways of 
ordering the rotated sequences to produce a similar sequence. 
A Complex Complete Composite Sequence can be specified by the sum of the 
ordering information used to generate the various rotated sequences from the Basic 
Sequences. 
Where the Complete Composite Sequence is not used in its entirety, then to save 
space and time it need not be generated. For example, when only 5 * 109 bits are 
selected or discarded then only the relevant portion of the Complete Composite 
Sequence of 1.88894 * 1022 bits need be generated. 
Additionally, a randomiser of N bits may be partitioned into as many smaller 
subsequences as required. 
For example, with N = 1 * 106 bits then subsequence A= 1000 bits, 8 = 10000 
bits, C = 100000 bits and D = 889000 bits, or further A= 12345 bits, 8 = 543210 bits, 
C = 123321 bits and D = 321124 bits. 
The ordering of the subsequences may be changed to produce differing 
randomisers. For example, ABCD or ACBD. It is clear that reconstructing the Basic 
Sequence from an unknown partitioning of a random sequence may be difficult when 
little is known of the subsequences. 
5.8.9. Summary 
a Any random or deterministic sequence can be rotated and concatenated and it may 
be a non-trivial task to determine whether a portion of a sequence is deterministic 
(composite) or random. 
a Use of sub-sequences smaller than a Basic Sequence may make it infeasible to 
determine the Basic Sequence and the Rotation order. 
a A composite randomiser can be stored efficiently in a reduced form with suitable 
rotation and ordering information. This storage (or perhaps 'compression1 of the 
randomiser is more space efficient than storing the randomiser is its original form. 
a Complex Randomisers may be infeasible to analyse. 
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5.9. Transactions with the Smart Card Function Generator 
5.9.1. Introduction 
Having defined the characteristics of the Smart Card Function Gener<JI()r, !iOmc of I he 
uses need to be defined. 
The Function Generator (I"G) is normally considered to he unique, except when a 
matched set of FGs is created for symmetrical processes. 
The 'simplex' implementation refers to a single unique FG used in asymmetric funclions. 
An asymmetric function uses the unique FG physically associated with an mlf!f<Jct in 
such a way as to be readily identifiable and able to provide an authentication of the 
artefact. 
'Duplex' or 'Multiplex' implementation refers to a matched pair or set of FGs to perform 
symmetric functions. S_vmmetric functions require that an identical copy of the data 
necessary for the function is available at both ends. 
5.9.2. Simplex Implementation 
An originator can interrogate the FG and store the input and output sequences as a 
means of identifying the FG uniquely. A unique FG can be bonded to an artefact or 
assigned to a person. Possession of specific information about the FG can be used to 
prove access to and knowledge of the FG and its accompaniment. 
An auditor can randomly interrogate the FG and store the input and output 
sequences. These input and output sequences may not be inscribed on the artefact as 
proof that the auditor has seen it. This implies that many different auditors can take 
unique proofs of the seal's integrity without conferring. 
An attempt at fraud may include suborning an auditor. However, introducmg 
an arbitrary selection of auditors from a pool may complicate the task. As it is not 
known which auditors may have validated the FG the opportunities for fraud are 
reduced. 
If all the input sequences used are known then a spurious FG can be 
implemented which can duplicate the correct response to each input sequence as a 
replacement for a genuine FG. However, if the auditor keeps a secret set of random 
input sequences and their corresponding outputs from the FG the substitution may be 
readily detected. This is a form of collective security in that an unknown number ol 
output sequences may have been taken and each sequence must be repeated for each 
person for the artefact to be authenticated. Consequently, an artefact may be validated 
by an unknown number of anonymous auditors and it may not be practical to forge an 
FG. 
Unilateral anonymous identification can be achieved by providing an FG that can 
be interrogated to produce an output sequence that is acceptable to a third party. For 
example, to prove the attendance of a person at a specilic location, the person must 
interrogate an FG and store the input and output seque11ces. This can later be used as 
proof that the person and the FG have communicated. 
Bilateral anonymous identification can be achieved by nn exchange of details 
from their respective FGs. For example, a person can obtain the output sequence of 
their own FG using a specific input sequence. This can be used to interrogate the other 
FG to prove a meeting has taken place without the necessity of divulging personal 
details. 
5.9.3. Multiplex Implementation 
A unique matched set of FGs can be produced and an origin.~tor cnn interrogate 
the FGs and store the input and output sequences as a means of identifying tht• FGt-1 
uniquely. 
In a symmetric system, such as access control, one card may h(' n~tnin('d on the 
inside of the secure area and a matching card must be produced from tlw outsidt• tu 
validate an access request. 
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Additionally, the matched pair of FGs can be used in an encryption system to 
provide key generation and management facilities. 
5.9.4. Combination Implementation 
For example, a single FG may be bonded to a shipping container in such a 
manner as to be destroyed if the container is opened. The details of the FG output can 
be stored by the vendor and transmitted to the customer by separate secure 
communications. If Seal is validated before the package is opened then the customer 
can be sure that the package is the same as the Vendor has sent. 
A Vendor may assign a matched FG to a shipping company which provides a 
courier serYice. This FG is compared against the retained matching FG to identify the 
courier as coming from the shipping company. The shipping company can issue an 
employee with a matched FG which can be used to identify the courier picking up a 
package. 
The courier's details can be stored by the Vendor as proof of pickup and the 
courier can retain details of the Vendor's package. 
5.9.5. Summarv 
0 Identification of individuals or artefacts can be rapidly achieved with 
implementations of the FG. 
0 Identification does not necessarily require disclosure of personal details at the time 
of the transaction 
5.10. Conclusions 
5.10.1. Theoretical Method 
0 The theoretical method is impractical to implement fully. 
0 The size of the randomiser and work required for a solution are the principal 
constraints. 
5.10.2. Proposed Method 
0 The proposed method can be implemented fully. 
0 The randomiser size constraint can be met with the deterministic method of 
generating sequences. 
0 The proposed method describes a stream cipher application that meets the 
recommendations of the theoretical method but is easier to implement and faster. 
5.10.3. Proof of Security 
a As the proposed method encapsulates the theoretical method, the proof of security 
for the theoretical method is not necessarily applicable. 
5.10.4. Composite Sequences 
a A binary sequence o~ any length can be constructed as a Composite Sequence by 
rotating and concatenating any Basic Sequence. 
0 The Basic Sequence can be of any length and the construction of the Composite 
Sequence can be specified in less bits than a Complete Composite Sequence. 
a It may be difficult to determine the Basic Sequence and the rotation ordering by 
analysis to reconstruct the randomiser. 
0 It may be impractical to distinguish a portion of the Composite Sequence from a 
portion of a Random Sequence. 
Edith Cowan University 74 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, 
Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
0 Complexity of the Composite Sequence can be enhanced by using multiple basic 
sequences of differing lengths. 
5.10.5. Fraud Costing 
Q A primary measure of the security of the proposed method is the costs and 
likelihood of fraud. 
0 The Function Generator design is practical and easy to implement. 
0 The Function Generator design is provably secure under single usc conditions and 
conditionally secure under limited use conditions. 
o The construction of large randomisers is practical but analysis of the characteristics 
of these randomisers may be impractical. 
0 Asymmetric and symmetric implementation methods may be used to provide 
security under a \\'ide range of conditions. 
5.11. Smart Card Implementation of One Way Function 
5.12. Introduction. 
Simulation of the Smart Card design described in the previous chapters will be 
addressed. The development environment is 'Turbo Pascal'. This imposes a number of 
constraints on the simulation such as array length and specific exception handlers but 
they do not affect the proposed design. 
The design documentation contains a structure chart, top-level algorithm and 
complete source code in a separate appendix to the thesis. The implementation of the 
design and the test data give a basis for decisions relating to further development of the 
design on a Smart Card. 
Development environments exist to implement the algorithm on a Smart Card 
but this option is outside the scope of the research. Gemplus manufacture a reader 
and software environment which can be used to develop a working Smart Card. 
(GCR400) 
5.13. Design of Smart Card Application. 
5.13.1. Introduction 
The function generator described in chapter 5 was developed as a model for the 
generation of random-like sequences from a known input sequences. The use of the 
method to generate identification and authentication sequences is fundamental to the 
development of the thesis and its resolution in terms addressing the questions posed. 
5.13.2. Functions 
5.13.2.1. Serial Numbers and Card Identification 
Each Smart Card must have a unique serial number that cannot be removed 
without destroying the card. This serial number identifies the card and permits it to be 
assigned to an individual or group. This first or external serial number is created when 
the card is manufactured and can be embossed or encoded on the surface of the card, 
for example, bar coding to permit scanning. Additionally, the serial number can be 
stored in ROM on the card to provide an electronic method of displaying it. This is to 
reduce the possibility of a chip being excised from a Smart Card and grafted onto 
another card with different identification characteristics. 
A second or internal serial number can be generated by implementing a standard 
a1gorithm which generates an output sequence from the randomiser. Either the first 
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sequence of bits from the randomiser can be chosen or a specific selection algorithm can 
be employed using a standard input sequence. This second number positively 
identifies the ramlomiser on the card and enhances the card security by ensuring that 
the randomiser as well as the Card is clearly identified. The hard-wiring of the serial 
numUer into the fabric of the card appears to be the best option as the manufacturer 
can ensure that card serial numbers arc unique. 
5.13.2.2. Password And Access Control 
Identification of the authorised user of the card may be important depending on 
what function is required. For example, an electronic image stored within the card may 
be compared against the image of the person presenting the card. 
A password to permit selection of functions is needed and this requires that 
either the password is unchangeable and issued with the card or the card must be field 
programmable either by the bank or by the user. 
Limitation of the number of access operations is needed for three reasons, 
restricting losses, identifying illegal transactions and preserving card security. 
If a misused card is reserved for low value, off-line transactions to preserve its 
utility, there will be little benefit from these transactions owing to the time taken to 
perform them. A misused card may either expire or be refused by the system 
operators. If the serial number is coded to identify the year and month of the issue, the 
access control can be designed to ignore cards without the necessar:y characteristics. 
High value, on-line transactions need to be authorised and a check of internal 
and external serial numbers can identify stolen or misused cards. Biometric or imaging 
details stored on the card can provide a check on the identity of the user. Automatically 
storing the user's image at the time of the high value transaction may limit the amount 
of fraud. 
Accessing a card by trying passwords at random can be prevented by counting 
the number of failed attempts and disabling the card if these attempts exceed the pre-
programmed limit. A temporary lockout can be implemented where the card refuses to 
function for a period of time or the card can self-destruct when misused and destroy the 
randomiser and the selection algorithms stored on the card. 
The card access-control module limits the amount of time the card can remain 
active without an activity being performed. This time-out function limits the amount of 
use to which a card can be put without the password being re-entered. 
In the implementation a 3 digit serial number is used. Larger passwords may be 
implemented at the wish of the manufacturer or user. 
5.13.2.3. Ha&h Functions. 
A hash value of a transaction provides the User with a check on the transaction. 
Validation of the hash value by the User before committing a signature and confirming 
acceptance of the transaction ensures that the transaction is not altered. 
Owing to the limited space on a real Smart Card, the hash value may be omitted 
from the implementation. However, an implementation that mimics MD5 operations 
has been used in the simulation. 
5.13.2.4. Validation Sequences 
The use of the card to generate a validation sequence is analogous to a digital 
signature where each unique input sequence generates a unique output sequence. 
The serial number of the card can be appended to a document prior to hashing 
and the hash value could be used to generate a validation sequence. This would provide 
both parties with a unique signatltre that is related to the transaction, the consent of 
the User and the specific card assigned to the User. 
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5.13.2.5. Encryption and Decryption. 
A hash sequence of a document can be used to generate an encryption key to a 
block algorithm such as Data Encryption Standard (DES). The validation sequence can 
be prolonged to provide a key sequence for a stream cipher application. 
Depending on processing speed it may be possible to usc the Smart Card to 
generate a stream cipher encryption to provide a User with on-line secure voice, mail or 
electronic document communication for commercial confidentiality reasons. 
The key sequence can be transmitted with the message header or sent separately 
as the Smart Card used is unique. 
5.13.2.6. Randomiser. 
The randomiser is used to deterministically generate sequences in response to 
particular inputs. It can only be copied at time of manufacture. The selection 
algorithms can be altered by the manufacturer to provide certain characten'stics for sets 
of cards with the same randomiser or selection algorithms. Alternatively, the Issuer or 
User may program the Selection algorithms for a particular card. 
5.13.3. Security 
The design meets the requirements of a 'One-Time-Pad' which is provably secure 
only if it is used once and discarded. The security is reduced by the repeated use of the 
method even though bits are used in different sequences. Consequently the user must 
determine a limit to the amount of uses permitted. 
5. 13.4. Memory Requirements 
Assembly Language implementation of common algorithms exist and Rankl & 
Effing suggest that a Hash algorithm requires 4 kilobytes of code (Rankl & Effing, 1997, 
p84) and the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) requires 1 kilobyte of code. (Rankl & 
Effing, 1997, p71) 
Estimation of the total memory requirements is based on the following 
considerations. A stream encryption method is more space efficient than a block 
algorithm, bit selection algorithms may require less space than a hash algorithm and 
the randomiser may be as small as 10000 bits (1250 bytes). 
The executable simulation program, SMARTCD.EXE, incorporating all the 
functions including access control, bit selection algorithms, stream encryption and the 
MD5 hash algorithm takes approximately 21 kilobytes of memory. This compiler 
produced executable file could be implemented more efficiently in assembly language. 
A Philips P83C855 Smart Card has 20 kilobytes of ROM, 2 kilobytes of EEPROM 
and 512 bytes of RAM. (Rank! & Effing,1997, p430) 
Consequently, the memory estimation is 4 kilobytes for a hash function, 2 
kilobytes for a stream cipher function, 2 kilobytes for the bit selection algorithm and 4 
kilobytes for access control, selection and recording. This leaves 8 kilobytes for 
additional applications and implementing the randomiser. For example, a randomiser 
of 32768 bits can be implemented in 4 kilobytes. 
5.13.5. Summary 
IJ This limitation of usage has substantial economic consequences both in the costs of 
manufacturing and distribution of new cards and the costs of fraud in a 
compromised system. The implementation costs reduce with many cards in usc but 
the opportunity for fraud increases with the uses. For the purposes of the 
simulation a limit of 500 uses is chosen. 
Q Implementation is practical with the estimated memory usage. However, further 
investigation into the viability of the Smart Card design is desired. 
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5.14. Software Simulation of the Design 
5.14.1. Introduction 
The simulation environment. is a Pascal development environment which 
'd I f · h f · s listed. rOVl es f<?r_ ~h<!. _deve opt_ncnt of a suite o __ programs t~ tmplci!J~n~_! c unctiOn 
.-.- -
·-
I Input File I I Randomiscr File I I Activity Lt)g File I 
. - - - - - ------ - - - - - - - - - ----- - - - - - - - --- - -
~ lSelection Algorithm I ' Access Control ' Note. The program exists ' 
& Operation ' within the dotted line area ~ /Hash Algorithm ' I ' Sequencing ' and the files arc defined ' 
' outside the area in the ~ I Encryption Algorithm I !Display I: environment. 
·------------------------------------ -· 
!output File! I Configuration File I 
. Figure 5-1 Schematic of Smart Card Simulation 
In figure 5-1, the inputs and outputs are either data files or keyboard inputs to 
permit testing and evaluation of results. A limited amount of display is available on the 
screen to administer the program and explain what is happening. The primary aim of 
the simulation is to develop data for evaluation rather than examine user interface 
aspects or comment on the physical characteristics of the card. 
5.14.2. Functions 
5.14.2.1. Serial number 
The serial numbers can be generated algorithmically from the randomiser using 
a specific input sequence or it can be stored in the configuration file. Both options 
permit the card to be positively identified. 
5.14.2.2. Selection Algorithm 
This has been discussed in chapter 6 and is being implemented with 
characteristics to suit a proposed Smart Card regime. 
5.14.2.3. Hash Algorithm 
The 'Message Digest 5' or MD5 algorithm has been available since 1991, having 
been proposed and implemented by R Rivest. As this hashing algorithm has weathered 
the probing attacks on its characteristics it is considered to be a reasonable algorithm 
to use. 
5.14.2.4. Encryption Algorithm 
The proposed encryption algorithm is a stream cipher for speed and simplicity of 
processing. An implementation of DES or other block cipher, however, could be used. 
Symmetric algorithms require that the encryption key and the decryption key are 
available to the sender and recipient of the message, which means that the key is as 
important as the message. 
This can be provided by having two Smart Cards created identical at manufacture. One 
can be issued to a User and the other retained by the Authoriser. 
Key generation for a block encryption method can be the hash value of a text file 
that can be communicated by a separate method to the recipient. Stored key tables 
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can be used to select a new key sequence and then it can be deleted. This way, a user 
of the system can produce a reasonable crypto-system usine'·d simple computing 
package which is dependent on the availability and securit.y of a Smart Card at both 
ends of the system. 
Key security can be enhanced by destroying the Smart Card by exceeding the 
amount of permitted log-ins. Additionally, a User may destroy a card rather than permit 
it to be misused. 
5.14.2.5. Display 
The display is a simple visual indication of the current status of the card and 
option permitted. The effective life-cycle, measured in number of accesses, is indicated 
by a bar graph display and a non-functional card can be indicated by a complete graph. 
5.14.3. Implementation 
The executable file for the simulation is approximately 21 kilobytes not including 
the randomisers and data files. Implementation in Assembly language and application 
specific hardware may substantially reduce this requirement. Files and file access 
routines could be implemented by ROM access while the hash algorithm and control 
functions could be implemented in hardware. The randomiser and selection data can be 
implemented in ROM. 
5.14.4. Summary 
Cl The simulation is able to process all the transactions required. 
0 The display is adequate for the user to select or reject as required. 
o It is expected that an implementation in assembly language may be much more 
economical in terms of memory storage. Additionally, a purpose built hardware 
implementation may reduce the memory requirements substantially. 
0 Implementation of an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), while expensive, 
could be cost effective if many thousands of cards are manufactured. 
5.15. Trials 
5.15.1. Introduction 
It is proposed that the software is duplicated in a simulated transaction 
environment to permit the testing of the design. With a PC to simulate both Smart 
Cards the functions and the responses can be tested. 
5.15.2. Lease Protocol 
1\vo copies of the software can be created with changes to the identifying details. 
The randomiser and selection sets can be changed to ensure two complete Smart Card 
Simulations. 
Each User can then use the Smart Card to hash a sequence to obtain a value. 
This value can be appended to the contract and then hashed again. The hash value 
depends on the original hash value of the contract and the signature sequences 
appended to it. The card serial numbers can be appended to identify the card in the 
transaction as well as a signature sequence. 
5.15.2.1. Tooting 
o A transaction file listing various activities and the costs involved was created and the 
information used as input to the Smart Card 
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o Comprehensive testing is not within the scope of this research which is 
concentrating on proof of concept rather than a bsolut.e security testing. 
5.15.3. Summary 
o Creation of two sets of Simulation Data is not difficult. Different responses arc 
recorded for identical inputs. 
5.16. Possible Transactions 
5.16.1. Introduction 
The two main classes of transactions are off-line and on-line. Off-line refers to 
transactions that do not require validation by the other party before processing. Ideally 
this will refer to low value, infrequent transactions. On-line refers to high value 
transactions such as bank transfers which require validation for legal and business 
reasons or secure transactions that must be validated before access can be permitted. 
5.16.2. Off-line transactions 
After the Smart Card is inserted into the reader: 
S. Card 1 Reader Controller 
[ insert card 1 
Input Seq. <=: 
[ card identity I 
Serial No. :::::> 
Input Seq. c: 
[Validate identity] 
Output Seq. :::::. 
5.16.3. 
Ask for Serial number 
Input Seq. 
I interrogate Card 1 
Output Seq. 
Transadion Seq. 
[ store 1 
Transaction Seqs. 
On-line Transactions 
Vendor Transactions 
[ daily transactions ] 
After the Smart Card is inserted into the reader; 
S. Card Reader Controller 
I insert card J [ card detected I 
Input Seq. c Ask for Serial number 
( card identity 1 
Serial No. :::::. Response from Card 
[ interrogate Card 1 
Input Seq. e:: Interrogation Seq. 
[Validate identity] 
Output Seq. :::::> Serial No. + 
Input Seq. e:: 
[Validate identity[ 
Output Seq. => 
Interrogation Seq. 
I request validation J :::::> 
Input Seq. e:: 
[ interrogate card I 
Output Seq. 
[forward [ => 
Input Seq. e:: 
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[ interrogate card copy J 
Output Seq. 
Input Seq. 
[ compare validation I 
Response 
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[ If Card Valid then 
hash of transaction details 
else ignore card] 
Input Seq. <= Output Seq. 
[ Card Accepted ] 
I Validate transaction ] 
Output Seq. :::::> Input Seq. 
5.17. 
[Hash + Validation 
+ transaction value] 
Output Seq. :::::> 
Conclusions 
Input Seq. 
[ Store Transaction Seq. 
For processing] 
0 The design is simple, fast and practical to implement. 
0 Size of the software is excessive but this may be addressed with hardware and 
software methods. 
0 Smart Card implementation must address memory limitations. 
0 Testing is limited to functional testing or proof of concept testing. 
0 Substantial testing of the design may be necessary before production could be 
considered 
6. Evaluation of Smart Card Function Generator 
6.1. Introduction 
This section addresses the testing and analysis of the data generated by the 
proposed method with conclusions. The data will be addressed in sequence and the 
testin methods identified and ex lained. 
t •1Analyse Test Datal 
Graphical 
Yl 
Results 
Nurrerical 
Results 
Figure 6-1 Overview of test program 
Figure 6-1 describes the overall test regime. It is noted that substantial testing of 
all the characteristics of the design is impractical within the scope of the research. 
Consequently, testing of design characteristics will be discussed but will not be 
implemented due to time and resource constraints. The principal impediment to 
thorough testing is the difficulty of giving a valid proof of thr. security of the method. 
Additionally, describing randomness adequately is a non-trivial task owing to the 
construction of the randomisers and the methods of using them. 
6.2. Overview or method 
The Smart Card is able to accept an input sequence from nny source and is able 
to calculate the output sequence according to n variety of algorithms. 
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A Secure Hash Function provides nominally unique output sequences from 
unique input sequences of varying length. The purpose of the hash function is to 
generate a characteristic of the input sequence which can he used to identify the input 
sequence and more importantly determine if it has been altered in any way since the 
previous hash value was generated. Consequently, it is important for the user to record 
the hash value produced as this constitutes a check on the validity of the input 
sequence which may be an electronic copy of an agreement. 
Parameters which should be tested include Selection Methods for generating 
Start Points, Selection Sets and algorithms for generating randomisers. The Input 
Sequences, Output Sequences and randomiscrs need to have their respective 
characteristics determined and any encryption methods need to be evaluated. 
A substantial concern is any correlation between the input and output 
sequences. Owing to the large amount of input sequences, in this case 2121:1, it is 
infeasible to test any significant portion. 
6.2.1. Selection Methods 
In general selection methods must be deterministic (able to be repeated exactly) 
but have the characteristic of being unpredictable to any reasonable degree to ensure 
security of the method. 
6.2.1.1. Start Points 
The calculation of the starting point for the selection algorithm is by taking a 
selection of bits from the input sequence and producing an integer value from them. 
This process is not limited by the size of the input sequence providing that the input 
sequence is of sufficient length, which is as yet undetermined. 
For example, should the input be a typical sequence from a secure hash 
function, (MDS produces a 128 bit sequence) then the selection of a starting point is 
simply a matter of choosing and arranging some of the bits in the input sequence into a 
binarv representation of an integer . 
7('000 
I . 60000 . 
• 50000 ,
~ 40000 ~ 
c 
·s 30000 . .. 
~ 
ill 20000 
10000 -
0 
Unsorted Start Point Sequence 
••• • # • •••• 
• • 
•• 
• 
• • 
• • • • • • • 
. '····· .. , • 
• 
• • • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
•• 
10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100 
Index 
I• RNDSPI Unsorted j 
FJpre 6-2 Scatter Plot of --Si8ii.P0intl. ... -·-·--·----
This selection method can be described as a set, SPI, of integers defining the 
order, index and number of the bits to be selected from the input sequence. The 
numbers in SPI are integers of nny vnlue and may be repeated producing 'nn unordered 
multiset with repetition' {Lew p46). A reasonable practice mny be selecting bits ns n 
combination that is 'nn unordered multiset without repetitiun'(l.ewp•l6). 
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For example, with I= j01100101010100101001010] (reading from the ldt) and 
SPI = j8,3,6,1 L the start point would be '1110' which translates into 14 in the decimal 
base. The only limit on the length and values of Sis the amount of time taken in 
calculating the start point as any result can be adjusted by the modulo N division of the 
number. (N is the length of the randomiscr in use) 
An initial test produced 100 16 bit start points from a single selection algorithm 
using 100 random input sequences. These results were stored in a file to be processed 
by a spreadsheet package. 
In figure 6.2, it can be seen that there is very little obvious relationship between 
the data plotted. The scatter appears to be random with little correlation between the 
individual points. A simple test for relationship consists of sorting the data sequence 
and plotting it. A distribution that peaks may indicate a preference for a particular 
range of values. 
After ordering the generated start points from lowest to highest and graphing 
them, the initial sequences showed characteristics that could be percdved as linear. 
(refer figure 6.3) 
Comparison of Start Point Sequences 
70000 
60000 
• 50000 ,
!i 40000 ·~ 30000 .. 
" 
--RNDSP1 Sorted 
--RNDSP2 Sorted 
RNDSP3 Sorted 
~ 20000 
10000 
0 .. 
1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85 92 99 
Start Point Number 
Figure 6-3 Ordered Sets of 100 Start -Points 
The data plotted shows three sequences of start points generated from the same 
randomiser but with differing selection sequences. It can be seen that the data appears 
to have linearity and the next step was to calculate and plot the regression lines of the 
data. 
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70000 
60000 . 
Ill 50000 , 
l! 40000 l 30000-
~ 20000 
10000 
Regression Line Comparison 
9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73 81 89 97 
Incremental Number 
Figure 6-4 Comparison of regression estimate with sorted data 
The selection sequences were: 
RNDSPI.DAT = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13,14, 15, 16} 
RNDSP2.DAT = {16,15, 14,13, 12, 11, 10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1} 
RNDSP3.DAT = {59,2,5,103, 123, 107,64,68,69,90,70,35,8,33, 19,78} 
-----1 P1 eslirmle 
P1 Sorted 
----
where the bits were selected from a sample of 100 random bit sequences of 128 
bits in length. 
The linearity was checked by performing a linear regression on the data and 
plotting the derived regression line with the ordered data sequence. 
The data plotted in figure 8.4 shows that the regression line has a close 
similarity to the ordered data and constitutes a good approximation of the data 
RNDSPI.DAT. 
It is considered that any data with a uniform distribution across the range will 
display a trace with linearity after it has been sorted. 
6.2.2. Selection Sets 
Selection Sets are groups of integers that specify the number of bits to select or 
discard during the construction of a random sequence from the randomiser. The size of 
the selection set is arbitrary and may range from one to many thousands of integers. It 
is considered that a selection set could be created by expanding an exponential or 
factorial number and selecting digits from the sequence. For example, there are 158 
digits in 1001 and this factorial number may be selected by a combination of bits in the 
input sequence. 
If the input sequence is uniformly distributed across the sequence space, that is, 
each possible sequence is equally likely then the input sequence is assumed to be 
random. 
A typical input sequence may be 128 bits such ns the output of a hnsh 
generator. For example, using a rnndomiser of 1.125HlJ9Q07 • 101 01 hits (2.-• 11 hits) any 
50 bits may be used to specify a Start Point. From the remaining 78 hits a spedfic 
selection of bits can be used to specify the selection sequence such as I J six bit 
number:'! runging between 0 and 63. 
Alternatively, a specific selection of20 bits will givt• a numht•r bt'I\\Tt'll 0 nnd 
1048575 and this number com·t•l'tl'd into nn cxpont•ntinl ur factorial muld pru\'ldt• n 
selection set of rr"!snnnhle h·ngth. A1lditionul\y, tht• tligits m tlw t->~'tiiii'IH't' t'illl bt• 
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grouped to give multiple digit numbers. For example, from the sub-sequence 123456, 
numbers 1, 23 and 456 can be selected. 
There are many possible ways of specifying the next bit to select or discard and 
as long as the bits in the randomiser are random then it is expected that the samples 
from the randomiser are also random. Consequently, testing the selection set is not 
considered necessary. 
6.2.3. Randomisers 
Randomisers for use in this system should be as large as possible to permit the 
user the greatest freedom in selecting bits. The randomiser should be random or if this 
is not possible then it should be indistinguishable from random when it is used. 
Generation of randomisers includes deterministic, non-deterministic and hybrid 
methods. 
Testing randomisers demands a substantial investment in testing. The use of a 
randomiser in a cryptographic method requires that the randomness characteristic is as 
near perfect as possible. Analysis of this characteristic is not easily achieved and the 
amount of knowledge and work necessary to reduce the uncertainty is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
A simple approach using visual methods was developed with a view to sifting the 
test sequences for 'non-randomness'. This method is subjective but very quickly 
identifies generators that may be flawed. These flaws include preferences for a 
particular sub-sequence and any sequence that passes these initial tests can then be 
analysed with numeric techniques. 
6.2.4. Encryption Methods 
At present the only encryption method implemented is a simple stream cipher 
though implementation of more complex methods is practical. Hardware 
implementations of DES are available and it is considered that a block cipher could be 
used with independent sub-keys. (Schneier p295) These sub-keys can be generated 
by the processing of the encryption of each block through the selection algorithm to 
obtain a new key sequence for the next block. 
6.3. Testing 
A Pascal version of MD5 was acquired and modified to run under the 'Turbo 
Pascal' development environment. The version from GnomeWorks was written to run 
under 'Delphi' and the modifications to run under Turbo Pascal were relating to string 
manipulation routines. 
The program was modified to read information from a lite of data, perform a 
hash to the data and write the hash sequence to a file. 
An input text file, 'fred.trn' contains a short summary of transactions generated 
by the mythical person 'Fred'. Each line of data includes the date and time of the 
transaction, the name of the card holder, the signature sequence of Fred, the name of 
the vendor and signature sequence followed by <1 short description of the item and the 
price. Date is formatted in two digits for the day, thw:-ce digits for the month nnd two 
digits for the year. Time is stored in twenty four hour formnt and tlw timC' zont• is listed 
alphabetically with WA time from GMT being ',J'. 
For example, 'OIAUG98.J0900 Fred l.td 0123·1S67H9AHCDEF Bill Bluggl'i 
ABCDEF0123456789 CommodoreS l'i~dun 3300 rego 123·1Sfl hhu- with grey trim $50' 
describes the purchnse of u car by Fn·d from Uillnn tlw first nf august ltJ9H at nint' am 
for fifty dollars. 
ThiN sequrncr iH hashrd into 'AAE27E·IOJH9.l.15Fb'.!HCCOHIJb1151JF77tlll' antlthili 
vnlue i11 unique to the u·unNilction ilti hsted. Thr :u dliHit ·trrs Hit' a ht·.xadt•t·lmal 
trant~cription of thr lllllllt'ric lf1 h\'tt' hiiHh vollllt'. 
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The hash value of the transaction is processed by the Smart Card to produce an 
output sequence '99D 16D302782241~517l313078584Sg6655' which can be retained by 
both parties as an authorisation of the transaction. Additionally it can be provided to 
the bank as a means of validating the transfer of funds. 
6.3.1. Testing of Output St:ts 
The initial concern with generating output sets from a randomiscr is that the 
selection method does not alter the samples in any detectable way. This is to 
demonstrate the 'Law of Large Numbers' of statistics where the characteristics of a large 
group of samples from a population has the characteristics of the population. 
Using an eight bit binary sequence from which any four bits will be selected as 
an example. To generate all the possible samples from zero to eight bits the complete 
range of the binary number is generated from 0 to 211-1 (0 to 255). These are ordered 
according to the decimal equivalent. Sorting this array of binary numbers by the 
number of ones in the sample and the decimal equivalent gives a listing of all the 
possible samples. 
number of no of cumulative 
bits samples total 
sampled 
0 0 1 
1 8 9 
2 28 37 
3 56 93 
4 70 163 
5 56 219 
6 28 247 
7 8 255 
8 1 256 
Table 6-1 Enumeration of Samples 
For a complete table see the Appendix 11.18. The table demonstrates that the 
average of all the samples is equal to the average of the population in accord with 
statistical theory. 
6.3.2. Summary 
0 It is accepted that the average of the all possible samples from a population is the 
same as the average of the population. With this established, using the average of 
a population of samples may characterise an unknown random sequence. 
a Using a set of rnndomisers of 10000 bits where a sample of 128 bits is to be 
selected, the average of the randomiser is calculated and the average of a set of 128 
bit samples is calculated and compared. 
0 The use of a set of starting points with each selection set ensures thnt the sequences 
are comparable, thnt is usc the same rnndomiscr nnd selection scquencr with only 
the starting point varying. 
0 It is noted that the average of the samples close-ly approximates tht' average of thr 
randomiser and this supports the view that the sampling nwthod dot's nut a!ler the 
chnmctcristics of tlw samples. 
C It iA noted thnt n randomist•r <irawu from a nutHlt•tt•rministic sourno may tlisplil)' 
similnr charactt•risli('S. 
6.3.3. Encryption Dt'cryption ~h·thod~ 
It is nnted that nny meHS<tgr from a mt'!iSiagr prot't"HHing s.\'Htrm is nblr 10 pro\•idr 
an eavesdropper with information ilhout llu· mrss<IJ.;t' and thr K)'tih"m. Thit~ ~lglnc,' 
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parameter of the system is related to the amount of use of the system and not just the 
amount of bits generated. 
For example, a small number of very long messages may give away less 
information than a large number of small messages. This is due to the structure of the 
messages which may have similar components such as a business salutation or an 
address block. 
However, if reasonable limits are placed on the use of the system, the ease with 
which a new system can be provided is able to counter the problems of overuse or 
compromise. 
6.3.4. Summary 
o Testing may become a major task involving much effort, consequently much 
planning is needed to ensure that the results gained are useful and meaningful in 
the context of this program. 
7. Recommendations and Conclusions 
7 .1. Introduction 
This section lists a selection of possible uses for the Smart Card Design. It is 
considered that the design may be useful in applications other than those listed. 
Conclusions are listed with reference to the original questions in Chapter 4. 
Directions for future research are limited by the lack of validation of the 
developmental method. It is practical to implement but without substantial testing and 
certification if cannot be used in commercial products. 
7.2. Recommendations 
7.2.1. Driver's Licence 
A unique Smart Card may be personalised and assigned to the Driver. Personal 
details recorded on the card can identify the lawful user and the electronic serial 
numbers can be used in automated data processing systems. 
For example, a driver being booked by a Traffic Patrol may be identified by the 
personal details on the Smart Card. The card can be identified to the system by the 
unique details and the information relating to the traffic offence can be validated by 
storing the output sequence which would provide a signature and an authentication of 
the identity and transaction. Should the card permanently store details of an offence 
then it would be available off-line to any authorised reader. 
7.2.2. Automotive Lease/Lend environment 
The use of the Smart Card as a key to validate the identity of the user is 
practical. Once the owner of the vehicle has identified the person concerned a unique 
Smart Card can be issued that is acceptable to the car computer as permission to use 
the vehicle. 
The owner ensures that the VMU can recognise the Smart Card. This can be 
achieved by ensuring that the VMU has a copy of the randomiser, selection, sets, and 
startpoint algorithms and can apply them only to validate a smart card. 
During manufacture of the Smart Card, a matched set of 2 or more chips can be 
created and one can be hardwired into the VMU. The remaining chips can be 
encapsulated into Smart Cards to provide a set of Master Keys to suit the particular 
VMU. 
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This implies that the Smart Cards arc uniquely and specifically related to a 
particular VMU and they can be considered to be a 'certilicatt: of ownership' of the VMU 
and, by association, the car. 
To ensure the security of.the method, the VMU must be physically secure 
against attempts to change the 'Key' chip. In cases where the VMU is encnpsulated in 
tamper-resistant materials it may be necessary to change the VMU for maintenance. 
The VMU may also include WORM memory which can b1: configured with specific 
information such as the engine number or owner details which can provide theft 
protection by identifying the components of the car.-; 
The Smart Cards, as a certificate of ownership can be used as Master Keys to 
permit a User to access all the functions providcd'by,thc VMLJ:, This function can be 
used to 'teach' the VMU to recognise another Smart 'card whiCh functions as a limited 
session key for a user i.n a lease/hire environment. · 
7.2.2.1. Complete Copy 
If the VMU has a c0mplete copy of the dar·a, it can periodically ask the Smart 
Card to prove its identity by as~:ing 'If you are Card XYZ then what is your answer to 
Question ABC' and wait for a response. The VMU will generate it's own answer after the 
challenge and response and compare them. If there is a match the smart card is 
acceptable and the use can continue. If there is no match the VMU can repeat the 
interrogation until at some stage the transaction is stopped. 
This may detect sub~~ttution of an alternate card after the authorised card is 
removed. 
The Owner generates two copies of a subordinate Smart Card and installs one 
subordinate Smart Card in the VMU which is unable to be removed without damaging 
it. 
The Master Smart card can authorise the VMU to store identification details of 
the subordinate Smart Card in case it is altered or swapped. With this copy of the 
subordinate Smart Card installed, the VMU can then validate any access and use of the 
vehicle with the other subordinate Smart Card. 
7.2.2.2. Incomplete Copy. 
The VMU keeps a table of questions and responses from the Smart Card and 
selects from it at random to validate the User's Card. 
This method may not be very secure, but further research may resolve this issue. 
7 .2.3. Electronic Commerce Environment 
7.2.3.1. Large transactions on-line by default 
If minimum and t'naximum amounts are defined for a transaction then a Smart 
Card can be used to authenticate transactions. Transactions below the minimum limit 
can be processed off-line to permit the use in all conditions. Transactions above the 
maximum limit can be recorded but not processed to provide evidence of attempted 
misuse. 
All transactions above the minimum limit must be processed on-line to minimise 
the possibility of fraud. The security can be enhanced by the bank interrogating the 
Smart Card during the transaction and ensuring that the card answers multiple 
interrogations to limit the possibility of falsely identifying a card. 
All transactions above the daily transaction limit can be validated by a Bank 
Employee where the image of the user is stored and compared against the details of the 
person presenting the card. This may become a mandatory requirement for 
transactions above a certain limit. 
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Fraud would be possible if the smart card could be copied by recording and 
playing back the answers to particular interrogation sequences. If the interrogation 
sequences arc random then the chance of predicting om~ in1crrogation sequence is 
small. If multiple random interrogations nre used then the Smart Card must generate 
multiple complete replies. If the reply is 128 bits long then three sequences would be 
384 bits (48bytes) enhancing the security of the method. 
The attempted fraud must predict beforehand what the three interrogation 
sequences are and gcnemte the correct responses to return. This can he only 
accomplished by determining the structure and contents of the Smart Card and the 
startpoint, sdcction set and randomiscr used. 
Examination by recording all the inputs and outputs is impractical due{~ the 
amount of time necessary to obtain enough information to reconstruct the function 
generator. Sophisticated tools to examine the internal structure of the Smart Card may 
not be generally available. 
Restricted access to the card would be achieved either by limiting the amount of 
uses or by limiting the amount of time before the card is declared lost or stolen. A card 
reported lost or a card subject to invalid access attempts can be incapacitated. A card 
reported lost and incapacitated then found again must be reactivated by the legitimate 
user. 
A card may be incapacitated either completely or partially. Partial 
incapacitation may mean that the card can perform a limited number of low value 
transactions such as buying a public transport ticket but not perform transactions 
above a certain limit. This would permit a legitimate user to use a card until it can be 
re-validated at a bank office and reinstated. 
If the card is stolen and the pin number is also obtained, then once the card can 
be reported stolen then all transactions with it can be stopped. Additionally, on-line 
transactions could be used to trace the location of the card and off-line transactions 
would limit the amount of losses incurred. 
7 .2.3.2. Small transactions off-line by. default 
With small transactions, below a specified limit , the vendor can record the 
details. Each transaction would be processed at the end of the day gathering these 
small amounts of data. 
Transactions less than a specified amount can be performed off-line. A Card 
Used to pay for public transport usage would generate identification and output 
sequences in response to a question. The question (input sequence) could identify the 
date and time of the transaction as well as the costing details. Periodically, the 
transport company can process the stored information and update its balances with the 
banks. 
A public transport corporation may issue these cards as an account card similar 
in use to a credit card with a monthly statement being issued. 
7.2.4. Access to Secure Areas 
A pair of Identical Cards can be produced during manufacture. The issuing 
authority keeps one and issues the other to an identified person. The retained card can 
be kept as a reference library for the computer controlling the access systems. 
Once the authorising card is removed from the library then the identification 
card cannot be used to access the system. This may prevent a stolen card from being 
used to unlawfully access premises. Should an employee leave the company without 
returning the card it poses no threat to the security of the system as long as the issuing 
authority removes the authorising card from the !ibrary. 
The pair of cards must be functionally identical but may have different sizes. 
The identification card may be the usual size for an identification document and the 
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authorising card may be physically smaller to fit a card fmmc. However, if both cards 
are identical in shape and have the photograph of the user imprinted then the card 
frame may provide a visual reference to the authorised users. 
7.2.5. Identification. 
Usc as an idcntificalion nrtcfact depends on being able to link the card with the 
user. Imprinting an image of the user on the card exterior can readily be achieved but 
the use of digitised images may take up too much of the Smart Card's memory. A 
method mentioned in 'New Scientist' suggests that a method of encoding a face into 
about 50 bytes of data may be suitable for usc on magnetic stripe cards.(New Scientist) 
This could be implemented easily in a Write Once Read Many (WORM) memory location 
permitting a Smart Card to store an image of the user internally. 
The User's face is recreated by superimposing digitised images from a library of 
290 faces. The library of images is not stored on the card. The composite face is 
specified by the images. used to construct it and this sequence is stored on the card. 
This may add to the security of using the card by permitting a picture of the 
lawful user to be displayed for comparison or record keeping purposes. Additionally, 
unless a universal standard library is used it may not be possible for a hacker to 
recreate or modify an image without the original database. 
7.2.6. Link Encryption in noisy environments. 
Using a pair of cards as a link encryption method is practical in an environment 
where noise can corrupt a signal. Cable-less transmissions such as infra-red remote 
transmitters could use encrypted sequences of commands or instructions. Any 
sequence that does not decrypt to a valid message would be ignored by the system until 
it is re-sent and decrypted correctly. 
If the sequence ts encrypted differently a number of times then the receiver must 
ensure that it decrypts to a valid command before responding. This ensures that cross-
talk and interference from other transmitters in the area has a minimum effect. 
Superimposing two or more dissimilar signals at the same frequency may 
produce a detectable sequence but not every receiver may decode the signal sensibly. If 
the Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) of transmitter A differs slightly from the PRF of 
transmitter B then the production of erroneous signals would be reduced. Changing the 
fundamental frequencies of both signals would enable the erroneous signals produced 
by beating to be detected. 
In figure 7.1, signals A and Bare superimposed to produce signal C. Signal C 
may be a valid sequence subject to misinterpretation by the system. If Signal A and 
Signal B are encrypted differently a number of times in sequence then the occurrence of 
a meanin ful su erim osition would be less like! •. 
Figure 7·1 Superimpoaitlon of Signal• 
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7.2.7. Stream Cipher Application 
A development of the stream encryption method is lo usc larger randomisers 
such as families of compact discs and the rotation and conc<c~tenation algorithm. This is 
a most effective method of generating nnd encrypting a mes:mge. 
7.2.8. One Time Pad 
A Smart Card FG may be used to generate a key sequence for a cryptognlphic 
algorithm. As long as the FG is only used once then the method is provably secure. A 
single FG may be used as a private key to an asymmetric method of encrypting Personal 
data for storage. A matched set of FG's can be used for secure communications in a 
symmetric method. 
7.2.9. Digital Photographs 
A digital image may be authenticated by a matched pair of Smart Cards. The 
image and its hash value can be appended to the card. The hash value input sequence 
can be stored with its output sequence as protection against the image being changed 
unilaterally. 
7.2.10. Documentation verification 
A function generator may be bonded into or on a hard copy of a legal document 
in such a way that removing or tampering with it will destroy its functions. The 
function generator may then provide an output sequence to the document's hash 
sequence and this Seal Sequence can be inscribed in the document signature or seal 
portion. 
The originator of the document can retain the random input and output 
sequences of the FG to identify the artefact. This prevents the document being altered 
without knowledge by substituting a new document and FG. If the FG fails to 
function or produces an incorrect sequence then the document may not be acceptable. 
However, the document can be authenticated by the original issuers and a replacement 
issued. 
Hierarchical signatures are '"'here a supervisor signs a document prepared by 
subordinates who have identified their contributions to the document by a signature. 
To sign the document, the seal sequence and the serial number of the respective 
FG are concatenated and the hash sequence is computed and may be inscribed on the 
document. The hash sequence produces an output sequence from the signer's FG 
which is appended to the signature portion. 
The Hash sequence and Output Sequence then constitute a 'signature' or Seal 
sequence on the document attesting to its integrity. The document can then be tested 
for alterations. 
An auditor can regenerate the hash sequence and ensure that the FG attached 
to the document has produced a specific output sequence. This hash sequence can be 
used to generate an output sequence from the auditor's Seal which can be appended to 
the document. 
A document may be stored on a Smart Card in permanent memory. The hash 
value of the document can be used to generate an output sequence from the FG to 
provide a validR!ion of the document. 
Additionally, the VLSI or other implementation of the proposed algorithm may be 
incorporated into the structure of the document in such a way that tampering with the 
document will destroy the device. 
It is considered that a 'Seal' may also be associated with a position rather than a 
person in the manner of corporate seals 
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7.2.11. Security Seals 
Additionally, VLSI or other implementations or the algorithm may be 
incorporated into artefacts as a 'Seal' or proof mark. For example, a Sm'art Card or 
other implementation could be permanently bonded across the gap between a container 
and the container door. Opening the door would destroy the Seal and replacing it 
would be- very difficull when only the legitimate user knows the details of its 
construction. 
7.2.12. Anonymous Identification 
Unilateral Anonymous Identification can be achieved by using a unique FG. 
Any person able to produce an input and output sequence for the FG is able to prove 
that they have had access to the FG. Personal details are not necessary. 
For example, a security patrol supervising a set of premises must be able to 
prove attendance at specific times. The patrol uses one FG to prove they have attended 
the premises by allowing the security system on the premises to interrogate the FG and 
store the results. This may also be reciprocal in that the patrol can interrogate the 
security system FG and store the results. 
For example, an artefact may use an attached unique FG for identification and 
its responses to interrogation can prove that the artefact has been seen by an auditor. 
Every auditor can randomly interrogate an FG and store an output sequence and this 
means that each auditor can obtain a unique 'proor of the Seal's integrity which need 
not be shared or made known. 
For example, a password may require a specific number of consenting 
'signatures' for access to bank accounts. Each person can then take the account 
identification sequence and process it through their personal FG. These output 
sequences can be used as a password directly or they can processed provide an input 
sequence to the artefact's FG and if this matches the password then the access is 
permitted. 
Bilateral Anonymous Identification can be achieved with two unique FG's. For 
example, two parties may use the FG output sequences to identify themselves to each 
other and these details can be provided to others as proof that they have communicated. 
Knowledge of the input and output sequences of an FG can be used to identify 
an unknown person. For example, a treasure hunt where the prize is an FG which has 
had its details stored by the convenor of the hunt prior to it being hidden. If the correct 
FG is found then it can be verified for prize giving purposes. 
For example, multiple copies of an identification Smart Card may have the image 
of the user embossed on it. If the card has an access password to initialise it then it 
can be used to authenticate access requests. The user initiates the access request by 
placing the card in a reader which may be accompanied by the user's password. The 
secure access control system identifies the Smart Card by its serial number and 
supplies a random interrogation sequence to the card and stores the response. 
Comparison of the output sequence with the output sequence from the copy of the card 
in the secure area can be used to approve access. 
7.3. Conclusions 
What are the characteristics of a Users, F, Resources, G, and levels, H, access 
environment and which authentication model, if any, could effectively represent this 
relationship in a real-time, distributed computing environment? 
Each relationship is characterised by a triplet (F, G, H) which describes the User, 
Resource and Access level. A manager must identify the user and define the resources 
and levels of access appropriate. A single user may have multiple access triplets. The 
triplets (Fl,Gl,Hl), (Fl,G2,H2) identify multiple resources and access permissions. The 
triplets (Fl, G3, H3), (Fl, G3, H4) identify th~ different options within a specific 
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resource. For example, for accounting purposes where one triplet describes work use 
and the other describes the personal usc. 
The authentication model proposed is bused on lht: 'Challenge- l~esponsc' 
model and addresses the identification and authentication of the individual users, 
resources and constrnints where the User or Resource is in possession of information 
which must be provided on demand. A User is identified by the Owner who issues an 
artefact which identifies and authenticates the usc of the resource. Identifying the user 
to the resource is effected by the Smart Card which serves as an identification and 
authentication artefact. If the Smart Card is unique it is practical to assign a specific 
card to a User and subsequently identify the User and all transactions made with it. 
The distributed environment may entail on-line and off-line transactions which 
will demand secure, reliable transactions. The use of the 'Challenge - Response' model 
in a transaction record enables all involved in the transaction to obtain a unique record. 
1. Posith·e identification of the Smart Card and the Authorised User of the card is 
achieved by creating a unique Smart Card. The card characteristics arc recorded 
with the details of the authorised User and are used to validate transactions both off-
line and on-line. Secure transmission and storage of information will minimise the 
possibilities of fraud or breach of privacy. The unique characteristics of the Smart 
Card can be used to provide cryptographic protection of all data in the system. 
2. Authentication of a User can be carried out by verifying the identity of the Smart 
Card, The embossed external serial number of the card may be a first-line 
identification and the second line could be an internal serial number.. Additionally, 
the Smart Card may provide specific answers to varied questions in a 'Challenge -
Response' model, where the card must provide specific answers to a varied set of 
questions. 
3. Validation of Transactions can be performed either on-line or off-line. The hash 
code of the transaction summary can be used to stimulate the Smart Card to 
produce a unique sequence which can be used to prove that a particular transaction-
was authorised by a specific Smart Card. Security of the method needs to be 
carefully examined. Initial data indicates the method is provably secure under J; 
restrictive conditions and conditionally secure under the most likely conditions. 
4. Investigation into the requirements of authentication and digital signatures to 
determine the technical considerations that may have a bearing on the security of 
the proposed model. 
5. A digital signature must be substantially secure against fraudulent actions and very 
difficult to forge. Any signature algorithm must be provably one-to-one and unique. 
A unique Smart Card can embody a signature generation algorithm that can ensure 
the signature generated is particularly unlikely to be generated by another card with 
the same input. Smart Card construction techniques may make each Smart Card 
unique. Additionally, determining the characteristics of the card by disassembly 
should be destructive. 
6. Implementation strategies must include secure manufacture and distribution of new 
cards. 
User strategies must include card identification methods, personalisation 
methods and secure access methods. The existence of a global network of electronic 
information systems makes the proposal effective. Cheap, bulk manufacturing of 
cards with variety to suit different applications. 
0 What requirements are necessary for untamperable electronic data storage for short 
and long term storage to assist in resolution of disputes in the transaction cycle? 
1. Memory devices must be physically and electrically robust and securely installed. 
The data may be encrypted prior to storage to prevent the data being intentionally 
altered by illegal access. Altered data may not be decrypted in a meaningful way 
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which would indicate that data has been altered. l!:ncryption makes the problem of 
intentionally altering the relevant data bits substantially difficult. 
2. Memory access methods must be secure to permit access for reading or writing by 
authorised users. Audit of Data to determine its value and storage needs. Data 
must be auditable and able to be validated by the card and the user. Flash Memory 
is considered suitable for this proposal due to its long term power-off data retention 
(20 years). Low Power versions may use as little as 3 volts where the vehicle 
electrical system provides a nominal 12 volts. 
3. The card must be resistant to misuse and abuse. Probing with sophisticated 
electronic devices must be very difficult after construction and pcrsonalisation. Data 
must be encrypted with an algorithm as strong as necessary to ensure that the data 
is secure in Htorage and transmission. A stream cipher would be suitable depending 
on the qualiti.es of the key generation method. 
4. Access to the card may be from password 1 PIN number retained by the user. 
There should only be one password for each card at a time. A manufacturer should 
not implement any global passwords for a card series as this would weaken the 
security of the system. Personal data kept on the card in secure memory and any 
information that uniquely identifies the user may be used. A photographic image of 
the user may be stored for recording and comparison by the vendor during certain 
transactions. 
5. The amount of data to be stored depends on the construction of the prototype 
systems. This depends on the amount of sensors, rate of data reading and the 
methods of data processing. Eg. Compression, encryption etc. Business 
requirements may require data to be stored for at least seven yt ars for taxation and 
audit purposes 
6. Physical threats such as intentional or accidental damage where the memory chips 
need to survive a major accident and fire where the vehicle is completely destroyed. 
Electrical faults intentional or othenvise may affect the integrity of the data. Static 
electricity and high voltages from ignition systems may corrupt data or damage the 
memory chips. Electronic threats include hacking against the administration 
system. Eavesdropping on the data by unauthorised persons can be countered with 
secure transmission techniques which include cryptographic protection. 
7. What data from the operation of a prototype is of importance in effecting the 
proposal and which security issues need to be addressed? 
8. Memory requirements, speed of operation and reliability data is. essential. 
Identification of the U"3er prior to issuing the card and identificar.ion of the card in 
use. Authentication of each use of the resource. Secure storage of all data. 
Memory size and type, processing speed and data transfer speed. 
9. Algorithms chosen to implement the system. Externally, embc~smg and proprietary 
data such as logos. Internally, serial numbers and access algorithms. If the issuer 
interrogates the card with an random sequence, the reply must match the issuer's 
generated reply or the card may be considered unacceptable and any transaction 
could be ignored. After identifying the User by the Issuer, a card can be 
programmed with personal details of the User. A picture may be embossed on the 
outside and stored inside as well. If a unique Smart Card is assigned to a particular 
User then the User is identified by the Card details. 
10. The use of memory technologies such as the WORM memory may permit an issuer 
to hard-code the identification details such as a picture of the user. Ease of 
manufacture, update and modification where a manufacturer or issuer should be 
able to personalise a number of cards. A matched set of cards may be used as a 
party key. 
11. Large scale manufacture could bring the costs of the Cards down and permit many 
additional uses. Reliability where a Card must repeatedly generate the same output 
Edith Cowan University 94 
I 
·i· 
,' " 
·.·.'' 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, 
Multi-Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
sequence for the same input sequence. Controls on the Card should be simple to 
use. 
12. ['ositive identification of the card by the internal and external characteristics. The 
user is identified by the additional details stored on the card and the knowledge of 
privileged information such as the password of the care]. 
13. A stream cipher may be efficiently implemented in the limited space available and 
must be at least conditionally secure. The proposal is provably secure if it used only 
once and discarded. Multiple usc means that the stream cipher is conditionally 
secure. The de~ign meets this requirement. The proposal may be used to generate a 
key for a block cipher such as DES or may be used to provide public key details, 
accessible only to the authorised user. Both stream and block methods may be 
implemented on a Smart Card, however, the limitations are data transfer rate and 
memory size, coupled to processing speed. 
14. The proposed method can be implemented on the Smart Card and may require Jess 
than 3 kilobytes of data depending on randomiser s1ze. Measurements of the 
security are complex and may be substantially outside the scope of this research. 
However, the method is provably secure under single use and conditionally secure 
under multiple use conditions. 
15. Use of proprietary protocols to identify the user before the card is issued are 
practical. For, example, SET and Lite-SET exist to handle funds transfer. User 
identification can be broken down into artefacts and information. Artefacts such as 
Smart Cards with unique characteristics can be recognised by the system as being 
genuine and acceptable. Information includes pin number, image matching and 
possibly even biometric methods of identifying the user. The use of hash value and 
identification sequences from the smart card are used to positively identify a 
transaction. The hash value is input into a function generator and the output 
sequence from the card is stored. The storage of these two pieces of information can 
be used to check on the validity of a copy of the transaction. 
16. Secure transmission methods as all data must be transferred and stored securely. 
As all system information may be of use to the unauthorised person the data must be 
either validated or encrypted to ensure that modification or error has been detected 
before use. Unique Smart Cards or sets of Smart Cards matched at time of 
manufacture. 
17. Protocols to identify users and transfer funds are generally outside the scope of this 
thesis. The transaction descriptions list the basis for a protocol design which would 
need development and formal proof before it could be used. A unique Smart Card 
used as a Function Generator (FG) provides a method of generating a unique output 
sequence from a unique input sequence. 
18. The input sequence may be the hash value of a transaction. The output sequence 
is unique to the FG and related to the input sequence. The output sequence can be 
recorded as an authorisation for the transfer of funds. 
19. As the Smart Card issuer retains a copy of its details, the start point, selection 
algorithms and the Randomiser, then reconstruction of any output sequence is 
possible by applying the input sequem:e. Transaction details, hash value and output 
sequence are used to recreate the output sequence for comparison with the supplied 
sequence. A match between the supplied output sequence and the recreated output 
sequence means the tran3action can be approved. 
20. Every party to an agreement may use a FG to generate unique sequences. 
Subsidiary sections of the contract can be signed with a particular sequence from its 
contributors and all participants may keep the final hash value. If a disagreement 
arises the contract must be hashed again and compared against the stored hash 
value. Identification of a Smart Card by its serial number and its response to specific 
interrogation sequences permits the Smart Card, and by association its User, to be 
identified to other parties. 
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7.4. Directions for Future Research 
The research has shown that it is practicnl to produce a Smart Card to provide 
authentication, identification, secure communications and data logging. Directions for 
further research arc constrained by one key factor, namely, the evaluation of the level of 
security provided by the developmental algorithm. 
While the goal is 'unco~'ditional' security, many commercially acceptable 
algorithms are 'computationally·.: secure in that the data, processing or storage 
requirements and complexity of'thc algorithm are infeasible. (Schneier ppS-9) 
'Provable Security' depends alrri'Ost entirely on complex. theoretical mathematics as the 
magnitude of the ana\y)>is may exceed even the most remarkably equipped researcher. 
Consequently, this is outside the scope of this Master's thesis and may pose substantial 
questions to more experienced researchers. 
Should the developmental algorithm provide provable security in the sense of 
being acceptable for use in Electronic Commerce then development of the suggested 
applications are described in the Recommendations section. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1. Sensor Integration Levels 
(BOSCH93 p 103) 
Legend. 
SE - Sensors 
SA - Signal Processing (analog) 
AD- Analog-digital con\'ertcr 
SG - Control Unit 
MC- Microcomputer 
!Transmission Path I control Unit (ECV) I 
Susceptible 
Com•entional 
m er crencc 
SA 
(analog) 
!Integration Lc\'el 11 
jintegration Level 
Buo Interference r--I SE I SA 1/o SG 
Compatible Proof 
(Digital) '-----
!Integration Level 31 Bus 
Interference r--I SE I SA Vol MC : SG 
Compatibl Proof (Digital) 
'---e 
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9.2. Engine Types and Classifications 
IBOSCH93 p 352) 
Type of Process Opt;n Process Closed Process 
Internal Combustion l!:xtcrnal 
Combustion 
Combustion gas -working medium Combustion gas 
i· working medium 
Phase change in 
working medium 
No I Yes 
Tvue of Combustion Cvclic Combustion \ Continuous Combustion 
Tvpe of Ignition Auto~ign External Ignition 
Enclosed Working Diesel Hybrid Otto- Rohs Stirling Steam 
Chamber Cvcle 
Turbine - - - Gas Hot Steam Steam 
Type of Mixture Heterogenous Homo- Heterogenous 
geneous 
In combustion chamber In a continuous fla.me 
Table 9·1 Classification of Engine Types 
Edith Cowan University 101 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, 
_______ _:M=u"'lt"i--'R-'-c=-='":.:'O:.::u_rcc_, M~~~~-Lcvcl Access ~S'>'y~so:lc:c·m~s-~-------~ 
I 
9.3. Overvi~w of Semiconductor Memory Devices 
(Hm;diiJ3 p%) 
I ~~micunductnr M!•umry 
I 
I Non-vu!ntile Memory I Volatile Memory j 
.:·. 
_., •' 
Programmed in JProgrmumed by User I 
mm1ufacturc 
Static Dynamic 
Memory Memory 
Programmed on Programmed 
programming while installed 
...l~,.;nn 
Standard Special Special Standard 
/Non-erasable/ I Erasable 1 Types Types Types Types 
-
Pago Nibble Static 
Mode Mode column 
Mode 
I I 
SRAM ZRAM DPR FIFO VRAM DRAM 
Static Zero Dual First in Video Dynamic 
RAM Power Port first RAM RAM 
RAM RAM out 
I I I I 
'Bipolar I (C) MOS II Erased with 
uv Light I Ecasod I Electrically 
ROM PROM DTP EPROM FLASH EEPROM 
Read Programmable One time Erasable EPROM Electrically 
Only Read only programmable programmable erasable 
Memory memory EROM ROM PROM 
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9.4. Information Security Objectives 
(Menezes, Van Oorschot and Vanstone p3) 
Privacy or Confidentiality 
Data integrity 
entity authentication or identification 
message authentication 
Signature 
Authorisation 
Validation 
Access control 
Certification 
Time stamping 
Witnessing 
receipt 
confirmation 
Ownership 
Anonymity 
non-repudiation 
Revocation 
keeping information secret from all but 
those who arc authorised to sec it. 
ensuring information has not been 
allered by unauthorised or unknown 
means 
corroboration of the identity of an entity 
(e.g. a person, a computer terminal, a 
credit card etc.) 
corroborating the source of information; 
also known as data origin 
authentication 
a means to bind information to an entity 
conveyance, to another entity, of official 
sanction to do or be something 
a means to provide timeliness of 
authorisation to use or manipulate 
information or resources. 
restricting access to resources to 
privileged entities 
endorsement of information by a trusted 
entity 
recording the time of creation or 
existence of information 
verifying the creation or existence of 
information by an entity other than the 
creator 
acknowledgment that information has 
been received 
acknowledgement that services have 
been provided 
a means to provide an entity with the 
legal right to use or transfer a resource 
to others. 
concealing the identity of an entity 
involved in some process. 
preventing the denial of previous 
committments or actions. 
retraction of certification or 
authorisation. 
Table 9·2 Some Information security objectives 
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9.5. Smart Card Specifications 
(Hendry p 1 06) 
Application Manufacturer Processor 
Phone Card ODS (Siemens . 
chip! 
Eurochip Philips 6805 
2nd 
Generation 
public 
telephony 
GSM SGS-Thomson 6805 
telephonv . 
Bank Gem plus 6805 
!credit/debit! 
Health I So laic 8051 
Secure 
Payments 
Computer Philips 8051 
Access 
Table 9·3 Sample Card Specifications 
Application RAM EEPROM 
Phone Card - 32 bits 
Eurochip 128 bytes I kb 
2nd Generation 
public telephony 
GSM telephony 384 bytes 8 kb 
Bank (credit debit) - 1 - 8 kb 
Health f Secure 256 bytes 2.5 kb 
Pavments 
Computer Access 640 bytes 8 kb 
Edith Cowan University 
ROM PROM 
16 bits 56 bits 
6 kb -
16 + -
1.5 kb 
8 kb -
8+2 -
kb 
20 kb 
Coprocessor 
-
-
Arithmetic 
Arithmetic 
Crypto (RSA) 
Crypto {fast 
exponentiation) 
Security 
Features 
Included 
security 
logic; 
countdown 
onl • 
randomised 
response 
times; low 
frequency 
protected 
Address 
scrambling 
. 
-
Low 
frequency 
and voltage 
sensors 
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9.6. Entity Relationship diagrams 
VAMP- Top Level Diagram 01.0 Ownership 
[vehicle 
Master 
Card 
Ownership 
1. Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle 
2. Owner Has Master Card to Vehicle 
3. Master Card has Vehicle 
(owner 
Note. At present, it is assumed that there exists a form of Master 
Card for the Vehicle which serves as a certificate of ownership and 
gives complete access to all functions of the control system. 
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VAMP - Top Level Diagram 01.1 Transfer of Ownership 
(vehicle (owner 
[Card 
New 
Owner 
Transfer of Ownership 
!Agreement to 
1. Owner and New Owner reach agreement about sale of 
Vehicle 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Owner cedes Master Card to New Owner 
New Owner has Master Card 
Master Card has Vehicle 
Note. At present, it is assumed that there exists a form of Master 
Card for the Vehicle which serves as a certificate of ownership and 
gives complete access to all functions of the control system. 
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VAMP - Top Level Diagram 01.2 New Card Preparation 
I owns 
!owner 
!recognise I 
[New 
Issue of Vehicle 
1. Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle 
2. Owner uses Master Card to prepare the Vehicle to accept 
New Card 
3. Owner has New Card and allocates it to the car 
4. Vehicle recognises New Card 
5. New Card has Vehicle 
Edith Cowan University 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.0 Lease Agreement 
I owns 
[owner 
!Agreement to 
Issue of Vehicle 
1. Owner with legal ownership of Vehicle 
2. Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2) 
3. Owner and User reach agreement about use of Vehicle 
4. Owner assigns New Card to User 
5. User has New Card 
6. New Card has Vehicle 
Edith Cowan University 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.1 Lease Hesolution 
!Accents 
[owner 
ignores [replaces [ 
[unassig [ 
(Old Card J (user 
Return of Vehicle 
1. Owner and User reach agreement about return of Vehicle 
2. Owner accepts Vehicle 
3. Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2) 
4. Owner unassigns Old Card from Vehicle 
5. New Card replaces Old Card 
6. Vehicle ignores Old Card 
Note. The Old Card can be retained as a receipt or advertising 
material and may be destroyed or retained by either owner or user. 
The assumption is that all Cards are unique and no information is 
able to be determined about the cards 
' 
', 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 02.2 Lease Extension 
(vehicle 
[old Card J 
jreplaces j 
jassigns J 
[user 
Extension of Lease of Vehicle 
1. Owner and User reach agreement about extension of lease 
2. Owner Reassigns Old Card to Vehicle 
or 
3. Owner assigns New Card to Vehicle (refer 0 1.2) 
4. New Card replaces Old Card 
6. User has New Card 
7. New Card has Vehicle 
8. Vehicle ignores Old Card 
Note. The Old Card can be retained as a receipt or advertising 
and may be destroyed or retained by either owner or user. The 
assumption is that all Cards are unique and no information is able 
to be determined about the cards 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 03.0 Buying and Selling 
!offer and 
[seller 
[Identifies Self [ 
(Receipt 
jdescribe j 
[Article 
Buying and Selling 
1. Buyer offers and Seller Accepts Offer 
2. Seller Identification on receipt 
3. Buyer Identification on receipt 
4. Seller provides Transaction details 
5. Buyer provides Payment details 
6. Electronic copy of Details to Seller 
7. Receipt describes Transaction and Article (refer 03.1) 
8. Paper copy to Buyer 
9. Seller cedes Article to Buyer 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 03.1 Receipt Processing 
Seller Identity Buyer Identity 
Payment 
Electronic Receipt Paper Receipt 
lv<llirll'ltinn !Transaction 
jValidatio ) 
Generate a Receipt 
1. Seller Identification on Receipt 
2. Seller provides Transaction details on Receipt 
3. Buyer Identification on Receipt 
4. Buyer provides Payment details on Receipt 
5. Receipt provides Transaction details to Validation process 
6. Validation Process returns Validation details to Receipt 
7. Receipt describes Transaction and Article 
8. Electronic copy of Details and Receipt to Seller 
9. Paper copy of Receipt to Buyer 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagnun 03.2 f~cccipt Processing 
Transaction Details /validation 
' ·' 
/Transaction lsignatur I 
Digital 
Signatur 
Receipt Processing 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Transaction details from Receipt 
Transaction details to Secure Hash process 
Hash result returned 
Hash to Digital Signature process 
Digital Signature returned 
Validation details to Receipt 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagram 04.1 AcccsH Control 
(control ( 
I access 
(card 
!Identifies 
(user 
Granting Access 
1. Authority controls access to premises 
2. Authority assigns Card to premises 
3. User Identified to Authority 
4. Authority assigns Card to User 
5. User has Card 
6. Card has access to premises 
Edith Cowan University 
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VAMP- Top Level Diagn.tm 04.2 Access Control 
jcontrol 
{Premises] (Authority} 
]From j Junassig 
[Ignores 
Surrenders 
or 
Keens 
Terminates Access 
(user 
!Refuses I 
1. Authority controls access to premises 
2. Authority refuses User access 
3. Authority unassigns Card from User 
4. Authority unassigns Card from Premises 
5. Premises ignores Card 
6. User surrenders or keeps Card 
Edith Cowan University 
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VAMP· Top Level Diagram 05.0 Signature 
jParty A 
Smart 
Card A 
Hash & 
authentication 
sequence 
Signature 
jNcgotiat I 
Hash 
Algorithm 
1. Party A and Party B reach agreement 
Smart 
Card 8 
Hash & 
authenticatio 
n sequence 
2. Party A and Party B have unique Smart Cards 
3. A and B append a card signature to the agreement 
4. The agreement is hashed 
5. The hash value is used to generate an Authentication Sequence. 
6. The hash and authentication sequences are stored by both parties 
for reference. 
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9. 7. Random Noise Sampler 
This design was provided by Mr. G. Robbins, Research Support Engineer, Edith Cowan 
University. 
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9.8. Calculation of Large Factorials and Exponentials 
9.8.1. Comparison of Results for Factorial Calculations. 
A comparison of results gained by Stirling's Method and the Sequential 
Summation method shows that, in general, Scqucnti<Il Summation produces results 
___greater than the results g~incd with Stirling's .')pproximation. 
Logarithmic Stirling 
101 3.6288000000 * 10 "6 3.5986956250E+OO 6 
11! 3.9916800000. 10 A7 3.9615625127E+OO 7 
121 4.7900160000. 10 A8 4.7568748747E+OO 8 
13! 6.2270208002 • 10 A9 6.1872394893E+OO 9 
14! 8.7178291203. 10 A1Q 8.666100 1955E+OO 10 
1St 1.3076743680. 10 A12 1.3004307256E+OO 12 
16! 2.0922789888 ' 10 A 13 2.0814114472E+OO 13 
17! 3.5568742811 * 10 A14 3.5394832971E+OO 14 
18! 6.4023737057' 10 A 15 6.372~046458E+OO 15 
191 1.2164510041 * 10 "17 1.2111278698E+OO 17 
201 2.4329020081'10A18 2.4227868550E+OO 18 
30! 2.6525285982 • 10 A32 2.6451709723E+OO 32 
40! 8.1591528323. 10 '47 8.1421726985E+OO 47 
50! 3.0414093197. 10 '64 3.0363446196E+OO 64 
601 8.3209871117. 10 '81 8.3094383964E+OO 81 
70! 1.1978571669. 10 1.1964320185E+OO 100 
"100 
80! 7.1569457061. 10 7.1494945686E+OO 118 
1\118 
90! 1.4857159644. 10 1.4843409665E+OO 138 
"138 
1001 9.3326215494 • 10 9.3248477868E+OO 157 
A1S7 
110! 1.5882455416. 10 1.5870428136E+OO 178 
A178 
1201 6.6895029130. 10 6.6848591871E+OO 198 
'198 
1301 6.4668554867. 10 6.4627115428E+OO 219 
A2}9 
1401 1.3462012447. 10 1.3454002075E+OO 241 
A241 
Table 9-4 Comparison of Logarithmic and Stirling's Approximation 
It is noted that Stirling underestimates the value of the fac~orial compared against the 
logarithmic method and it is suggested that the logarithmic method is a more accurate 
method of generating large factorials. 
9.8.1.1. Calculation by Integer Methods 
Comparing Direct Calculation with Sequential Summation shows occasions 
where the results differ and this is due to the methods of generating logarithms on the 
computer. Logarithms are approximations of a number where speed of calculation is 
more important than accuracy. The user must define suitable error levels when using 
logarithms to calculate large numbers. 
It is considered that Integer methods of calculating large factorials are more 
accurate but substantially slower to use. Above a certain number, the ability to check 
the accuracy of the Integer method becomes difficult and may be infeasible unless 
another method becomes available. 
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19! 
20! 
70! 
• 
1Q81 
1.1978571669. 
lQlOO 
• 
10157 
= 
> 
< 
> 
> 
< 
< 
< 
< 
> 
< 
1307674368000 
20922789888000 
121645100408832000 
11 15894272 
556996128468876694221686370498539309406 
587654599213137088405964561723446997811 
> 526816992388562667004907 
159682643816214685929638952175999932299 
156089414639761565182862536979208272237 
582511852109168640000000000000000000000 
Table 9-5 Comparison of Logarithmic and Direct Calculation 
The logarithmic result differs from the Integer result after 8 decimal places and 
this is considered to be due to the methods of generating logarithms. More accurate 
methods of generating logarithms by direct calculation were not considered even though 
the algorithm is relatively simple. 
Edith Cowan University 
119 
11/12/99 
I 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, Multi-
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
In general, logarithms umJercstimatc a-nurnbc·ru·nlcSs the comp\cle logHrithm -
of a number is used in calculation. For example, Pi is irralional and most calculators 
give Pi as 3. t 41592654 and the logarithm of Pi to I he base I 0 HS 0.497149872. A 
truncated value of Pi means that the numbers generated underestimate the correct 
value. 
Logarithmic methods arc quicker to implement hut limited by the numeric 
representation of 11oating point numbers on the computer which appear accurate only to 
eight decimal places. 
9.8.2. Calculation of Large Binary Numbers by Integer 
Multiplication 
Large exponentials are calculated in entirety and listed in the table below. 
Each number is displayed in the following form : exponent of 2 ; calculated value 
038837035105112493612249319837881569585812759467291755314682 
518714528569231404359845775746985748039345677748242309854210 
746050623711418779541821530464749835819412673987675591655439 
460770629145711964776865421676604298316526243868372056680693 
76 
Table 9·6 Integer Calculation of Powers of Two 
Modest values for N produce substantial values of 2N and the level of accuracy 
available is considered to be in excess of any reasonable requirements. 
It is noted that where n is a multiple of 20 the last two digits of the number are 
76 and where n is a multiple of 10 the last two numbers are 24. 
9.9. Visual Testing 
9.9.1. Single Bit Sequences 
The program is called 'LWALKl.PAS' which displays the results of 10 runs of a 
single bit generator in graphical form. A composite display created from summing the 
individual values of the runs characterises the output of the randomiser. 
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9.9.2. Multi~bit Sequences 
The Program is called 'DWC.PAS' and includes a library file called 'DWI.JB.PAS'. 
The implementation performs tests up to four bits on a random generator. 
The program includes input and output file handling, printing of the results and 
trace. Input parameters include choice of target shape and size, number of test runs, 
two, three or four bit tests, overlapping and non-overlapping samples and 
characteristics calculated from the trace. 
9.9.2.1. Parameters. 
The program displays the file input menu first to determine if files will be used. 
After selecting an option from INPUT, OUTPUT, INOUT- (input and output files used) 
and NONE the program continues with the Data Input screen. 
The Data Input Screen permits the user to change the number of runs, the size 
and shape of the target, the number of bits tested and whether the samples overlap. 
Each trace is displayed in blue and then the blue pixels are counted and set to 
green. 
Maximum Runs 
User selectable number of runs where the trace starts at the origin and terminates 
at the periphery. 
Run Number 
Actual number of the run being performed. 
Target Radius 
Radius of the circular target and half the dimension of the square target. 
Target Area 
Area of the target calculated from counting the pixels inside. 
Blue Count 
The total number of pixels visited during the test 
Blue Area 
The actual number of pixels illuminated during the test 
Blue Density 
The result of dividing the Count by the Area 
· Blue Direction 
Not implemented at present 
Green Area 
The area of the green trace compared with area of the target as a percentage. 
Expected Blue 
The expected number of bits according to Kaye. 
Average Per Cent 
calculated from the average blue count divided by expected blue as a percent 
Overlap 
if set to yes the test is for a binary source with memory. 
If set to no the test is for n bit sequences. 
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Files Input 
Displays the file name for data input to the program 
Files Output 
Displays the file name for data output from the program 
Q to Quit 
press 'Q' or 'q' to exit the program when this is displayed 
P to Print 
press 'P' or 'p' to print the screen to the local printer. 
Time 
System time at time of test 
Date 
System Date at time of test 
9.9.2.2. Testing 
In the examples provided, a file called 'TESTI.DAT' was generated and stored 
with the program using the compiler random function. The file was then used 
repeatedly as input for a variety of tests and the different tests compared. 
9.9.2.3. Results. 
The resulting graphs are stored in the appendix 9.13. 
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9.10. Secure Sequence 
program scl; 
{ 
} 
A program to simulate the input from a s~cure hashing protocol and 
use it to generate a secure sequence in return. 
author 
date 
version 
' ,. 
David Shaw 0956404 (/ 
OS july 97 
1 initial -version. 05jul97.' 
2 loop and error flag added. Start_point stored in a 
file 'for analysis 08jul97. 
ancillary programs 
scl 1 fill a file with the randomizer 
sc1_2 fill a file with input sequences of integers 
scl_3 read the contents of an integer file 
uses crt; { use text mode facilities } 
= 'file is incomplete'; 
= •program is terminated due to error'; 
= 'Press any key to continue'; 
canst 
file_error_message 
program_error_message 
continue_message 
terminate_message = 'This program has terminated correctly'; 
sequence_input_file_name = 'd:\programs\rndinp1.dat'; 
{ name of file of inputs } 
randomizer_file_name = 'd:\programs\rndmise1.dat'; 
{ name of randomizer file } 
output file name= 'd:\programs\rndout1.dat 1 ; 
{ name-of file outputs } 
sp output file name= 1d:\programs\rndsp1.dat'; 
{~arne of-file-for storing start_points generated} 
no bits in = 128; { number of bits in input 
-
nbi 1 = no bits in -' 1; 
- -
no _bits out - 128; { number of bits in output 
nbc 1 = no bits out 1; 
sequence } 
sequence } 
size_of_sp_select = 16; { number of bits used to calculate SP } 
sp_1 = size_of_sp_select - 1; 
size_of_select = 10; { number of values in select array } 
s_1 = size_of_select - 1; 
size_of_randomizer = 32768; 4096 bytes of rom in bits 
sp_select array[o .. sp_1] { selection sequence} 
{ 
} 
of integer= (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16); 
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_1 and in any order. these 
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which 
order to generate a starting point long integer 
selection: array{O .. s_l] {selection sequence 1 
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} 
type 
of integer- (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10); 
these numbers are the increments added to the lltarting point and 
may be of any valid integer or long integer value. 
negative numbers may be used · 
of { input sequence type } in_sequence ~ array(O, .nbi_l] 
out_sequence = array [0 .. nbo_,l], of 
sp_out_file 
out file 
file_ name 
= file of longint; 
= file of integer.; 
string-[40];" 
integer; 
integer; { ou-tput sequence type },1 { startpoint file } 
{ data file type } 
{ name of file type !/ - ·--;)' 
' ) 
var 
" 
" { } sequence_input_ file . o\J,t~.-f-i.le; file of inputs 
., c- '•-', 
randomizer file out_;file; randomizer file } 
sequence_output_ file out_ file; { file of outputs 
sp_output_ file sp_out_file; { file of start points 
start _point 
input 
output 
longint; 
in_sequence; 
out_sequence; 
{ starting point in randomizer } 
{ input sequence from input file } 
{ output sequence to output file } 
error_flag boolean; { file error flag } 
} 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
procedure get_sequence(var f: out file; 
{ 
var flag : boolean; 
var i : in_sequence) ; 
get an input sequence from an input file and store the bits in an 
array 
} 
var count : integer; { loop variable } 
begin 
writeln( 1 Getting Input Sequence From File 1 ); 
Writeln; 
for count := 0 to nbi 1 do 
begin 
if eof(f) then 
begin 
writeln(file_error_message); 
flag := true; 
exit; 
end; { if eo£ } 
read(f,i[count]}; { read value and store in array } 
end; { for count } 
end; { get_sequence } 
procedure generate_SP(i in_sequence; 
var sp : longint); 
{ 
use the input sequence and the constant sp_select to generate a 
starting point. 
124 
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var temp, 
value, 
count 
begin 
{ temporary value ) 
{ incremental value for starting point sp } 
{ loop variable } 
longint; 
writeln('generating a starting point from input sequence'); 
writeln; 
value •= 0; /) ' 
for count : = m~lto sp 1 do 
li lA' -begin temp := i(sp_select[countll; 
value := value or temp; 
if count < sp 1 then value := value shl 1; 
end; { for count } 
sp := value; 
writeln('start point is 1 ,sp:l0); 
writeln; 
end; { generate_sp } 
procedure generate_output_sequence{var rif : out_file; 
var ref : out_file; 
sp ; longint; 
var o : out_sequence); 
Use the starting point and the selection sequence to select 
output sequences from the randomizer file and store the output 
sequence in an output file 
var rifsize, 
rifpos 
count, 
temp 
begin 
{ random input file size } 
{ pointer to position in random input file } 
longint; 
{ loop variable } 
{ index to selection increments } 
integer; 
writeln('Generating output sequence'); 
writeln; 
reset (rif); 
{ get size of file } rifsize := filesize(rif); 
rifpos : .. sp; { set 'file position to start point } 
for count := 0 to nbo 1 do 
begin 
if rifpos > rifsize then rifpos :: rifpos mod rifsize; 
{ ensure file position is always within the file } 
seek(rif,rifpos); {position pointer and get 
read{rif,o[count]); 
bit ) 
temp :: count mod size_of_select; { calculate next increment } 
rifpos := rifpos + selection[temp]; 
write(rof,o{count]); {write to output file } 
end; { for count } 
end; { generate_output_sequence); 
{ ++'+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ) . 
begin { main } 
clrscr; 
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writeln('Smart Card simulation Program J '); 
{ identify and prepare files for use } 
{ file of input sequences } 
assign (sequence_input_file, sequence_.input_file_name); 
reset(sequence_input_file); 
{ file of randomizer data } 
assign(randomizer_file, randomizer_file~name); 
reset(randomizer_filel; 
{ file of output sequences calculated from input sequence and 
randomizer data } 
assign(sequence_output_file, output_file_name); 
rewrite(sequence_output_file); 
{ file of start points generated from the input sequences } 
assign(sp_output_file, sp_output_file_name); 
rewrite(sp_output_file); 
{ loop until input file of input sequences is empty } 
error_flag := false; { set error_flag condition } 
While not EOF(sequence_input_file) do 
begin 
get_sequence(sequence_input_file,error_flag,input); 
if error_flag then 
begin 
writeln(program error message); 
exit; { if true stop-program } 
end; { if error_flag } 
generate_SP(input, start_point); 
write(sp_output_file,start_point); 
generate_output_sequence(randomizer_file,sequence_output_file, 
end; { while not eof } 
start_point, output); 
{ close all files before exiting 
close(sequence_input_file); 
close(randomizer_fileJ; 
close (sequence_output.~file); 
close(sp output file); 
{ finish-message } 
writeln('This program has terminated correctly'}; 
writeln(continue_message); 
readln; 
end. { main } 
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program scl 1; { -
A program to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and 
use it to generate a secure sequence in return. 
This program generates randomizer bits as integers 0 & 1 and stores 
them in a file 
author 
date 
version 
uses crt; 
canst 
David Shaw 0956404 
OS july 97 
1 initial version 
{ use text mode facilities } 
no bits_out = 128; 
size of randomizer = 32768; 
{ number of bits in output sequence 
{ 4096 bytes of rom in bits } 
type 
out_file = file of integer; 
file_name = string[40]; 
var 
output_file_name : file_name; 
output_file out_file; 
value { random value for storage } 
integer; 
count { loop counter } 
: longint; 
{ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++,+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
procedure fill file(var f : out_file); 
begin 
rewrite(£); 
randomize; 
for count := 
begin 
{ initialize random generator } 
1 to size_of_randomizer do 
value := random(2); 
write(output file, value); 
end; { for coUnt } 
close (f); 
end; { fill_file } 
procedure read_file(var f: out_file~; 
var value integer; 
begin 
reset(f); 
while not eof(f)do 
begin 
read (f, value); 
write (value); 
end; { while not eo£ } 
close(£); ~ 
end; { read_file 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++} 
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begin { main } 
clrscr; 
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1_1 '); 
writeln('Random sequence generation '); 
output_file_name := 'd:\programs\rndmisel.dat'; 
assign(output_file, output_file_name); 
fill_file(output_file); 
read_file(output_file); 
writeln ('File terminated correctly'); 
end. { inain } 
• • ..
" 
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program scl 2; { -
A prog1·am to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and 
use it to generate a secure sequence in return. 
This program generates sequences,of 128 random bits as integers 
0 & 1 and stores them in a file; 
} 
author 
date 
version 
uses crt; 
canst 
David Shaw 0956494 
OS july 97 
1 initial version 
{ use text mOde facilities J 
no bits_out = 128; 
no_of_sequences = 100; 
{ number of bits in output sequence } 
{ 100 * 128 bits } 
type 
out_file = file of integer; 
file_name = string[40]; 
var 
output_file_name : file_name; 
output_file out_file; 
value random value for storage } 
integer; 
count loop counter } 
: longint; 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
procedure fill file(var f out_file); 
var countl, count2, value 
begin 
rewrite(£}; 
integer; 
randomize; 
for countl := 
begin 
1 to 
{ initialize 
no_of_sequences 
write ( 1 * 1 ) ; 
for count2 := 
begin 
1 to no bits_out do 
,01 
value := random(2); 
write(£, value); 
end; { for count2 } 
end; { for countl } 
close(£); 
end; { fill_file } 
procedure read_file(var f: out_file); 
var value integer; 
begin 
reset(£); 
while not eof(f)do 
begin 
Edith Cowan University 
random 
do 
generator } 
129 
11/12/99 
I 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Conlrol in Mulli-User, Multi-
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
read(f,value); 
write {value); 
end; { while not eof } 
close(f); 
end; { read file 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
begin { main } 
clrscr; 
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1_2'); 
writeln('Random sequence generation for selection sets '); 
output_file_name : = 'd: \programs\rndinpl. dat •.·; 
assign(output_file, output_file_name); 
{ files closed within procedures } 
fill_file{output_file); 
read_file(output_file); 
writeln; 
writeln ('press any key to continue'); 
readln; 
end. { main } 
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program scl 3; { -
A program to simulate the input from a secure hashing protocol and 
use it to generate a secure sequence in return. 
This program reads the bits as integers 0 & 1 from a file 
} 
author 
date 
version 
uses crt; 
canst 
David Shaw 0956404 
05jul97 
1 initial version 
{ use text mode facilities } 
no bits_out = 128; 
size_of_randomizer 32768; 
{ number of bits in output sequence 
{ 4096 bytes of rom in bits } 
type 
out_file = file of integer; 
file name= string[40); 
var 
output_file_name : file_name; 
output_file out_file; 
value 
count 
integer; 
: longint; 
{ random value for storage } 
{ loop counter } 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
procedure read_file(var f: out_file); 
var value integer; 
begin 
reset (f); 
while not eof(f)do 
begin 
read(f,value); 
write (value); 
end; { while not eof } 
close(f); 
end; { read_file } 
{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
begin { main } 
clrscr; 
writeln('Smart Card Simulation Program 1 1 '); 
writeln ('Sequence reading from a file 1 ) 7 
writeln; 
write('What is file name to be read? : 1 ); 
readln(output_file_name); 
writeln; 
assign(output file, output file name); 
{ file opened-and closed i~ pro~edure } 
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read_file(output_file); 
writeln; 
writeln; 
writeln('This program has terminated correctly. '); 
end. ( rna in ) ., 
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Test Results- Menu and Access Control 
Parameter Jiillut Value EX-pected Hcsult Actual Result Comment 
Input password access granted access ok 
Password granted 
-No. Of Tries No. Tries >limit access denied access denied ok 
-time out do nothine: exit session exit session ok 
Usage Limit No. <=limit permit access permit access ok 
-Excess use No. > limit access denied access denied ok 
Menu choice 0 exit program exit program ok 
Time Out Do Nothing redo password redo password ok 
-legitimate I show S.No. show S.No. ok 
-legitimate 2 show sequence show ok 
sequence 
-legitimate 3 Hash sequence Hash ok 
sequence 
-legitimate 4 crypto choice crypto choice ok 
-legitimate 5 summary summary ok 
-error A ignore it ignore it ok 
-error s ignore it ignore it ok 
-error 1.3 ignore it to option I ? 
-error 4232657 ignore it to option 4 ? 
-error -1 ignore it to ootion 1 ? 
9.11. Simulation of Smart Card Design. 
9.11.1. Introduction. 
The design from chapter four has been implemented with copy of the MDS hash 
algorithm from Gnome Works. The design of the main program and sub-procedures is 
discussed and testing of the main program is documented. 
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9.11.2. Design of Program SMARTCD.PAS 
9.11.2.1, Conatanta 
Value Name 
NumberOffries 
Password 
CardSeria!Numbc 
r 
Hexlist 
Delay! 
delay2 
timeoutlimit 
numberotbitsin 
numberofbitsout 
rna" bits 
maxusage 
size_of_select 
size_of_sp_select 
size_of_randomize 
r 
nbi_l 
nbo_l 
sp_l 
s_l 
windowO 
window! 
window2 
window3 
pathname 
randfilename 
usagefilename 
inputfilename 
outputfilename 
logfilename 
inseqfilename 
headennessage 
notokmessage 
errormessage 
exitmessage 
endmessage 
sn_select 
sp_select 
3 
123 
'1234567890 123456' 
'0 123456789ABCDE 
F' 
4000 
8000 
15000 
128 
128 
255 
500 
10 
16 
32768 
numberofbitsin · 1 
numberofbitsout · 1 
size_of_sp_select - 1 
size_of_select - 1 
1, 1,80,25 
1, 1,80,12 
1,13,80,25 
10, 5,70, 7 
'd; \programs\ scard \ 
'rndmizel.dat' 
'usagel.dat' 
'inputl.dat' 
'output.dat' 
'logfile 1.log' 
'inseq1.txt' 
'Smart Card 
Simulation Software' 
'Access to this card 
has not been 
successful' 
Purpose 
login attempt limit then error 
password for card access 
serial number of card 
convert to hexadecimal 
characters 
short delay 
medium delay 
long delay 
size of input strings 
size of output strings 
largest string permitted 
usage limit 
number of values in select 
array 
number of bits used to 
calculate SP 
4096 bytes of rom in bits 
for o .. n-1 references 
for O .. n-1 references 
for 0 .. 15 references 
for O .. n-1 references 
full window coordinates 
menu window coordinates 
result windo\\' coordinates 
warning \'lrindow coordinates 
path name 
randomiser file name 
usage record file name 
input string 
output string 
security log 
input sequence 
standard message 
standard message 
'Access to this card standard message 
has been DENIED' 
'Exit from session standard message 
selected' 
'This program has standard message 
terminated correctly' 
1,15,4,13,2,11, 10,99, Serial number select values 
48,27 ,66,15,34,33,2, 
11 
59,2,5,103,123,107,6 start point select values 
4,68,69,90,70,35,8,3 
3,19,78 
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selection 1 ,2,3,4,5,6, 7 ,8,9, 10 Selection set select values 
9.11.2.2. Inputs, Outputs (Top Level Procedures only} 
char [menu choice] 
string [ hash process string ] 
Main Program 
choice 
sDigest 
session sessionrecord ( global information J 
procedure initsession 
session Sessionrecord [ global information ] 
procedure textsetup 
integer [ screen type ] IN 
headermessage : constant OUT 
procedure getpassword 
session Sessionrecord [ global information ] 
integer [ local password ] OUT pw 
tries integer [ no, of access tries] OUT 
procedure closesession 
session Sessionrecord [ global information ] 
9.11.2.3. Algorithms (Top Level Procedures Only) 
begin main procedure 
initialise session record 
prepare text screen 
get password 
if OK 
loop while choice is not 0 
IN OUT 
IN OUT 
IN OUT 
choice 0 clearscreen and display exit message 
choice 1 display the card and randomiser serial 
numbers 
3 get a text string and hash it with MDS 
4 get a text string and hash it for a start 
5 display logfile data 
choice 
choice 
point and encrypt it 
choice 
choice 
endloop choice 
6 display usage data and bar graph 
if NOTOK 
display notokmessage 
if ERROR 
destroy randomiser, input,output, log and usage files 
clear screen and display errormessage 
close the session 
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display goodbye message 
end main program 
9.12. Testing 
9 12 I Test Results Menu and Access Control -
Parameter Input Value 
Input password 
Password 
-No. Of Tries No. Tries >limit 
-time out do nothing 
Usage Limit No. <- limit 
-Excess use No. >limit 
Menu choice 0 
Time Out Do Nothing 
-legitimate I 
-legitimate 2 
-legitimate 3 
-legitimate 4 
-legitimate 5 
~legitimate 6 
~error A 
~error s 
~error 1.3 
-error 4232657 
-error -I 
Serial Number ... 
Hash Function this is a test 
this is aa test 
this is a test 
Encryption this is a test 
Function 
this is aa test 
this iG a test 
Usage Record ... 
Edith Cowan University 
l~xpccted Result 
access gran ted 
access denied 
exit session 
permit access 
access denied 
exit program 
redo password 
show S.No. 
show sequence 
Hash sequence 
crypto choice 
summary 
Usage Record + 
Card Serial No. 
ignore it 
ignore it 
ignore it 
ignore it 
ignore it 
Card Serial No. 
+ 
Randomiser 
Serial No. 
hash value 
hash value 
hash value 
Encryption 
seouence 
usage record + 
card serial no. 
Actual Result 
access 
granted 
access denied 
exit session 
permit access 
access denied 
exit program 
redo password 
show S.No. 
show 
sequence 
Hash 
sequence 
crypto choice 
summary 
Usage Record 
+ Card Serial 
No. 
ignore it 
ignore it 
to option 1 
to option 4 
to option 1 
12345678901 
23456 + 
2404AE08862 
BEFA5F3CF9 
4C2386A60A4 
00300220E04 
805CEA9556 
338 I C6042A8 
95360061304 
A9837784E5 
C34A0404AO 
E 
00300220E04 
8D5CEA9556 
3-3BIC6042A8 
00300220E04 
805CE 
95360061304 
A9837 
00300220E04 
805CE 
123/500 :: 
12345678901 
23456 + bar 
graph 
Comment 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
ok 
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9.12.2. 
Input Output function 
Input Sequence 
sequence separator 
Output Sequence 
Logfile 
indicator 0:: 
0123456789ABCDEF 
FE1BF09FF604ACB3 
Hash function indicator 
Hash Output Sequence 
H:: 
0030D220E048DSCEA955633B1C6042A8 
Encryption function indicator E· · 
Encryption Output sequence 0030D220E048DSCE hash value of input 
sequence 
Sample of Log file 
0: :0123456789ABCDEF :: FE18F09FF604AC83 
H::0030D220E048D5CEA95563381C6042A8 
E::0030D220E048DSCE 
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83 
H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8 
E::0030D220E048DSCE 
E::0030D220E048DSCE 
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83 
H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8 
E::0030D220E048DSCE 
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83 
H: :0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8 
E::0030D220E048D5CE 
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9.12.3. Source Code 
SmartCD.PAS, a simulation of the design 
program mnartcd; 
Author David Shaw 
File Name: SMARTCD.PAS 
this program simulates the functions of a design for a smart card 
proposed in chap 4 of the thesis documents. 
version: l initial version 15jul97 
2 common include file theslib.pas added 05nov97 
3 include MDS unit 
4 complete menu options 
functions include 
1. serial number 16 bytes 
2. accept a hash function and return a transfer function 
3. generation of a hash function from input data 
4. generation of a stream cipher encryption using a hash key 
5. storage of transaction details plain or encrypted output 
6. Password controlled access 
7. function selection 
it is considered that a security function that counts the number of unsuccessful 
attempts to access the card and deletes or destroys the data to prevent any reuse of the 
card 
uses crt, 
strings; 
{ use text screen calls } 
{ use string processing calls } 
{$I d:\programs\scard\sclib.pas} 
{$I d:\programs\scard\mdSlib.pas} 
{include general modules } 
var 
choice 
sDigest 
session 
: char; 
: string; 
{ global 
: sessionrecord; 
variables } 
{ menu choice } 
{ hash process string } 
{ global information } 
{-------------------Main Program-------------------------------------} 
begin { smarted main } 
textsetup ( 0) ; 
initsession(session); 
getpassword(session); 
{ prepare text screen } 
{ prepare global record } 
{ validate access request 
if session.aflag <> error then displayusage(session); 
case session.aflag of 
ok : begin 
choice := 'X'; 
while choice <> '0' do 
Edith Cowan University 
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{ ok ) 
{ ok ) 
) 
{ ok ) 
{ ok ) 
{ ok ) 
notok 
error 
begin 
menu(choice); { check timeout } 
case choice of 
'0' begin { exit from session 
'1' 
text setup ( 1) ; 
gotoxy(22,5); 
write(exitmessage); 
delay(delayl); 
end; 
getserialnumber(session); { display card serial no. 
1 2' begin { output for an input sequence } 
'3' 
getinput(session); { get input string } 
generateoutput(session); { display outputstring 
end; 
begin { hash an input message } 
gethashinput (session); { get input string 
session, outstring { perform hash } 
:= MDSProduceDigest(session.inputstring); 
putoutsequence(session) { display outputstring } 
end; 
'4' begin {encrypt a message } 
getcryptoinput(session); { get input string } 
session.tempstring { perform hash } 
:= MDSProduceDigest(session.inputstring); 
encryptmessage(session); { encrypt message} 
end; 
'5' displaydata (session); display log file } 
1 6 1 displayusage (session); display usage records 
end; { case choice } 
end; { while choice <> o } 
end; { case ok } 
begin { access not approved 
writeln; 
writeln(' ':8,notokmessage); 
delay(delayl); 
{ 
) 
end; 
resetting of the number of tries is simulated by closing 
the program. In a real application if 3 tries are made 
before stopping then 24 hours must elapse before the 
numberoftries is set to zero. 
begin { illegal activity performed or card expired } 
{ destroy randomiser and selection algorithms} 
{ with session do 
begin 
erase(usagefile); 
erase (inpfile); 
erase (outfilel; 
erase (ranfile) ; 
may not need to 
erase (logfile); 
end; {with} 
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{ display error message } 
textsetup {3); 
textcolor(white + blink); 
textbackground (red) ; 
clrscr; 
writeln; 
writeln(' ':lS,errormessage); 
delay{delay2); 
clrscr; 
textsetup(l}; 
end; 
end; { case aflag } 
closesession{session); 
ending; 
close all files } 
goodbye message } 
end. { smarted main 
Library Program SCLIB.PAS 
( 
Author D. Shaw 
SCLIB.PAS is used with SMARTCD.PAS 
include this file to use generic data structures 
used by smartcd,pas 
} 
canst 
numberoftries 
password 
= 3; 
= 123; 
login attempt limit then error } 
password for card access } 
cardserialnumber = '1234567890123456'; { serial number of card} 
hexlist = '0123456789ABCDEF'; convert to hexadecimal characters } 
{ time constants} 
delayl 4000; 
8000; delay2 
timeoutlimit = 15000 i 
( numeric constants } 
numberofbitsin = 128; 
numberofbitsout = 128 i 
maxbits 255; 
maxusage = 500; 
size_of_select = 
size_of_sp_ select = 
10; 
16; 
size of randomizer = 32768; 
( derived numeric constants 
nbi 1 = numberofbitsin 
nbo_ 1 = numberofbitsout 
sp_ 1 = size_of _sp_ select 
s _1 = size of select 
{ text windows } 
Edith Cowan University 
} 
1; 
1; 
1; 
1; 
{ delay periods } 
{ size of input strings } 
{ size of output strings } 
( largest string permitted 
( usage limit } 
( number of values in select array 
{ number of bits used to calculate SP 
( 4096 bytes 
( for 0 .. n-1 
( for o .. n-1 
{ for 0 .. 15 
( for 0 .. n-1 
of rom in bits 
references } 
references } 
references } 
references } 
} 
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window a array[l. .4] of integer • 1' 1,80,25); ( full } 
windowl array[l. .4] of integer • 1, 1,80,12); ( menu } 
window2 array[l .. 4] of integer • 1,13,80,25); ( result } 
window3 array[l. .4} of integer • (10, 5, 70, 7) ; ( warning } 
( file names 
pathname •d:\programs\scard\'; ( path name } 
randfilename • •rndmizel.dat'; ( randamiser } 
usagefilename • 'us agel. dat'; ( u~:;:~ge record } 
inputfilename • •inputl.dat'; ( input string } 
outputfilename •output.dat'; ( output string } 
logfilename • • logfilel.log'; ( security log } 
inseqfilename • • inseql. txt'; ( input seqeunce } 
'Smart Card Simulation Software'; 
{ text messages 
headermessage = 
notokmessage = 
errormessage 
exitmessage 
endmessage 
'Access to this card has not been successful'; 
'Access to this card has been DENIED'; 
= 'Exit 
= 'This 
{ constant arrays } 
from session selected'; 
program has terminated correctly'; 
sn_select : array[O .. 15] { serial number selection sequence } 
of integer= (1,15,4,13,2,11,10,99,48,27,66,15,34,33,2,11); 
( 
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_1 and in any order. these 
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which 
order to generate a serial number 
} 
. 
sp_select : array[O .. sp_1] { start point selection sequence } 
of integer = 
(59,2,5,103,123,107,64,68,69,90,70,35,8,33,19,78) i 
( 
numbers may be of any value from 0 to nbi_l and in any order. these 
numbers indicate which bit from the input sequence is used in which 
order to generate a starting point long integer 
} 
selection array [O .. s_l] 
of integer = 
{ incremental selection 
( 1, 2 1 3 1 4 1 51 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10) j 
sequence } 
( 
these numbers are the increments added to the starting point and 
may be of any valid integer or long integer value. 
negative numbers may be used 
} 
type 
{ enumeration types } 
accessflag = (ok,notok, error); 
messagetype = (input,output); 
{ string types 
shortstring = 
hexstring = 
file name = 
} 
string [16]; 
string [32]; 
string [40]; 
anystring 
longstring 
= string [80] ; 
= string [255] ; 
( array types } 
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in_sequence 
intarray 
inputarray 
array [0 .. nbi_l] of shortint; { input sequence type } 
= array[O .. maxbits] of shortint; 
= array [1 .. numberofbitsin) of Bhortint; 
{ current state of card usage 
{ password for access control 
{ current usage counter } 
{ record types } 
usagerecord = record 
psword integer; 
usecounter : integer; 
numbertries : integer; { number of access tries permitted 
end; { usagerecord } 
{ file types } 
usagefile : file 
sintfile file 
log_ file : text; 
{ record type 
sessionrecord = 
record 
serialnumber 
a flag 
of usagerecord; { file of usage record 
of shortint; { short integer file } 
{ current state of session } 
shortstring; { card serial number 
accessflag; { access permitted } 
usage usagerecord; current status of program } 
usagefile 
inpfile, 
out file, 
ranfile 
inseqfile, 
logfile 
inarray 
inputstring 
tempstring, 
instring 
outstring, 
usagefile; 
sintfile; 
text; 
inputarray; 
longstring; 
shortstring; 
logstring : hexstring; 
end; { sessionrecord } 
{ file of session record } 
{ input file of characters } 
{ output file of shortint } 
{ randomiser file of shortint 
{ input sequence to be transformed 
{ log data file } 
{ array of shortint } 
input string for hash 
{ work space strings } 
{ hexadecimal strings } 
logfile entry } 
255 chars 
{----------------------- functions---------------------} 
function getbit{v,b : integer): integer; 
var temp : integer; 
begin { extract a bit from a byte } 
temp := 0; 
case b of 
0 temp := v and 
1 temp := v and 
2 temp := v and 
3 temp := v ond 
4 temp := v and 
5 temp := v and 
6 temp := v and 
7 temp := v and 
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end; { case } 
getbi t : = temp; 
end; { function getbit 
{-------------------procedures --------------------------------} 
procedure textsetup(i : integer); 
begin { set up text window and colours } 
case i of { set text window size and location 
0 window (windowO [ 1) , windowO (2] , windowO [3) , windowO [ 4] ) ; 
1 window(windowl[l) ,window1(2) ,window1[3) ,window1[4]); 
2 window(window2[1],window2[2] ,window2[3),window2 [4]); 
3 window(window3 [1) ,window3 [2) ,window3 [3],window3 [4)); 
end; { case } 
textcolor(yellow); 
textbackground(blue); 
clrscr; 
{ default text colour } 
{ default background colour } 
{ reset screen } 
gotoxy(20, 1); 
writeln(headermessa~e); { display message 
end; { textsetup } 
procedure initsession(var s : sessionrecord); 
b2gin { preset session paramters } 
with s do 
begin 
serialnumber := cardserialnumber; { set password } 
aflag := notok; { default no access } 
{ preset files } 
assign(usagefile, pathname + usagefilename); 
assign(inpfile, pathname + inputfilename); 
assign(outfile, pathname + outputfilename); 
assign{ranfile, pathname + randfilename); 
assign(logfile, pathname + logfilename); 
assign{inseqfile, pathname + inseqfilename); 
reset(usagefile); 
read{usagefile,usage); 
close(usagefile); 
{ get current usage state } 
with usage do { put usage data into current buffer } 
begin 
if usecounter > maxusage then { check if card expired 
s.aflag := notok; 
numbertries := numberoftries; { max permitted tries before lockout 
} 
psword := password; { 
{ 
store password } 
increment usage count inc (usecounter); 
end; { \•dth usage } 
end; { sessionrecord } 
end; { initsession } 
procedure getpassword(var s : sessionrecord); 
{ 
} 
obtain a password 
the stored value. 
to be changed. 
var pw 
tries 
integer; 
integer; 
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begin 
s.aflag := notok; 
tries := 0; 
with s.usage do 
begin 
{ initialise } 
while tries co numbertries do 
begin 
textsetup ( 1); 
gotoxy(10,4); 
write('Input the password now 
read (pw) ; 
not excessive tries } 
{ prepare screen } 
'); { get password } 
tries := tries + 1; { increment try counter 
if pw = pS\IIOrd then 
begin 
{ password entered ok 
s.aflag := ok; 
exit; 
{ set ok condition } 
{ exit while loop } 
end; 
if pw = 0 then 
begin 
{ user chooses to s~op } 
s.aflag := notok; 
exit; 
{ 
{ 
set notok condition } 
exit while loop } 
end; { if pw 
{ too many tries at guessing password 
if tries > numbertries then s.aflag := error; 
end; { while tries } 
end; { with u } 
end; { getpassword 
procedure Menu(var c : char); 
var timeout : integer; { current time } 
begin { display choices and response } 
textsetup(l); { initiailise text screen } 
timeout := 0; { clear timer } 
gotoxy(20, 1); 
write{headermessage); 
gotoxy{l0,4); { display menu 
write('O : Exit from Session'); 
gotoxy(lO,S); 
write('l : Display serial number of card'); 
gotoxy(lO, 6); 
write('2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence'); 
gotoxy{l0,7); 
write{ 1 3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message'); 
gotoxy(lO,B); 
write('4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value'}; 
gotoxy(lO, 9); 
write('S : Display Log File'); 
gotoxy(lO, 10}; 
write('6 : Display usage Record'); 
gotoxy(20,12); 
write('Enter Choice : '); 
C := I Q I j 
repeat 
inc (timeout) ; 
if keypressed 
begin 
{
{ default response = exit 
input process loop } 
{ increment usage time } 
then 
c : = readkey; { calculate input value } 
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wdteln (c); 
exit; 
end; 
{ echo to -screen } 
until timeout >= timeoutlimit; 
write('Access Timeout'); {if timeout and no keypressed then exit} 
delay (delayl) ; 
clrscr;' 
end; { menu } 
procedure closesession(var s 
begin { close 
with s do 
begin 
: sessionrecord) ; 
current session } 
aflag := notok; 
rewrite(usagefile); 
write(usagefile,usage); 
close(usagefile); 
disallow access } 
store usage data at end of session } 
end; { with } 
end; { closesession } 
proceU~re ending; 
begin 
textsetup(3); 
gotoxy(10,3); 
writeln(endmessage); 
delay (delayl) ; 
end; { ending } 
{ display goodbye message 
{ initialise screen } 
{------------------option 1 procedures-------------------------------} 
procedure getserialnumber(s : sessionrecord); 
var 
bits, 
chars 
ch 
lint 
begin 
{ generate 
integer,· 
byte; 
shortint; 
randomiser serial number } 
{ loop counters } 
{ characters in sequence } 
{ hex character equivalent } 
{ input bit from randomiser } 
textsetup(2); { initialise text screen } 
reset(s.ranfile); open file } 
ch := O; 
gotoxy(5,3); 
write ('SERIAL : 1 ); 
write(s.serialnumber); { write card serial number } 
write { 1 : : ') ; 
for chars := 1 to 32 do { get first 128 bits from file } 
begin 
for bits := 1 to 4 do 
begin 
iead(s.ranfile,lint); 
ch := ch shl 1; { shift left 1 place } 
ch := ch or lint; { add LSB ch or ooooooox} 
ch := ch and 15; { blank 4 msb digits ch and ooooxxxx} 
end; { for bits } 
write (copy(hexlist, ch+1, 1)); { convert to hexadecimal chars 
ch := O; 
end; { for chars } 
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9.12.4. sp : sp + 
sp := sp shl 1; 
end; { for count } 
end; { startpoint } 
getbit(intvalue,bit); 
{ make 
{ get 
sp } 
procedure generateoutput (var s : sess.ionrecord); 
{ 
bit } 
open an input file and generate a sequence ·according to 
a particular startpoint and selection algorithm 
} 
convert input string to bits } var 
linarray 
loutarray 
in_sequence; { input string for conversion } 
in_sequence; { output sequence from conversion 
index, 
bits 
filelength, 
start 
logstring 
begin 
integer; 
longint; 
short string; 
{ index to selection set } 
{ loop counter } 
{ size of randomiser 
{ position in randomiser 
{ log file record } 
{ initialise screen } textsetup (1); 
startpoint(start,s.instring}; { generate a start point } 
reset(s.ranfile); 
filelength := filesize(s.ranfile); 
start := start mod filelength; 
for bits := 0 to nbi_1 do 
begin 
seek(s.ranfile,start); { 
read(s.ranfile,loutarray[bits]l; { 
index := bits mod 16; { 
start :=start+ sn_select[indexJ; { 
start : = start mod filelength';'- { 
end; { for bits } · 
close(s.ranfile); 
generate output sequence } 
get length of randomiser } 
calculate start point } 
seek position in randomiser 
read bit } 
get next bit index } 
increment selection value 
make sure it is inside file 
append(s.logfile); { store details in log file } 
textsetup(2); { initialise screen} 
gotoxy(5,3); 
write( 1 The input sequence is •,s.instring); 
write(s.logfile, 1 0:: •,s.instring); 
gotoxy(5,5); 
write ( •The output sequence is : 1 ); 
convert2hex(logstring,loutarray); 
writeln(logstring); 
writeln(s.logfile, 1 :: 1 , logstring); 
close(s.logfile); 
delay(delayl); 
clrscr; 
textsetup (1); 
end; { generateoutput } 
{------------------option 3 procedures-------------------------------} 
procedure gethashinput(var s : sessionrecord); 
begin { get a string to hash } 
textsetup ( 1) ; { initialise screen } 
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gotoxy(S,S); 
write ('HASH : What is the input meaoage ? '); 
readln (s, inputstring); 
if length(s.inputstring) 
read(s.inputstring); 
writeln; 
end; { gethashinput } 
0 then { clear buffer } 
procedure putoutsequence(var s : sesaionrecord); 
begin { display output sequence } 
gotoxy(S,lO); 
write ('The output sequence is : '); 
write(s.outstring); 
append(s.logfilel; { write hash value to logfile } 
writeln(s.logfile, •H:: ',s.outstring); 
close(s.logfile); 
delay{delayll; 
end; { putoutsequence } 
{------------------option 5 procedures-------------------------------} 
procedure getcryptoinput 
begin 
textsetup(l); 
gotoxy{S,S); 
write ( 'CRYPTO : '); 
readln(s.inputstring); 
(var s : sessionrecord) ; 
{ get input string } 
{ initialise screen } 
get input string } 
if length(s.inputstring) 
readln(s.inputstring); 
end; { getcryptoinput } 
0 then { clear buffer } 
{ get input string } 
procedure encryptmessage(var s ~ sessionrecord); 
var 
msg, 
key, 
bit : shortint; 
filelength, 
sp : longint; 
index, 
loop, 
count, 
inlength 
ch 
integer; 
byte; 
begin 
{ message bit } 
{ key stream bit } 
{ process bit process 
{ randomiser size } 
{ start point } 
{ index to array } 
{ loop counter } 
{ loop coounter } 
{ length on string } 
{ character in string 
textsetup (1); J .... { initialise } 
gotoxy(S,S); 
rewrite(s.inpfile); 
rewrite(s.outfile); 
reset(s.ranfile}; 
append(s.logfile); 
index := O; 
startpoint(sp,s.tempstring}; { calculate a startpoint } 
{ convert inputstring to input file of shortints } 
inlength := length(s.inputstring}; {number of characters to process 
} 
for count := 1 to inlength do 
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} 
begin 
ch := ord(s.inputstring[count]); 
for loop := 1 to 8 do { convert 
begin 
bit := ch and 1; 
ch : = ch shr 1; 
writ~(s.inpfile,bit); 
end; { for loop } 
end; { for count } 
reset(s.inpfile); 
filelength := filesize(s.ranfile); 
sp := sp mod filelength; 
seek(s.ranfile,sp); 
while not EOF(s.inpfile) do 
begin 
inc{index); 
read(s.ranfile,key); 
read(s.inpfile,msg); 
get a character } 
to bits and store } 
get length of randomiser 
set start point } 
{ process message bits } 
{ selector for array } 
{ get bits from files } 
sp := sp + sp_select[index mod 
sp := sp mod filelength; 
16] ; { increment selector } 
{ ensure less than randomiser size 
if key = msg then { if same then 0 } 
bit ::::: 0 
else { if different then 1 } 
bit := 1· 
' 
write(s.outfile,bit); { store crypto bit ) 
end; { while } 
gotoxy(5,10); 
write ( 1 OUTPUT : 1 ) ; { reset crypto file } 
reset(s.outfile); 
while not eof(s.outfile) do { convert file to ascii 
begin 
ch := 0; 
for count := 1 to 8 do { convert char to ascii } 
begin 
read(s.outfile,bit); 
ch := ch shl 1; 
ch := ch or bit; 
end; { for } 
write( chr(ch)); {write ascii char } 
end; { while not eof } 
writeln(s.logfile, 1 E:: 1 ,s.tempstring); { store tempstring 
close(s.inpfile); 
close(s.outfile); 
close(s.ranfile); 
close(s.logfile); 
delay(delay1); 
close files } 
end; { encryptmessage } 
{------------------option 5 procedures-------------------------------} 
procedure displaydata(var s: sessionrecord); 
var display logfile data } 
linecount integer; { number of lines displayed } 
inputsequence anystring; { input string from file } 
begin 
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reset (s.logfile); { open logrile 
linecount := 0; 
text setup (1); initialise screen 
gotoxy(S,S); 
wri teln ( 'LOG : • ) ; 
while not eof(s.logfile} do 
begin 
inc (linecount); { count line } 
readln(s.logfile,inputsequence); {get line } 
writeln(inputsequence); { display line 
if linecount mod 10 = 0 then { pause to read lines } 
begin 
writeln('Enter to continue '}; 
readln; 
end; { if } 
end; { while } 
write ('FINISH : '); 
close{s.logfile); 
delay(delayl); 
end; { displaydata } 
{ close files } 
{-----------------option 6 procedures ------------------------} 
procedure displayusage(var s : sessionrecord); 
var maxuse, { maximum usage in tens } 
tenuse, { actual usage in tens } 
oneuse, { actual usage in ones } 
count integer; { loop counter } 
begin { display current usage status } 
clrscr; 
textsetup (2); { initialise screen } 
maxuse := maxusage div 10; {max uses of card in 10 1 s } 
tenuse := s.usage.usecounter div 10; { use by tens } 
oneuse := s.usage.usecounter mod 10; { use by units } 
gotoxy(10,4}; {display usage } 
write( 1 USAGE : 1 ,s.usage.usecounter:5, 1 / 1 ,maxusage); 
writeln ( 1 Serial : 1 , s. serialnumber) ; { display card serial number } 
{ display bar 
gotoxy(10,5); 
Gotoxy(10,5); 
gotoxy(10,6); 
gotoxy(10,6); 
graph 
for count := 1 to maxuse 
for count := 1 to tenuse 
do write(IOI); 
do write ( 1 ~ 1 ) ; 
for count := 1 to 9 do write{' 01 ); 
for count := 1 to oneuse do write{' 2 '); 
{ if maximum usage limit exceeded destroy card } 
if s.usage.usecounter > maxusage then s.aflag := error; 
text setup (1), 
end; { displayusage} 
4.3 MD5LIB.PAS MD5 Hash Program Library 
{program md5lib .pas ;} 
{ 
this program is taken from the network. Gnomeworks 1998 modified to run 
under turbo pascal but not perfect modified to work with the Smart Card 
Simulation Program 
} 
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canst 
hexlisting = '0123456789ABCDEF'; 
811 7; 
812 = 12; 
813 = 17; 
814 = 22; 
821 = 5· 
' 822 = 9; 
823 = 14; 
824 = 2 0; 
831 = 4; 
832 = 11; 
833 = 16; 
834 = 23; 
841 = 6; 
842 = 10; 
843 = 15 i 
844 = 21; 
type 
MDS_CTX = record 
state : Array[O .. 4] of Longint; 
count : Array[O .. 2] of Longint; 
buffer : Array[0 .. 64] of char; 
end; 
PMDS CTX = AMDS CTX; 
- . -PLint = Longint; 
var 
PADDING : Array[0 .. 63] of Char; 
{--------------------------------------------------------} 
procedure RotateLeft (var x : Longint; n : Integer); 
var 
Resultl : Longint; 
xTemp Longint; 
begin 
xTemp : = x; 
Rezultl := (xTemp shl n) or {xTemp shr (32-n)); 
x ::::: Resultl; 
end; 
function F(x : Longint; y 
var 
resultl 
result2 
begin 
resultl := 
Longint; 
Longint; 
x and y; 
(not x) and z; 
Longlnt; z 
result2 .-
F := resultl or result2; 
end; 
function G{x : Longint; y 
var 
resultl 
result2 
Longint; 
Longint; 
Edith Cowan University 
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begin 
resultl := (x and z) ; 
:= y and {not 
:= result! or 
result2 
G 
end; 
z) ; 
result2; 
function H (x : Long!nt; y : Long!nt; z 
begin 
H ::: {x xor y xor z); 
end; 
function I(x : Longint; y 
var 
Longint i) z 
' 
resultl : Longlnt; 
begin 
resultl := x or (not z); 
I := y xor resultl; 
end; 
procedure FF(var a Longint; 
i ac 
' 
Longint) ; 
begin 
a .- a + F(b,c,d) + X + ac; 
RotateLeft(a,s); 
a 
·-
a + b; 
end; 
procedure GG(var a Longint; 
i ac 
' 
Longint) ; 
begin 
a := a + G(b,c,d) + X + ac; 
RotateLeft(a,s); 
a := a + b; 
end; 
procedure HH(var a Longint; 
i ac 
' 
Longrnt) ; 
begin 
a := a + H(b,c,d) + X + ac; 
RotateLeft(a,s); 
a := a + b; 
end; 
procedure II (var a Longint; 
i ac 
' 
Longint) ; 
begin 
a := a + I(b,c,d) + X + ac; 
RotateLeft(a,s); 
a := a + b; 
end; 
procedure MDS_memcpy{output 
var 
Index : Word; 
begin 
b,c,d 
b,c,d 
b,c,d 
b,c,d 
PChar 
for Index := 0 to length do 
output [Index] : = input [Index] ; 
end; 
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{Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UJN1'4). Assumes len is 
a multiple of 4.} 
procedure Decode(var output : Array of Longint ; input : PChar ; len 
Word); 
var 
i, j : word; 
a,b,c,d : Long!nt; 
begin 
i : = 0; 
j : = 0 i 
while j < len do 
begin 
a := Longint{input[j]}; 
b := Longint(input[j+l]); 
c := Longlnt(input[j+2]); 
d := Longint(input[j+3]); 
output [i] := a or (b shl B) or (c shl 16) or (d shl 24); 
Inc (i); 
Inc(j,4); 
end; 
end; 
procedure MDS_memset(output 
var 
Index : Word; 
begin 
PChar 
for Index := 0 to length do 
output [Index] :"' Chr (value); 
end; 
value Integer 
procedure MDSTransform (var state Array of Longint 
var 
a,b,c,d : Longint; 
x : Array[O .. 15] of Longint; 
sA,sB,sC,sD : string; 
begin 
a := state[O]; 
b := state [1] ; 
c := state [2]; 
d := state [3] ; 
Decode {x, block, 64); 
FF (a, b, c, d, xi OJ. 811, 
FF [d, a, b, c, X[ lJ. 812, 
FF (c, d, a, b, X[ 2]. 813, 
FF (b, c, d, a, xi 3]. 814, 
FF (a, b, c, d, X[ 4]. 811, 
FF (d, a, b, c, X[ 5]. 812, 
FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6]. 813, 
FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7]. 814, 
FF (a, b, c, d, X[ BJ. 811, 
FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9]. 812, 
FF (c, d, a, b, X[10], 813, 
FF (b, c, d, a, X [11) , S14, 
$d76aa478); 
$e8c7b756); 
$242070db); 
$c1bdceee); 
$f57cOfaf) ; 
$4787c62a); 
$a8304613); 
$fd469501) i 
$698098d8); 
$8b44f7af); 
$ffff5bbl); 
$895cd7be) ; 
length 
block 
Word); 
PChar); 
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PF Ia, b, c, d, X [12] I 811, $6b901122) i 
FF (d, a, b, c, X (lJ) t 812, $fd987193); 
FF (c, d, a, b, x(l4], 813, $a679438e); 
FF (b, c, d, a, X (15] 1 814, $49b40821); 
( Round 2 
GG (a, b, c, d, xl 1], 821, $f6le2562) ; 
' GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 61, 822, $c040b340); 
GG (c, d, a, b, X (11), 823, $265e5a51); 
GG (b, c, d, a, xl O], 824, $e9b6c7aa) ; 
GG Ia, b, c, d, xl 5]' 821, $d62flOSd); 
GG (d, a, b, c, x(lO], 822, $2441453) i 
GG (c, d, a, b, X (15), 823, $d8ale681); 
GG (b, c, d, a, X I 4], 824, $e7d3fbc8); 
GG Ia, b, c, d, X[ 91, 821, $21elcde6); 
GG (d, a, b, c, x[14), 822, $c33707d6}; 
GG (c, d, a, b, X [ 3] I 823, $f4d50d87) ; 
GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 8], 824, $455al4ed) ; 
GG (a, b, c, d, X (13] 1 821, $a9e3e905); 
GG (d, a, b, c, X( 2] 1 822, $fcefa3f8}; 
GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 71, 823, $676f02d9) i 
GG (b, c, d, a, X [12) t 824, $8d2a4cBa); 
( Round 3 ) 
HH (a, b, c, d, X [ 5) I 831, $fffa3942); 
HH (d, a, b, c, X[ 8] ' 832, $8771f681) ; 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[ll], 833, $6d9d6122); 
HH (b, c, d, a, x(l4], 834, $fde538Dc); 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], 831, $a4beea44); 
HH (d, a, b, c, X ( 4) 1 832, $4bdecfa9) ; 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 71, 833, $f6bb4b60); 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[lO], 834, $bebfbc70); 
HH (a, b, c, d, X [13] , 831, $289b7ec6); 
HH (d, a, b, c, xl 0], 832, $eac..127fa); 
HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], 833, $d4ef30B5); 
HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 6], 834, $4881d05); 
HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], 831, $d9d4d03 9) i 
HH (d, a, b, c, X (12] , 832, $e6db99e5); 
HH (c, d, a, b, X (15] , 833, $1fa27cf8); 
HH (b, c, d, a, X ( 2] , 834, $c4ac5665); 
( Round 4 ) 
II (a, b, c, d, X[ O], 841, $£4292244); 
II (d, a, b, c, X [ 7], 842, $432aff97); 
II I c, d, a, b, X [14], 843, $ab9423a7); 
II (b, c, d, a, X[ 51, 844, $fc93a039); 
II (a, b, c, d, X [12] 1 841, $655b59c3) ; 
II (d, a, b, c, X [ 3], 842, $8fOccc92); 
II (c, d, a, b, X (10] 1 843, $ffeff47d); 
II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], 844, $85845dd1); 
II (a, b, c, d, x[ B], 841, $6fa87e4f) ; 
II (d, a, b, c, X [15] 1 842, $fe2ce6eO); 
II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], 843, $a3014314); 
II (b, c, d, a, x[13], 844, $4e0811a1); 
II (a, b, c, d, X [ 4], 841, $f7537eB2); 
II (d, a, b, c, x[11], 842, $bd3af235); 
II (c, d, a, b, X[ 2], 843, $2ad7d2bb); 
II (b, c, d, a, X[ 91, 844, $eb86d391); 
state [OJ := I'> tate [0] + a; 
state [1] :: state (1] + b; 
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state[2] :- state[2] + c; 
state[J] := state[3) + d; 
{zeroize sensitive information.} 
MDS memset {PChar(®x), 0, sizeof (x)); 
end; 
procedure MDSUpdate(context 
Word); 
var 
i : Word; 
index : Word; 
partLen : Word; 
w_temp : word; 
stemp : string; 
begin 
PMOS CTX 
{Compute number of bytes mod 64} 
input PChar inputLen 
index :=Word( (Word(context~.count[O]) shr 3) and $3F); 
{update number of bits} :1 
w_temp := (inputLen shl 3); 
context"'.count(O] := context .... count[O] + w_temp; 
if context"'.count[O] < w temp then 
Inc(context"'.count[l]}; 
w_temp := (inputLen shr 29); 
context .... count [1] ::::: context" .count [1] + w_temp; 
partLen := 64 - index; 
{Transform as many times as possible.} 
if inputLen >= partLen then 
begin 
MDS_memcpy(PChar(®contextA.buffer[index]), PChar(input}, partLen); 
MDSTransform (contextA.state, contextA.buffer}; 
i := partLen; 
while (i + 63) < inputLen do 
begin 
MDSTransform (contextA.state, ®input[i]); 
i : = i + 64; 
end; 
index := O; 
end 
else 
i : = 0; 
{Buffer rema~n~ng input} 
MDS_memcpy(®contextA.buffer[index] ,®input[i) ,inputLen-i); 
end; 
procedure MDSinit(context 
var 
Padindex : Integer; 
begin 
PMDS_CTX); 
{Initialize the PADDING array} 
PADDING[O] := Chr($80); 
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for Padindex : 1 to 63 do 
PADDING [Padindex] : = Chr (O); 
{Initialize the context} 
context"' .count (O] := O; 
context"'.count[l) := 0; 
cantext"'.state[O) := $67452301; 
context" .state [1] := $efcdab89; 
context"'.state(2] := $9Bbadcfe; 
context"'.state[3] .- $10325476; 
end; 
procedure Encode(output : PChar ; inPut 
Word); 
Array of Longint 
var 
i, j : word; 
begin 
i := 0; 
j != 0; 
while j < len do 
begin 
output[j] := Char(input[i] and $FF); 
output [j+l] ~= Char{ (input [i) shr 8) and $FF) ; 
output [j+2] := Char( (input [i) shr 16) and $FF) 
output [j+3] :::: Char{ (input [i] shr 24} and $FF) ; 
Inc(i); 
Inc(j,4); 
end; 
end; 
procedure MDSFinal(digest : PChar; context 
var 
bits : Array[O .. B] of Char; 
Index : word; 
padLen : Word; 
sTemp ~ string; 
begin 
{save number of bits} 
MD5_memset{bits,64,8); 
Encode (bits, context" .count," .. ~); 
{Pad out to 56 mod 64.} 
PMD5_CTX); 
index := Word((context".count[O] shr 3) and $3f); 
Str{index,sTemp); 
if index < 56 then 
padLen .- (56 - index) 
else 
padLen .- (120 - index); 
Str{padLen,sTemp); 
MD5Update(context, PADDING, padLen); 
{ Append length (before padding) } 
MD5Update {context, bits, 8); 
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{Store state in digest } 
Encode (digest, contextA.state, 16); 
{ Zeroize sensitive information. } 
MDS_memset(PChar(context), 0, sizeof(context)); 
end; 
function tohex(a: integer} :string; 
var MSnibble,LSnibble : integer; temp 
begin 
MSnibble := O; 
LSnibble := 0; 
temp := ''; 
LSnibble := a AND 15; 
MSnibble := a AND 240; 
MSNibble := MSNibble shr 4; 
temp := copy(hexlisting,msnibble,l); 
string; 
temp :=temp+ copy(hexlisting,lsnibble,l) 
tohex := temp; 
end; { tohex } 
function MDSProduceDigest(PassText 
var 
context : MDS_CTX; 
sDigest : string; 
sTemp : string; 
szMessage : Array[O .. 255] of Char; 
digest : Array[0 .. 16] of Char; 
len Word; 
i,x : integer; 
begin 
szMessage[O] := Chr(O); 
StrPCopy(szMessage,PassText); 
len := StrLen(szMessage); 
MD5Init(®context); 
MD5Update(®context,szMessage,len); 
MD5Final(digest, ®context); 
sTemp : = ' '; 
sdigest :=''; 
for i := 0 to 15 do 
begin 
x := Integer(digest[iJ); 
stemp := tohex(x); 
sDigest := sDigest + sTemp; 
end; 
md5producedigest := sDigest; 
end; 
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9.13. Test Run of Smart Card Simulation 
9.13.1. Initial Screen to Request Password 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
Input the password now: 123 
If the password is entered incorrectly more than three times the card self destructs by 
destroying the randomiser, selection set and startpoint files. This option is implemented 
but disabled in the simullation. 
9.13.2. Menu Screen 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6: Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
USAGE: 241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456 
XX. __ _ 
Displays permitted options and the current usage state. If no choice is made within a 
set time the session enters the 'time-out'state and is closed. 
Edith Cowan University 
157 
11/12/99 
1 
Developmenl of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Conlrol in Mulli-User, Mulli-
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
9.13.3. Display Card Serial Number 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1: Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6: Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 1 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
SERIAL: 1234567890123456 :: 2404AE08B62BEFA5F3CF94C2386A60A4 
The number '1234567890123456' is the serial number of the card devised by the 
manufacturer. 
The number '2404AE08862BEFA5F3CF94C2386A60A4' is the serial number derived 
from the randomiser written into the ROM on the Smart Card. 
9.13.4. Generate An OutPut Sequence From And Input 
Sequence 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4": Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : DisPlay Log File 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 2 
. 
The output sequence is curr.ently fixed. It demonstrates the processing of an input 
sequence into an output sequence. 
' 
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9.13.5. Hashing an Input Scqu~!lf.f. 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 3 
The input sequence provided by the user is 'this is a test' which is hashed to produce an 
output sequence of '0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8'. 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
HASH :What is the input message?: this is a test 
The output sequence is: 0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8 
Smart Card Simulation Softwar 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
The input sequence is : 0 123456789ABCDEF 
The output sequence is: FE1BF09FF604AC83FEIBF09FF604AC83 
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9.13.6. Encrypting An Input Sequence 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encl}•pt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 4 
The input sequence is 'this is a test also' which is hashed to provide an input sequence 
to the key generator. This sequence is used to select the start point in the randomiser 
and a key of the requisite length is determined. The key sequence and the input 
sequence are processed bitwise with an 'exclusive-or process' and the output sequence 
is detennined. 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
CRYPTO : this is a test also 
OUTPUT : 3+,_qj,l•=fuE+n_iD 
9.13.7. Display The Transaction Log 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File · 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 5 
Edith Cowan University 
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Smart Card Simulation SoH ware 
H::0030D220E048D5CEA955633131 C6042A8 
0::0123456789ABCDEI' :: I'EIBF09FF604AC83 
H::22847537D60D45DII20D95980A040119 
E::4 !08A090A30C207E 
O::OI23456789ABCDEF :: FEIBF09F1'604AC83 
H::E40D37B I D8C7 ADE0470BA32133907161 
E::2CA330885DC8CECO 
O::OI23456789ABCDEF :: FE I BF09FF604AC83 
0::0123456789ABCDEF ::FE IBF09FF604AC83 
0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE IBF09FF604AC83 
Enter to continue 
H: :0030D220E048D5CEA95563381 C6042A8 
li'·· A4 7n~4rnru~n4h')n4 
The output sequence is '0::0123456789ABCDEF :: FE1BF09FF604AC83' where the 
initial character '0::' indicates an output. 
The hash sequence is 'H::0030D220E048DSCEA95563381C6042A8' where the initial 
character 'H::' indicates an hashed output. The input sequence is not stored. 
The encryption sequence is 'E::A47034C008046204' where the initial character 'E::' 
indicates an hashed output. The input sequence is not stored.and the output is stored 
in hexadecimal format. 
9.13.8. Display Current Usage Record 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
3 : Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 6 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
USAGE: 241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456 
xx __ _ 
The usage record consists of a session count (241) and maximum permitted uses (500), 
The card serial number is displayed and a bar graph consisting of a top row which 
count the tens and a shorter bottom row which counts from,O to 9. For example: 
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XX __ _ 
indicates 241. 
The card will cease functioning when the counter exceeds 500. 
9.13.9. Exit From The Session Selected 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
0 : Exit from Session 
1 : Display serial number of card 
2 : Generate Output Sequence from Input Sequence 
!,', 3: Generate a hash value for an input Message 
4 : Encrypt a message with a Hash value 
5 : Display Log File 
6 : Display Usage Record 
Enter Choice : 0 
The exit from the session displays the session count and disables the input. A complete 
new session must be commenced. 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
Exit from session selected 
Smart Card Simulation Software 
USAGE: 241/500 Serial: 1234567890123456 
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9.14. Data Visualisation 
program linearwalk; 
generate an array of longintcgcrs and store in a file. 
each array of longint is generated by starting a random generator 
at the centre of the screen and counting the number of hits in each 
pixel until a border value is detected then it stops. 
the max longint value is then scaled to permit contouring of the 
display. 
uses 
printer, 
crt, 
graph; 
canst 
maxarray 
arraycentre 
ESC 
= 
= 
= 
{ hardcopy of screen display } 
{ text screen functions } 
{ graphics screen functions } 
401; { array length ) 
201; { midpoint of array 
#$1B; 
length ) 
portrait = 0; printer output orientation 
landscape = 1; 
type 
lintarray = array(l .. maxarray] of !Ongint; 
lintfile = file of linta~ray; 
!filename = string[BO]; 
var 
store 
storename 
lint file; 
!filename; 
{ file of 'longinteger arrays } 
anyarray, 
gross 
' 
lintarray; 
ch 
' 
char; 
increment, 
max, 
size : longint; 
row, 
count, 
num, 
current 
grflag, 
finish 
integer; 
boolean; 
{ input array ) 
{ total array ) 
loop response ) 
{ arrayindex for insertion } 
{ graphics ok flag } 
{ terminate loop flag } 
{==========================================================) 
procedure printgraph(Mode, direction : integer); 
var i,j,k,m, 
msb,lsb,Maxx,Maxy : integer; 
begin 
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maxx : = getmaxx; 
maxy : = getmaxy; 
setviewport ( 0, 0, maxx, maxy, false) ; 
write (1st, ESC, 'A', #$07); { on printer set line spacing to 7/72 inch } 
case direction of 
portrait : begin 
landscape 
end; { case } 
lsb := maxx AND $DOff; { maxx mod 256 } 
msb : = maxx shr 8; { int maxx I 256 } 
for j := 0 to maxy div B do 
begin 
write(lst,ESC, char(mode) ,char(lsb) ,char(msb)); 
for i := 0 to maxx do 
begin 
m := 0; 
for k := 0 to 7 do 
begin 
m := m shl 1; { shift m left 1 bit } 
if getpixel(i, j*B + k) <> 0 then inc(m); 
end; ( for k } 
write(lst, char(m)); 
end; { for i } 
write (1st, #$0D, #$0A); 
end; { for j } 
end; { portrait } 
begin 
lsb := maxy AND $DOff; 
msb := maxy shr 8; 
j : = 0; 
repeat 
{ maxy mod 256 } 
{ int maxx I 256 } 
write (1st, ESC, '*', char (mode) , char {lsb) , char (msb)) ; 
for i := maxy downto 0 do 
begin 
m ::: o; 
for k ::: 0 to 7 do 
begin /-
m : = m shl 1,;1 { shift m left 1 bit } 
if getpixel{(tr k,i) <> o then inc(m); 
end; { for k } 
write(lst, char(m)); 
end; { for i } 
write(lst, #$OD, #$0A); 
inc(j,B}; 
until j >= maxx-1; 
end; { landscape } 
write(lst,#$0C); { form feed} 
end; { printgraph } 
procedure 
var count 
begin 
cleararray(var a 
integer; 
lintarray); 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
a[countJ :"' 0; 
end; 
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procedure 
var count 
begin 
writearray(var a 
integer; 
lintarray); 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
begin 
if count = 200 then textcolor(yellow) 
else textcolor(white); 
write (a [count],' •); 
end; 
end; { wri tearray 
procedure beep; 
begin 
sound(SOO); 
delay(SOO); 
nosound; 
end; 
procedure readfile(var s 
var count : integer; 
a : lintarray; 
begin 
reset(sl; 
while not eof(s) do 
begin 
read{s,a); 
writearray(a); 
readln; 
end; 
end; { readfile } 
lintfile); 
procedure dorun{var s 
var a 
lintfile; 
lintarray ) ; 
begin 
size := FileSize(s); 
Seek (s, size); 
finish := false; 
cleararray(a); 
randomize; 
current := arraycentre; 
While not finish do 
begin 
num ~= random(2); 
case num of 
1 : begin 
inc (current); 
inc{a[current]); 
end; 
0 begin 
dec {current); 
inc(a[current]); 
end; 
end; { case } 
if (current = 1) or (current = maxarray) then finish := true; 
if keypressed then break; 
end; { while not finish } 
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write (s, a); 
end; { dorun } 
procedure getmax(var s 
var m 
var temp : lintarray; 
max : longint; 
count : integer; 
begin 
reset(s); 
max := 0; 
while not eof(s)do 
begin 
read(s,temp); 
lint file; 
longint); 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
begin 
if temp[count] ~max then max := temp[count]; 
end; { for } 
end; 
m:= max; 
end; { get max } 
procedure initialisegraphics(var gflag 
var 
grDriver: Integer; 
grMode: Integer; 
Errcode: Integer; 
begin 
grDriver := Detect; 
boolean) ; 
InitGraph (grDriver, grMode, 'c: \language\bp\bgi 'l; 
{ setgraphmode{grmode); 0 vga low 640*200 2 pages 
Errcode := GraphResult; 
if ErrCode = grOk then 
gflag := true 
else 
begin 
1 
2 
vga med 
vga high 
640*350 2 pages 
640*480 1 page} 
Writeln{ 1 Graphics error: 1 1 GraphErrorMsg{ErrCode)); 
gflag := false; 
end; { end if errcode } 
end; { initialisegraphics } 
procedure putgraticule; 
begin 
rectangle{0,0 1 getmaxx,getmaxy); 
floodfill{l0 1 10 1 White); 
setcolor {black) ; 
Line{99,10,99,459); 
Line{S02,10,502,459); 
{ vertical 
{ vertical 
left line } 
right line } 
line{l00,459,501,459); 
line{301,10,301,459); 
{ base line } 
{ central line 
outtextxy (100, 465 1 1 -200'); 
outtextxy(297,465, 1 0 1 ); 
outtextxy(499,465, '200 1 ); 
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end; { put graticule } 
procedure display(var a: lintarray; 
x,y,r : integer); 
var count, scale, 
baselinex, 
baseliney : integer; 
begin 
setcolor(black); 
baselinex := x; 
baseliney := r * y; 
scale := 20; 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
begin 
putpixel (baselinex + count, baseliney- (a (count] div scale), black); 
end; { for } 
end; { display 
procedure displayline(a lintarray); 
var count, scale, 
baselinex, 
baseliney : integer; 
begin 
setcolor(black); 
baselinex := 100; 
baseliney := getmaxy - 50; 
scale .- 10; 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
begin 
1\ 
.I 
u 
putpixel(baselinex +count, baseliney- (a[count] div scale), 
black) ; 
end; { for } 
end; { displayline 
procedure keeptotals(var a,g lintarray); 
var count integer; 
begin 
for count := 1 to maxarray do 
g [count] : = a [count] + g [count]; 
end; 
{··························································) -~ . 
clrscr; 
storename := 'd:\programs\datavis\store.lni'; 
assign(store,storename); 
reset (store); 
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initialisegraphics (grflagl; 
if grflag then { graphics is ok } 
begin 
rectangle(l,l,getmaxx,getmaxyl; 
setviewport(3,3,getmaxx-3,getmaxy-3,false); 
clearviewport; 
floodfill(lO,lO,white); 
while not finish do 
begin 
if keypressed then ch := readkey; { test for quit 
if (ch = 'Q') or (ch = 'q') then finish :=true; 
reset (store); { Prepare input file } 
row := 0; 
putgraticule; 
cleararray{gross); 
while not eof{store) do 
begin 
inc (row) ; 
cleararray(anyarray); 
read{store,anyarray); 
keeptotals(anyarray,gross) ;{ keep 
{ X y 
display(anyarray,100,45 , row); 
end; { while not eof } 
if eof{store) then finish := true; 
end; { while } 
readln; 
end; { if grflag } 
ch : = readkey; 
totals } 
color } 
if (ch = 'P') or (ch = 'p') then printgraph(4,landscape); 
ch := readkey; 
clearviewport; 
putgraticule; 
displayline(gross); 
ch : = readkey; 
if (ch = 'P') or (ch = 'p') then printgraph(4,landscape); 
ch := readkey; 
read; { pause until key pressed } 
closegraph; 
close{store); 
end. { main } 
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program dwc; 
{$I d:\programs\datavis\DWCL18. PAS} { include library file } 
{--------------------------main---------------------------------------
-} 
begin { dwc } 
cleartextscreen; 
menu; 
getfiles(session,start); 
if start then 
begin 
loopl : = 0; 
initialisegraphics(grflag); 
if grflag then { graphics 
{ test for graphics adapter } 
available } 
begin 
finish := false; 
While not finish do 
begin 
dograticule(session); 
initscreenrec(session); 
doinput(session); 
{ set up screen } 
{ set up default values 
{ alter values as required } 
if session.shape = 1 then 
squarecountpixels(session) 
else 
circlecountpixels(session); 
{ size the target 
initview(session.screen.g); 
randomize; 
for loop1 := 1 to session.maxrun 
begin 
{ initialise the randomiser } 
do 
session.loop := loop1; 
current ;= session.centre; 
restart := false; 
loop2 : = 0; 
{ reset to centre } 
case session.shape of { 1 = square 2 = circle } 
1 : case session.numberbits of 
2 dosquare2(session); 
3 : dbsquare3(session); 
4 : dosquare4(session); 
end; 
2 case session.numberbits of 
2 dotarget2(session); 
3 : dotarget3(session); 
4 : dotarget4(session); 
end; { case } 
end; { case } 
case session.numberbits of 
2 dorun2(session,loop2); 
3 : dorun3(session,loop2); 
4 ; dorun4(session,loop2); 
end; { case } 
density(session); 
dotext(session,loop1); 
end; { for loop } 
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beep; 
while not keypressed do 
begin 
{ quit or print result ) 
ch : = read key; 
case ch of 
'R', 'r' : begin { restart } 
finish := false; 
break; { leave 
end; 
IQI I tqt begin { quit } 
finish 
·-
true; 
break; { leave 
end; 
'P', 'P' : printgraph(4); 
else 
end; 
end; { 
finish := 
{ case } 
while not 
true; 
keypressed } 
while 
while 
state } 
state } 
end; { while not finish } 
closegraph; { When program over close graphics } 
end; { if grflag } 
end; { if start } 
closefiles(session); 
endmessage; 
end. { dwc } 
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{ Drunkards 
Uses 
Walk Library functions 
des, 
printer, 
graph, 
crt; 
{ use des funct.iono for fj le and Urne 
{ output to printer } 
{ use graphics window functions 
{ use text window functions } 
canst 
shortdelay 1500; 
blank6str •GUOUUO•; 
blank40str = 'OOOfrOUOUtitifrOo-o-frDCrOtifrOlifrfr(frOOfrOOOUOOVfrfrO'; 
\r 
' headerstring = 'Data Visualisation Program'; 
inputname 
outputname 
'intinput. dat'; 
'intoutpt. dat'; 
default values 
days : array [0. ,6] of String[9) = { day conversion } 
('Sunday', 'Monday', 'Tuesday', 
'Wednesday', 'Thursday', 'Friday', 
'Saturday'); 
months array[l .. l2) of string[3) = { month conversion} 
{'JAN' I 'FEB', 'MAR' I 'APR' I 'MAY' I 'JUN', 
'JUL' I 'AUG' I I SEP' I 'OCT' I 'NOV', 'DEC'); 
max runs 
minradius , 
midradius , 
maxradius 
tcoll , 10; 
tcol2 , 150; 
tcol3 , 250; 
tcol4 , 400 i 
trow , 10 i 
textmodetext 
textmodeback 
1; default maximum number of runs permitted 
50; { default smallest size of target } 
100; { default size of target } 
200; { default largest size of target } 
{ text x position values } 
, 
, 
{ text y position values } 
yellow; 
blue; 
{ text mode text colour } 
{ text mode background } 
{ graphics mode colours } 
linecolour , 
labelcolour 
textcolour , 
blankcolour , 
changecolour , 
errorcolour , 
gratcolour , 
areacolour , 
tracecolour , 
crosscolour , 
magenta; 
lightgray; 
lightcyan; 
green; 
white; 
red; 
yellow; 
green; 
lightblue; 
red; 
{ text window labels } 
{ text window results} 
{ blanking colour } 
{ change text colour } 
{ colour for errors } 
{ target colour } 
{ overwrite colour } 
{ trace colour } 
gbackcolour = lightgray; { backgound colour f 
} 
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tbackcolour blue; { text wi.ndo"' background } 
ibackcolour blue; 
hbackcolour yellow; 
degree = 0. 017453292; degree in radians } 
ESC = #$1B; hexadecimal equivalent of escape key } 
onesize = 255; maxsize of ld array } 
{-------------------data store types ------------------------------ } 
type 
values = (total,min,avg,max,counter); array index } 
valuesarray 
realarray 
onearray 
twoarray 
threearray 
four array 
= 
= 
array [values] of longint; { data store } 
array(values] of real; 
array[O .. onesize] of longint; { ld array 
array[l. .2] of shortint; { 2d array 
array[l .. 3] of shortint; { 3d array 
array[l .. 4] of shortint; { 4d array 
} 
} 
} 
} 
{-------------- file handling types -------------------------------} 
direction (input,output,inout,none); { file data direction 
filename 
sintfile 
string[40]; 
= file of shortint; 
. 
{ data file } 
choicerecord = record { progam choices storage } 
inputfile, 
outputfile : sintfile; 
inputf ilename, 
outputfilename filename; 
flow : direction 
end; 
{--------------graphics types ------------------------------------} 
numstr = string [20]; { temporary strings } 
nstr = string[S]; 
view = record 
port : viewporttype; 
fill : integer; 
end; { view } 
screens = record 
g, { graphics } 
i, { input } 
t, { text ) 
h { help ) 
view ; 
end; 
screen data storage 
screens; 
pointtype; 
screenrecord = record 
screen 
centre 
tradius longint; { size from centre } 
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shape, 
numberbits 
{ 1 - square 2 ~ circle } 
integer; 
loop, 
target area 
iteration count 
longint; { area in circle } 
aveexpblue, 
greenarea ·.real; 
totalbits, 
expectedblue, 
bluerunarea, 
bluerunnurnber · 
bluerundensity 
bluecount, 
bluearea 
bluedensity 
{ total bits tested in all runs 
{ calculated value by kaye 
{ area of run } 
{ number of digits 
longi_nt; 
real; 
valuesarray; 
real array; { storage 
arrays } 
} 
bluedirection 
usefile, 
overlap 
filechoice 
timestr, 
datestr 
end; { end screen 
valuesarray; 
{ file input/output 
boolean; { overlap data } 
choicerecord; 
: numstr; 
record } 
vector = record { direction of trace } 
s,f : pointtype; 
end; 
var {-------------------global variables ------------------------} 
start, 
grflag, 
finish, 
restart 
current, 
boolean; 
next pointtype; 
Run, 
loopl, 
loop2 integer; 
count : longint; 
pixelcolor : word; 
session : screcnrecord; 
ch : char; 
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{--------------------- Functions ------------------------------------} 
function LeadingZero(w : Word) : String; 
var { place a leading zero and convert time to string } 
s : string; 
begin 
Str(w:O,s); 
if Length(s) = 1 then 
s:='0'+s; 
LeadingZero : = s ,· 
end; 
function num2str(a 
var 
templ, 
temp2 longint; 
c 
begin 
c := " . 
' 
numstr; 
{ convert 
templ : = 
longint) :numstr; 
integer to string 
a; temp2 := 0; 
if a = 0 then c :='0'; 
templ := abs(templ); 
while templ <> 0 do 
begin 
temp2 : = templ mod 10; 
c := chr(temp2 + 48} + c; 
templ := templ div 10; 
end; { while } 
if a< 0 then c := '-'+ c; 
num2str := c; 
end; { num2str } 
procedure beep; 
begin 
sound(400); 
delay(lOO); 
nosound; 
end; { beep } 
for display } 
function getnum(a : nstr; p,q 
var i,code : integer; 
integer): integer; 
tch : char; 
begin 
while (ord(tch) <> 13) do 
begin 
tch := readkey; 
case ord(tch) of 
48 .. 57: begin 
a : = a + tch; 
outtextxy(q,trow * p,a); 
end; 
13 : break; 
end; { case } 
end; { While } 
val (a, i,code); 
getnum := i; 
end; { getnum } 
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function getstr(p,q : integer): filename; 
var s : filename; 
code : integer; 
tch : char; 
begin 
s : = "i 
while (ord(tch} <> 13) do 
begin 
tch : = read key; 
case ord(tch} of 
32 .. 122 : begin 
S:=S+tCh; 
outte~:txy(p,trow * q,s); 
end; 
13 : break; 
end; { case } 
end; { While } 
getstr := s; 
end; { getnum 
{---------------------Procedures ------------------------------------} 
procedure initview(v view); 
begin 
with v do 
begin 
setviewport(port.xl,port.yl,port.x2,port.y2,port.clip); 
clearviewport; 
end; { with v } 
setcolor(v.fill); 
floodfill{v,port.xl,v.port.yl,linecolour); 
end; { initview } 
procedure circlecountpixels{var g : screenrecord); 
var x, 
y 
t 
c 
count 
range 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
integer; 
longint; 
word; 
boolean; 
integer; 
{ count pixels in target } 
range := g.tradius + 1; 
initview(g.screen.g); 
setcolor(gratcolour); 
i,'· 
setfillstyle{solidfill,gratcolour); { draw and fill target } 
fillellipse{centre.x,centre.y, tradius,tradius); 
t := O; { initialise count } 
for x := centre.x - range to centre.x + range do 
for y := centre.y - range to centre.y + range do 
begin 
c := getpixel(x,y); test pixel colour } 
if c = gratcolour then 
begin 
{ if yellow then part of target } 
inc(t); 
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putpixel (x, y, areacolour.); { ar.eacolour when counted ) 
end; 
if c = gbackcolour then count := false; 
end; 
g.targetarea := t; 
end; { with g ) 
end; { countpixels } 
procedure squarecountpixels(var·g : screenrecord); 
var x, 
y integer; { count pixels in target } 
t longint; 
c 
count 
range 
rect 
begin 
word; 
boolean; 
integer; 
array[l .. 4] of pointtype; 
range := g.tradius + 1; 
initview(g.screen.g}; 
with g do 
begin 
setcolor(gratcolour); 
setfillstyle(solidfill,gratcolour); { draw and fill target } 
rect [1] .x := (centre .x tradius); 
rect(ll .y := (centre.y tradius); 
rect [2] .x := (centre.x + tradius); 
rect [2] .y := (centre.y tradius); 
rect [3] .x .- (centre .x + tradius); 
rect[3].y := (centre.y + tradius); 
rect [4] .x := (centre .x tradius); 
rect [4] .y := (centre .y + tradius}; 
{ print target } 
FillPoly(Sizeof(rect) div SizeOf(PointType), rect); 
t := 0; { initialise count } 
for x := centre.x - range to centre.x + range do 
for y := centre.y - range to centre.y + range do 
begin 
c := getpixel(x,y); test pixel colour } 
if c = gratcolour then if yellow then part of target } 
begin 
inc(t); 
putpixel(x,y,areacolour); { areacolour when counted } 
end; 
if c = gbackcolour then count := false; 
end; 
g.targetarea := t; 
end; { with g ) 
end; { countpixels 
procedure cleartextscreen; 
begin 
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textcolor(textmodetext); 
textbackground(textmodeback); 
clrscr; 
gotoxy(20,l); 
write(headerstring); 
end; { cleartextscreen 
procedure endmessage; 
begin 
cleartextscreen; 
gotoxy(lS, 7); 
write('This Program has terminated normally.'); 
delay(shortdelay); 
end; { endmessage } 
procedure closefiles(g screenrecord); 
begin 
if g.usefile then 
begin 
cleartextscreen; 
if (g.filechoice.flow = input) or 
(g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
close(g.filechoice.inputfile); 
gotoxy(lO,S); 
write (g. filechoice. inputfilename, ' closed 1 ) ; 
end; 
if {g.filechoice.flow = output) or 
(g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
close(g.filechoice.outputfile); 
gotoxy(10,7); 
write(g.filechoice.outputfilename, ' closed'); 
end; 
delay(shortdelay); 
end; ( if ) 
writeln; 
end; { closefiles } 
procedure menu; 
begin 
gotoxy(15,3); Write('Choice 1 
gotoxy(l5,4); write(' 2 
gotoxy(lS,S); write(' 3 
gotoxy(l5,6); write(' 4 
gotoxy(l5,7); write(' C 
gotoxy(l5,8); write(' Q 
writeln; 
end; { menu } 
NONE <Default>'); 
Input') ; 
Output'); 
Input and Output•); 
Continue'); 
EXIT I) i 
procedure filetest(var f 
var fn 
c 
var cf 
sintfile; 
filename; 
integer; 
boolean) ; 
begin 
if length(fn) > 0 then 
begin 
9.15. assian(f,fn}; 
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case c of 
1 : reset (f); 
2 : rewl-i te (f) ; 
end; { case } 
{$I+} 
case ioresult of 
0 writeln (fn, • 
2 writeln (fn, 1 -: 
3 writeln(fn,' 
5 writeln(fn,' 
12 writeln(fn, 1 
end; { case } 
is available'}; 
File NOT found'); 
Path NOT found'); 
File Access Denied'); 
Invalid File Access Code'); 
if ioresult <> 0 then cf := false; 
end; { if } 
end; { testfile } 
procedure getfiles(var g 
var s 
var choice 
anyfile 
choice£ lag 
begin 
char; 
filename; 
boolean; 
choiceflag := false; 
s := true; 
while not choiceflag do 
begin 
screenrecord; 
boolean) ; 
Write('What is Choice <1>,<2>,<3>,<C>,<Q>? '); 
readln {choice) ; 
writeln; 
case choice of 
'1' : begin 
g.usefile := false; 
g.filechoice.flow :=none; 
choiceflag := true; 
end; 
'2' begin 
g.usefile := true; 
g.filechoice.flow := input; 
Write {'What is the Input file Name ? 1 ); 
'3' 
readln(g.filechoice.inputfilename); 
filetest{g.filechoice.inputfile, 
writeln; 
end;, 
)1 
begin1 
g.filechoice.inputfilename, 
1, choiceflag) ; 
g.usefile := true; 
g.filechoice.flow := output; 
Write{ 1 What is the Output file Name ? 
readln{g.filechoice.outputfilename); 
filetest{g.filechoice.outputfile, 
writeln; 
end; 
g.filechoice.outputfilename, 
2, choice flag); 
141 : begin 
Edith Cowan University 
I) i 
178 
11/12/99 I 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, Multi-
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
9.16. t !- "; 
GetTime(h,m,s,hund); 
t := LeadingZero(h) + ':' + LeadingZero(m) + ':' + LeadingZet·o(s); 
end; { dotime } 
procedure dodate (var t : numstr); 
var { get date from system } 
y, rna, d, dow : word; '' 
begin 
GetDate(y,mo,d,dow); 
t := leadingzero{d) + MONTHS[mo] + leadingzero(y); 
end; { dotin:e } 
procedure initialisegraphics(var gflag : boolean); 
var { check for a graphics driver and configure 
grDriver: Integer; 
grMode Integer; 
ErrCode : Integer; 
begin 
grDriver := Detect; 
InitGraph(grDriver, grMode, 'c:\language\bp\bgi '); 
ErrCode := GraphResult; 
if ErrCode = grOk then 
gflag .- true 
else 
begin 
Writeln ( 'Graph.i.cs error:', GraphErrorMsg (ErrCode)); 
gflag := false; 
end; { end if errcode } 
end; { initialisegraphics } 
procedure printgraph(Mode integer); 
var i, j, k, { loop counters } 
m, 
msb,lsb,Maxx,Maxy : integer; 
begin 
maxx := getmaxx; 
maxy := getmaxy; 
{ get whole screen } 
setviewport(O,O,maxx,maxy,false); 
write(lst, ESC, 'A' ,#$07); { set line spacing to 7/72 inch } 
lsb := maxy AND ~nOff; 
rnsb := maxy shr 8; 
{ rnaxy mod 256 } 
{ int rnaxx I 256 
j := 0; { initial x value } 
repeat { scan x values } 
write(lst,ESC, '*', char(mode) ,char(lsb),char(msb)); 
for i := maxy downto 0 do { y values to scan } 
begin 
m := O; 
for k := 0 to 7 do 
begin { construct m from individual pixel values 
m := m shl 1; { shift m left 1 bit } 
if getpixel(j + k,i) <> 0 then inc(m); ( if pixel not black ) 
end; { for k } ( record it } 
writc(Jst, char(m)); 
end; I fori I 
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write(lst, #$OD, #$OA); { character 13 and character. 10 } 
inc(j,B); 
until j >= maxx - 1; { complete width used } 
write{lst,#$OC); { form feed } 
end; { printgraph- } 
procedure dotext(gr : screenrecord; 
i : integer); 
longint; var tint 
temp 
tempstr, 
tmin, 
word; 
tavg, 
tmax : numstr; 
begin { display text screen data 
/ 
" :_-· ',--:: 
)/ 
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext); 
with gr do 
. { } '·, beg~n set text v:iewport 
initview (screen, ·t) ; 
setcolor(labelcolour); { print headings } 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow, 'MAX.RUNS'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 
outtextxy(tcol1 1 trow * 
outtextxy(tcol1 1 trow * 
outtextxy(tcol1 1 trow * 
3, 'Run Number')i 
5, 'TARGET'); 
6,'Radius'); 
7, 'Area'); 
9 1 'BLUE') i 
10~'Count'); 
11 1 ' Max'); 
12, I AVg•); 
13 1 ' Min') ; 
outtextxy{tcol1 1 trow * 14, 'Area'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 15,' Max'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 16 1 ' Avg'); 
outtextxy {tcoll, trow * 17 1 ' Min'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 1B,'Density'); 
outtextxy{tcol1,trow * 19,' Max'); 
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 20,' Avg'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 21, 1 Min'); 
outtextxy{tcol1,trow * 22, 'Direction•); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 23,' Max'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 24,' Avg'); 
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 25, • Min'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 27, 'GREEN AREA'); 
outtextxy(tcoll 1 trow * 28, 'Per Cent'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 30 1 'Exp.Blue'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 31, •ave %'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 331 'Overlap'); 
outtextxy(tcollltrow * 34, 'Total Blta'); 
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outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 35, 'Files'); { use files } 
if gr.usefile then 
case gr.filechoice.flow of 
input begin 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Input'); 
tempstr := gr.filechoice.inputfilename; 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow* 37,tempstr); 
end; 
output begin 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Output'); 
tempstr := gr.filechoice.outputfilename; 
outtextxy_(tcoll, trow* 37,tempstr); 
end; 
inout begin 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 36,' Input'); 
tempstr := gr.filechoice.inputfilename; 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow * 37,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 38,' Output'); 
tempstr := gr.filechoice.outputfilename; 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow* 39,tempstr); 
end; 
end; { case } 
{ overlapping } 
if i = gr.maxrun then 
begin 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 42, 'R to repeat'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 43, 'Q to quit'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 44, 'P to print'); 
end; { if finish is true } 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 45, 'Time'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 46, 'Date'); 
write in values } 
settextjustify(righttext,centertext); 
setcolor(textcolour); 
str(gr.maxrun,tempstr); 
outtextxy{tcol2,trow * l,tempstr); 
str(gr.laop,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 3,tempstr); 
str(gr.tradius,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 6,tempstr); 
str(gr.targetarea,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 7,tempstr); 
str(gr.bluecount[counter),tempstr); 
str(gr.bluecount[max] ,tmax); 
str(gr.bluecount(avg) ,tavg); 
str(gr.bluecount[min],tmin); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * lO,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * ll,tmax); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 12,tavg); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 13,tmin); 
str (gr, bl uearea [counter] , tempotr) ; 
str(gr.bluearealmaxl ,tmax); 
str(gr.blucarea [avg] ,tavgl; 
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str (gr. bluearea [min] , tmln) ,· 
outtextxy (tcol2, trow * 14, ternpstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * lS,tmax); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 16,tavg}; 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 17,tmin); 
str (gr .bluedensity [counter] :2:4, tempstr) ; 
str (gr.bluedensity [max): 2:4, tmax); 
str(gr.bluedensity[avg] :2:4,tavg); 
str(gr.bluedensity[min] :2:4,tmin); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 18,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 19,tmax); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 20,tavg); 
outtextxy(tco12,trow * 2l,tmin); 
str (0, tempstr); 
str(gr.bluedirection[max] ,tmax); 
str(gr.bluedirection[avg] ,tavg); 
str{gr.bluedirection[min] ,tmin); 
outtextxy{tcol2,trow * 22,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 23,tmax); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 24,tavg); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 25,tmin); 
str(gr.greenarea:2:2,tempstr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 28,tempstr); 
tempstr := num2str(gr.expectedblue); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 30, tempstr); 
if gr.expectedblue <> 0 then 
begin 
gr.aveexpblue := {gr.bluecount[avg] I gr.expectedblue)*lOO; 
str{gr.aveexpblue:2:4,tempstr); 
outtextxy{tcol2,trow * 3l,tempstr); 
end; { if ) 
if gr.overlap then 
tempstr := 'Yes' 
else 
tempstr := 'No'; 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 33, tempstr); 
tempstr := num2str(gr.totalbits); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 34,tempstrl; 
if not gr.usefile then outtextxy(tcol2, trow* 35, 1 none'); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 45, gr.timestr); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 46, gr.datestr); 
end; { with view 
end; { dotext 
procedure getcoords(x,y,r,deg : integer; 
var t : point type l; 
begin { calculate coordinates for radial labelo } 
t.x :~ trunc(oin(deg • degree) * r); 
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t.y :- trunc(cos(deg * degree) * r); 
t.x := x + t.x; 
t.y := y + t.y; 
end; { getcoords 
procedure cross(x,y integer); 
var temp : integer; 
begin { draw a cross at coordinates 
setcolor(crosscolour); 
temp := 5; 
line(x-temp,y,x+temp,y); 
Line(x,y-temp,x,y+temp); 
circle(x,y,temp -2}; 
end; { cross } 
procedure dosquare2(var g: screenrecord); 
var count : integer; 
coord : pointtype; 
increment : integer; 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
{ initview(screen.g}; 
} cross{centre.x,centre.y); 
setcolor(gratcolour); 
rectangle{centre.x - tradius,centre.y 
centre.x + tradius,centre.y + 
increment := tradius + 10; 
settextjustify(centertext,centertext); 
tradius, 
tradius); { print target } 
outtextxy(centre.x, 
outtextxy(centre.x + 
outtextxy(centre.x, 
outtextxy(centre.x 
end; { with g } 
end; { dosquare2 } 
centre.y 
lncrement,centre.y, 
centre.y + 
increment,centre.y, 
procedure dosquare3(var g: screenrecord); 
var coord pointtype; 
increment : integer; 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
initview(screen.g); 
cross(centre.x,centre.y); 
increment, 1 oo'); 
I 01 1 ) j 
increment, '10 1 ) ; 
I 111) ; 
{ pn.nt target } 
setcolor(gratcolour); 
rectangle(centre.x- tradius,centre.y tradiua, 
centre.x + tradiua,centre.y 
increment :~ tradiuo + 15; 
settextjuotify(centertcxt,centertext); 
+ tradiua); 
outtextxy(centre.x, centt·c.y inct·ement, '000'); 
outtextxy(ccntre.x t incn::ment, centre.y increment, '001'); 
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, centre.;- , '010'); 
outtextxy(centre.x t increment, ecntn~.}' t incrernPnl, '011'1,• 
outtextxy(centre.x, CL•Iltl·e,y incn·mPnt, '100 •); 
outtextxy(centre.x increment, ct>nt rt•.y 1 itll'l'l'lllt•nt., '101 •): 
outtextxy(centn~.x incn!ment, ct:ntte.'/• '110'1; 
outtextxy (centn!,X inLTt·rnt~nt, n•nt n·. ~· lllcl t•nwnt, • Ill' l; 
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end; { with g } 
end; { dosquare3 } 
procedure dosquare4(var g: screenrecord); 
var coord : pointtype; 
halfinc, 
increment : integer; 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
initview(screen.g); 
cross{centre.x,centre.y); 
setcolor(gratcolour); 
rectangle(centre.x- tradius,centre.y 
centre.x + tradius,centre.y + 
increment := tradius + 25; 
tradius, 
tradius); { print target } 
halfinc := trunc(increment/2); 
settextjustify{centertext,centertext); 
outtextxy(centre.x, 
outtextxy(centre.x + halfinc, 
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, 
outtextxy{centre.x + increment, 
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, 
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, 
outtextxy(centre.x + increment, 
outtextxy(centre.x + halfinc, 
outtextxy(centre.x, 
outtextxy(centre.x 
outtextxy(centre.x 
outtextxy(centre.x 
outtextxy(centre.x 
outtextxy(centre.x 
outtextxy{centre.x 
outtextxy{centre.x 
end; { with g } 
end; { dosquare4 } 
half inc, 
increment, 
increment, 
increment, 
increment, 
increment, 
half inc, 
centre.y increment, '0000'); 
centre.y increment, '0001'); 
centre.y increment, '0010'); 
centre.y halfinc, '0011'); 
centre.y, '0100'); 
centre.y + halfinc, '0101'); 
centre.y +increment, '0110'); 
centre.y +increment, '0111'); 
centre.y +increment, '1000'); 
centre. y + increment, '1001'); 
centre.y +increment, '1010'); 
centre.y + halfinc, '1011'); 
centre.y, '1100'); 
centre.y halfinc, '1101'); 
centre.y increment,'1110'); 
centre. y increment, '1111') ; 
procedure 
var coord 
begin 
dotarget2(var 
point type; 
g : screenrecord); 
with g do 
begin 
{ do 2 bit target } 
initview(ocreen.g); 
croas(centre.x,centre.y); 
aetcolor(gratcolour); 
circle(centrc.x,centre.y,tradius); {print target ) 
settextjuotify(ccntertcxt,centertext); 
getcoordo{centrc.x, centre.y, Lradiun + 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '00'); 
g~tcoordo(<.:cntre.x, centr·e.y, tr·adiun 
outtextxy (c. cord. x, coord. }', '0 1 •) ; 
getcoordo(centn~.x. ccntre.y, t_r.Hiiull t 
outtextxylcoonl.x,coord.y, 1 10'); 
getcoordo(centr~ x, centrt~. 1l, t r.t<liuu 
outte)(txy (coord. x, coon!.~··' 11 1 ); 
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end; 
end; ( 
{ with g 
dotarget2 
procedure dotarget3 (var g screen record); 
var coord pointtype; 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
initview(screen.g); 
cross(g.centre.x,g.centre.y); 
setcolor(gratcolour); { draw target } 
{ double thickness to eliminate bleed through 
circle(g.centre.x,g.centre.y, g.tradius); 
circle(g.centre.x,g.centre.y, g.tradius+l); 
settextjustify(centertext,centertext); 
g.tradius +10, 180, 
g.tradius +20, 135, 
g.tradius +20,90, 
g.tradius +20,45, 
coord); 
coord); 
coord) ; 
coord) ; 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '000'); 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy(coo;_·d.x,coord.y, '001'); 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '010'}; 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy (coord. x, coord. y, '011'}; 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy (coord. x, coord. y, '1 00' J ; 
getcoords (g.centre.x, g.centre.·/. 
outtextxy (coord, x, coord, y, '1 01' J ; 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy (coord, x, coord. y, '11 0') ; 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '111'1; 
g.tradius +10,0, coordJ; 
g.tt·adius +20,315, coord); 
g.tr.'l.dius +20,270, coord) ; 
g. t1·actiu~ +20,225, coordl; 
end; { ;dth g } 
end; { dotarget3 } 
procedure dotarget4 (var g screenrecord) ; 
var coarct pointtype; 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
initview(ocreen.g); 
croas(g.centrc.x,g.centre.yl; 
setcolor (gratcolourl; { draw t • .uget } 
{ double thickneoo to eliminate bleed through 
circle (g. centre. x, g. cent 1·e. y, q. t r.1d iuo J; 
circle(g.centre.x,g.centl·e.y, ~.traditJn•ll; 
circle (g, cenln! .x, g. ct•nt rr•. y, q. t 1 .Hittw .: J; 
oettextjuotifylcei\tt•rtrxt,ct•rJ~t·Itt·~t); 
getcoonlnlq.centlr:·.x, q.o·nt n•.'/. <J.t 1-tditUJ 
outtextxy(l'oonl.x,coord.;•. •oooo· J; 
getcoonlu(q.ct•ntn·.x, q.ct•lltrr.;·. q.tl.tdlull 
outtextxy(coor·ct.x,cootd.y, 'OOOI'J; 
getcoordu (y. eent n·. x, IJ. crnt 1 •·. y, 'I t 1 .HI! uu 
outtextx;•tcootd.x,cnont.;·. ·oo.o• J; 
gf'ttcoordu ('J. c~nt n·. :-:, q. crnt r ... ;·, IJ t 1 ,J,Il Uti 
OU l t ~X t X'/ { C 00 I'd . X, ('""! ll y , ' 0 0 l I ' ~ ; 
10, 
:w. 
::0' 
.::v, 
100, coord) 1 
1~7. coordl: 
I p,' COOh1) ; 
I 1 ~, f.'O.OJ"d) j 
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getcoords{g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius + 20, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0100'); 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius ~ 20, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0101')'; ' 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius + 20, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0110 1 ); .. 
getcoords (g. centre. x, g. centre·. y,. ·g: tradiur:~,.- + 20, 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '0111·')_;_ --
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.cenfz::e.y,'>g_.tradius +. 10,-
outtextxy(coord.x-;coord.y,'lOOO')·_; _-,-
getcoords'(g.centre.x, g.ce-ht.re.y,: g.trii~H~-s + ·20-; 
90, coord) ; 
68, coord) ; 
45, coord); 
' 22;'- coord) ; 
.·a, coord); 
338, 'Coord); 
outtextxy{coord.x,coord.y,-ilOOi•J_; __ c 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.cent're.y,"·-g.trachus + ~0, "315, _coord); 
Outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1010-')·; - ,:;- _ 
getcoords(g.centre.x, ·g.centre.y,- g.tradius_ + .. 2o,·- 293, coord); 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1011'); ,._ \' 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g.tradius·-+.;20, 270, _coord); 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1100'); >' 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre.y, g·.tradius + 20,_ 248, '·coord); 
outtextxy(coord.x, coord.y, '1101,'); 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g.centre .. y, g.t_radius + 20, 225, coord); 
outtextxy(coord.x,coord.y, '1110'); 
getcoords(g.centre.x, g . .centre.y_, g.tradius + 20, 202, coord); 
outtextxy(coord;x,coord.y,'ll11'); 
end; { with g } 
end; { dotarget4 } 
procedure dograticule(var gr: screenrecord); 
var xlimit, ylimit : integer; 
begin 
xlimit := getmaxx; { get screen limits } 
ylimit := getmaxy; 
setcolor(linecolour); 
rectangle(O,O,xlimit, ylim.it); { set gratiCule } 
rectangle(3,3,xlimit _.::'3~-ylimit- 3); 
line(479,3,479,ylimit - 3); 
with gr do · 
begin 
setviewport(479,4,479,ylimit-3,clipon); {set text area} 
getviewsettings(screen.t.port); _{ store.-text· area limits } 
screen.t.fill := lightgray; ,_ ---.:, 
getviewsettings (screen.h.port) ;. '{-"stOre 'be'lp screen limits } 
screen.h.fill := yellow; 
setviewport(4,4,478,478, clipon); ---. {' giaphics _area } 
getviewsettings (screen. g .port); _store graphics area limits 
screen.g.fill :=white; 
getviewsettings(screen.i.port); { store data input- area limits } 
screen.i.fill :=blue; 
end; { with gr } .;. 
end; { dograticule } 
procedure initscreenrec(var g 
begin 
with g do 
begin 
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with screen.g do 
begin 
centre.x := (port.x2 
centre.y := (port.y2 
fill := gbackcolour; 
end; { with } 
port. xl) 
port.yl) 
d . ','1 lV -,'2; ,, 
divi'.·2; 
tradius := midradius; 
maxrun := IJlaxnms; 
'J { default Settings 
(I} 
shape := 1-
' 
step := 1; 
overlap := false; r(",-" 
numberbits :"' 2; { default_ two bit patterns } 
expectedblue := tradius • tradius; "\:::, . 
aveexpblue := 0; 
totalbits :=:: 0; 
bluerunarea := 0; 
greenarea := 0; 
bluerunnumber := 
bluerundensity := 
bluearea[minl 
bluedensity[min] 
bluedirection[min] 
bluecount [min] 
dotime(timestr); 
dodate(datestr}; 
end; 
end; { initscreenrec } 
0; 
0; 
:= maxlongint; 
:= maxlongint; 
: = maxlongint; 
:= 0'\axlongint; 
procedure dohelp{t : view); 
var temp : integer; 
begin { print help data on screen } 
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext); 
with t do 
begin 
initview(t); 
setcolor(labelcolour); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow, 'Help Screen'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 3, 'Run :'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 6, 'Index:'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 9, 'Density : '); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 12, 'Direction:'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 15, 'COUNT'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 17, 'MAX'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 19, 'AVG'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 21, 'MIN'); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow • 34, 'Target(in Pixel.Sl •); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 36, 'SIZE : '); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 38, 'AREA : '); 
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setcolor(textcolour); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 
outtextxy(tcoll,-trow ··• 
oUttextxy{tcoll,trow * 
4, 'Number of Runs'); 
7, 'Number of counts'); 
lO,'No. of Bluea'}; 
13, 'Avg.-·'Direction'l; 
16, 'total this run'); 
18, 'Max. of all runs')_; 
20, 'Avg. of all runs'); 
22, 'Mi'n. of' ail runs'); 
36,' radius'}; 
38,' pixels'}; 
outtext.Xy(tcoll,ti:ow * -40; 1 KEY COMMANDS'}; 
outtextxy{tfrai1,trow_ * 44,'P 
outtextxy(t}po-ll,trow * 46,_'0 
end; { wit\).?h } 
{ return,t~ graphics window} 
end; { dohe.lp } 
Print') ; 
r Quit'); 
procedure doinput (var gr :,1 screenrecord); 
var pas, 
temp, 
code, 
tsize, 
truns : integer; 
tstrl, 
tstr2 : numstr; 
tch : char; 
templstr, 'f: 
longblank. J: string [40]; 
inputstr : string[6); 
/ .. - overlap : boolean; 
begin { change session parameters 
settextjustify(lefttext,centertext); 
inputstr : = ' '; 
with gr do 
begin 
initview(screen.i); 
setcolor(labelcolour); 
outtextxy{tcol1,trow, 'Data Input Screen'); 
tstrl := num2str(minradius); 
tstr2 := num2str(maxradius}; 
),! 
·.;, 
.JI 
outtextxy{tcoll,trow * 5, '<T>arget Radius Min. ' + tstrl 
+ ' Max.' + tstr2); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 6, 'Current Radius'); 
tstrl := num2str(gr.tradius); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 6,tstr1); 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * B, 1 <0>verlap'); 
if gr.overlap then outtextxy(tcol2,trow * B, •yes') 
else outtextxy(tco12,trow * B, •no'); 
outtextxy(tcol1,trow * 10, 'Number of <R>uns -Min 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 11, 'Current Runs'); 
tstr1 := num2str(gr.maxrun); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 11,tstr1); 
tstr1 := num2str(gr.numberbits); 
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outtextxy(tcoll,trow 11 13, 'Number of <B>its '); 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow" 13,tstrl}; 
outtextxy(tcoll,trow * 15, '<S>hape Default '); 
if gr.shape = 1 then outtextxy(tcoi2,trow * 15, 'Square') 
else outtextxy(tcol2,trow • 1.5, 'Circle•); 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow * 22, 'Select-<?;. letter' _td change va.lues'); 
outtextxy(tcoll, trow *~ 23, 'Press return after e'i~tering eac-h va.lue 1 ); 
'·'·· 
:;'!!,-:'-'•' 
outtextxy (tcoll, trow .. *'<, 25, 'EXIT this scre'en : left ari:"o111') ; 
setcalor(textcolour); 
while not keypressed do 
begin 
tch : = read key; 
if tch = #O then 
begin 
tch : = readkey; 
case tch of 
'K' 
end; 
end 
else { 
begin 
case 
'·begin exit - left arrow } 
pes := 25; 
setcolor(blankcolour); 
outtextxy (tcoli, trow' *~'pas, blank6str) ; 
setcolor(changecolour); 
outtextxy(tcoll 1:trow * pas, 'EXIT'); 
break; 
end; 
{ case } 
.',' 
not escape character'' } 
tch of 
'B', 'b' begin { change number of bits } 
inc(gr.numberbits); 
if gr.numberbits > 4 then gr.numberbits := 2; 
setcolor(blankcolour); 
outtextxy (tcol2 1 trow_.*' -1'3, .blank6str); 
·' '· ' ' 
setcolor (changecolour) --; 
outtextxy (tcol2, troW ~ "'13 1 nu~2str {gr .numberbits)); 
end; 
•s' I' s' 
'T' I 't' 
begin { select square 'or circle target } 
setcolor (blankcolour-) ( · n · 
outtextxy (tcol2, trow * 15 1 blarik6str); 
setcolor ( changecolour) ; 
if gr. shape = 1 then c;-
begin 
gr.shape := 2; 
outtextxy(tcol2 1 trow * 15 1 'Circle'); 
end 
else 
begin 
gr.shape := 1; 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * 
end; 
\\ 
15, 'Square'); 
end; 
begin { change size of t~rget } 
pas := 6; 
setcolor(blankcolour); 
outtextxy (tcol2 1 trow * pas 1 blank6str)_; 
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'0', 'o' 
1 R 1 , 'r' 
setcolor(changecolour); 
tsize : = getnum ( inputstr, poe, tcol2); 
if tsize > maxradius then tsize := maxradius; 
if tsize c 50 then ~size := 50; 
setcolor (blankcolour) ; 
outtextxy(tcal2, trow * pas, blank6str) ;;, 
set color ( changecolour.) ; 
outtextxy(tcol2,trow * pas, num2str(tsize)); 
gr.tradius :~ tsize; 
gr .expectedblue := tsize :-*- tsize; 
end; '' -· ·· 
begin {_ use overlapp_in£(-sampleS '} 
pas := 8; 
setcolor(blankcolour); 
outtextxyjtcol2,tiow * pas, blanY.6str); 
overlap : = nq·t- overlap·;_ 
setcolor (charigecoloui::") ; · 
if overlap then ' 
outteXtxy(tcol2,trow *pas, 'Yes') 
else '' 
outtextxy(t-col2,-tr?W- * .. pos;-•no•}; 
gr, overlap : =_ o":;.erlap r 
end; ~-~ 
begin { -change nUmber of runs 
pas := 11;'. - · 
setcolor (bl'ankcol,Our)_; 
outteX.txji"(tcol2,·tro0 * pas, blank6str); 
setcol6r(changecolour); 
truns := get~um(fnputstr,pos,tcol2); 
if truns > maxint then·- truns : = maxirit ;-c 
gr. maxrun : = truns; 0\ 
end; · 
'H' , 1 h' dohelp(screen.h); 
end; { case } 
end,-_, {if tch } 
setcolor(labelcolour); 
end; { while not keypressed 
tch := 'x'; 
end; { with i } 
clearviewport; 
end; { doinput } 
procedure getbit(var f 
var b 
begin 
read(f,b); 
end; { get bit } 
procedure putbit(var f 
var b 
begin 
write(f,b); 
end; { putbit } 
sintfil_e; 
shortint); 
sintfi.-le; 
: shortintf; 
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procedure density(var g : screenrecord); 
var indexx, indexy : integer; 
totall, 
total2 : longint; 
begin { count number of tracecolour and areacalour pixels } 
total11;. := 0; 
tota12. : = 0; 
setcolor(areacolour); 
with g do 
begin 
for indexx := (centre.x,;.- (tradius + 1)) 
to (centre.x +_ (tradius +· 1)) do 
for indexy := {centre.y -· (t'radius + 1)) 
to (centre. y '+ (t-radiLis + 1)) dO 
begin ,. 
pixelcolor := getpixel(indexx,indexy); 
case pixelcolor of re; 
tracecolour ·' : begin { turn trace to green } 
areacolour 
end; { case } 
end; { for } 
pUtpixel{indexx,indexy,areacolour); 
inc (totall) ;·-
inc(total2}; 
end; 
b.egin { count 
inc{total2); 
end; 
total area } 
.. bluecount [counter) : = bluerunnumber; 
bluerunarea := totall; 
greenarea := total2; 
bluearea[counter] := bluerunarea; .----: ----<::-, 
rt" "~\ 
bluerundensity := (bluecount [counter] /bluearea [counter]); i:/ 
bluedensity[counterJ := bluerundensity; 
greenarea := (greenarea/targetarea) * 100; 
doirec(bluecount,loop); {store data in a record} 
doirec{bluearea,loop); 
dorrec(bluedensity,loop); 
doirec{bluedirection,loop); 
end; { with g } 
end; { density } 
procedure dorun2(var g 
var oldcolour : word; 
r2 : twoarray; 
count shortint; 
screenrecord;l longint); 
begin { generate and plot pixels on target in 2 bits } 
{ if files are used } 
if g.usefile and ( (g.filechoice.flow = input) 
or (g.filechoice;-:f'!ow = inout)) then 
begin 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r2[1J); 
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191 
11/12/99 
I 
Development of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Control in Multi-User, Multi-
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r2[2]); 
end 
else 
begin 
for count : = 1- to,,?:, do ·, { 
r2 [~aunt] := rafld.om(2); 
intitial:i.ne array } 
{ get random value } 
-\-- '1 ' ' 
if ·g.uset'il~ and (g,filechoice.flow =output) 
tfA:.., or- (_4:-'fil_echoice·. noW:= inoutl then 
\\e~~~bf't {g~;fti~-Ch~-ice .ou~~-utfile, 'i:2 (1]) ; 
(\ plltbi t (g, filechofce. outputfi ie-; r2 (2] ') ,-. _, 
end; { if } ·· · ' . " 
,_, :; -'J "-, ., ' _c-
setlcolor {traceii:::olodr)/; 
while not restart do 
begin 
inc (1}; 
if r2(1] = 0 then 
case r2 [2] of 
0 : begin { o·a } 
next.x ~= current.x 
next. Y. : = current, y 
"end; 
1 begin 
ne~t.x 
next.y 
end; 
.. 
end; caser2 [1] 
if r2 [1] = 1 'then 
case r2 [2 J of 
0 : begin 
( 01 } 
:= current.x 
:= current.y; 
= 0 } 
( 10 } 
+ 
1· 
• 
1· 
• 
next.x := current.x; 
next. y : = _current. y _+ 1 ;_ 
end; 
1 ,. begin { 11} 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current.y; 
end; 
end; { case } 
{ write data to file } 
' if g.overlap then 
begin 
r2 [1] : = r2 [2] ; { swap } 
1· 
• 
( up ) 
[ down } 
( left..} 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2[2]) 
else 
r2 [2] := random(2); 
-\, 
if {g. filechoice. flow = output) or. (g. filechoice ._flow = inout) 
then 
putbit (g. filechoice. outputfile, r2 [2]') ·;· 
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inc(g.totalbits) 
end; { if overlap } 
if not g.overlap then 
begin 
if g.usefile and {g.filechoice.f.low = input) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2(1]); 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r2(2]); 
end 
else 
begin 
r2 (1] := random(2); 
r2 (2] := random (2); 
end; ( if ) 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r2[1)}; 
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r2[2]); 
end; ( if ) 
inc(g.totalbits,2); 
end; 
pixelcolor := getpixel(next.x,next.y); 
if pixelcolor = gratcolour then 
begin if hit target rim } 
restart := true; 
end; 
putpixel(next.x,next.y,tracecolour); { illuminate point} 
current : = next; 
ch := 'x'; 
end; { while not finish 
g.bluerunnumber := 1; 
cross(next.x,next.y); 
end; { dorun2 } 
Edith Cowan University 
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end; 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow =output) 
or (g.f.Uechoice.flow = .i.nout) then 
begin 
putbi t (g. E ilechoice. output f i1 e, r3 [ 1) ) ; 
putbit{g.filechoice.outputf.ile,r3 [2)); 
putbi t (g. f ilechoice. outputfile, r3 [ 3] ) ; 
end; { if } 
setcolor(tracecolour); 
while not restart do 
begin 
inc(l); 
case r3[1] of 
0 : begin 
case r3 [2] of 
0 : begin 
case 
0 
' 
r3 [3} of 
begin { up 000 } 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current. y 
end; 
1; 
1 begin { up and right 001 } 
next .x := current.x + 1· 
' 
next.y := current. y 1· 
' 
end; 
end; { case r3 [3 J } 
end; 
1 begin 
case r3 [3 J of 
0 
' 
begin { right 010 } 
next .x := current.x + 1; 
next.y := current.y; 
end; 
1 begin { right and down 
next.x .- current.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; 
end { case r3 [3] } 
end; { case r3 [2] } 
end; {case r3 [2] } 
end; { case r3[1] = 0 } 
1 begin 
case r3 [2] of 
0 : begin 
case r3[3] of 
0 : begin { down 100 } 
+ 1; 
+ 1· 
' 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current.y + 1; 
end; 
011 
1 begin { down and left 101 } 
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then 
end; 
end; ( case r3 (3] } 
end; 
1 begin 
case r3 (3] of 
0 
' 
begin ( left 110 } 
next. x := current. x 
next. y :::: current.y; 
end; 
1 begin ( left and up 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; 
end { case r3 [3] } 
end; { case r3(2] = 1 } 
end; {case r3[2) } 
end; { case r3 [1] = 1 } 
end; { case r3 } 
if g.overlap then 
begin 
1; 
111 } 
1· 
' 
- 1; 
r3 [1] := r3 [2]; { store previous values for next run } 
r3 (2] := r3 [3]; 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
getbit (g. filechoice .'inputfile, r3 [3] ) 
' else '·' 
r3[3) := random(2); 
if (g.filechoice.flow = output) or (g.filechoice.flow = inout} 
putbit(g.filechoice.,outputfile,r3 [3J); 
inc(g.totalbits); 
end { get next value } 
else { non-overlap } 
begin 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = input) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
getbi t (g, filechoice. input file, r3 [ 1] ) ;_ 
getbit (g, filechoice. iriputfile, r3 [2]} ;-· 
getbit(g.filechoice.inPlltfile,r3[3]); 
end 
else 
begin 
for count := 1 to 3 do { refill array } 
r3 [count) := random(2); 
end; 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout} then 
begin 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,rJ [1]); 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r3 [2)); 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r3{3]); 
end; 
inc(g.totalbits,3); 
end; 
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pixelcolor : getpixel(next.x,next.y); 
if pixelcolor = gratcolour then 
begin 
restart :~ true; 
end; 
putpixel (next .x, next. y, tracecolour); 
current := next; 
ch ~= 'x'; 
end; { while not finish } 
g.bluerunnumber := l; 
cross (next. x, next. y) ; 
end; { dorun3 } 
procedure dorun4(var g 
var oldcolour word; 
screenrecord;l longint); 
index, 
count 
r4 
begin 
if g. usefile 
begin 
integer; 
fourarray; 
and (g.filechoice.flow = 
or (g. filechoiCe. flow = 
input) 
inout) 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r4[1]); 
getbit (g.filechoice.inputfile, r4 [2]); 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile, r4[3]); 
getbit{g.filechoice.inputfile, r4(4]); 
end 
else 
b,egin 
then 
for count := 1 to 4 do 
r4 (count] := random{2); 
end; 
intitialise array } 
{ get random value } 
if {g.filechoice.flow = output) or {g.filech~ice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r4[1]); 
putbit (g. filechoice .outputfile, r4 [2]) ; \) 
putbit(9'.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [3)); 
putbit{g.filechoice.outputfile,r4(4]); 
end; { if } 
setcolor{tracecolour); 
while not restart do 
begin 
inc {1) ; 
case r4[1] of 
0 : begin 
case r4 [2] of 
0 : begin 
case r4 [3] of 
0 : begin 
Edith Cowan University 
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; ' 
: ~ ! 
" '··.\ 
1 
1 
end; 
end; 
begin 
1 
1 
' 
end; 
end; 
begin 
case 
0 
' 
1 
end; 
begin 
next.x != current.;.: + J ; 
next. y := current.y 2; 
end; ( r4 [4] = J ) 
( case r4 ( 4} ) 
r4 [4] of 
begin 
next.x := current.x + 2; 
next.y := current.y 2; 
end; 
begin 
next.x := current.x + 2; 
next.y := current.y 1; 
end; { r4(4] = 1 } 
end; { case r4 [4] 
end; ( r4 [3] = 1 ) 
end; { c,~se r4 [3) } 
end; { r4\[2] = 0 ) 
begin r 
case r4 [3!] of 
o : be'.i!#ri' 
1 
,, 
\Case r4 [4] of 
()_,\: begin 
'-\ next.x := current.x + 2; 
:)) next.y := current.y; 
J/ end· 
I ' 
__ 1·~: begin 
next.x := current.x + 2; 
next.y := current.y + 1; 
end; { r4 [4] , 1,1 ) 
end; { case r4 (4] f} 
end; ([ 
begin ~-. 
case r4 [4) of 
0 : begin 
1 
next.x 
next.y 
end; 
begin 
:= curr'ent.x + 2; 
" := current.y + 2; 
next.x := current.x + 1; 
next.y := current.y + 2; 
end; { r4 I 4] = 1 ) 
end; { case r4 [4] } 
end; { r4[3] = 1) 
end; { case r4 [3] } \,\ 
end; { r4 [2] 1 ) 
{ case r4 [2] 
{ r4 [1] 0 ) 
case r4 [2] of 
0 
' 
begin 
case r4 [3] of 
0 : begin 
case r4 [4] of 
o : begin 
next.x := current.x; 
next.y := current.y + 2; 
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end; 
1 : beg.in 
next.x := current.x 1· 
' 
next.y := current.y 1 2; 
end; { r4 14 I 1 ) 
end; {case r4[4) } 
end; 
1 begin 
case r4(4] of 
0 : begin 
current.x 2. 
' 
next.x := 
next·.y := 
end; 
current.'/+ 2; 
1 begin 
next.x := current.x 2; 
next.y := current.y + 1; 
end; { r4 14 I • 1 ) 
end; { case r4 [4] } 
end; ( r4131 • 1) 
end; { case r4 (3) } 
end; { r4 [21 • 0 ) 
1 begin 
case r4 [3] of 
0 : begin 
case r4 [4] of 
0 : begin 
1 
next.x .- current.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; 
begin 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; { r4[41 • 1 ) 
end; { case r4 (4) } 
end; 
1 begin 
case r4 [4] of 
0 : begin 
next.x := current.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; 
1 begin 
next.x := curr'ent.x 
next.y := current.y 
end; ( r4[4] • 1 ) 
end; { case r4 [4] } 
end; ( r4[3] • 1 ) 
end; { case r4 [3] } 
end; { r4[21 • 1) 
end; { case r4 [2] 
end; { r4lll • 1 } 
end; { case r4 [1]} 
if g.overlap then 
begin 
2· 
' 
2· 
' 1; 
2; 
2; 
1· 
' 2· 
' 
r4 [1] := r4 [2]; { store previous values for next run } 
r4[2J := r4{3}; 
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r4[3] :- r4(4]; 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flo"' =input) 
o1· (g.filechoice.flo~>t = inout) then 
get bit (g. f Llechoice. inputf i le, r4 [4 l l 
else 
r-l [4] :: t".3ndom(2); 
if (g.f.ilechoice.flow =output) c,.r (g.filechoice.flow"' inout) 
then 
putb.lt (g. f i lechoice. outputf ile, r4 [4]); 
inc(g.totalbits); 
end { get next value } 
else { non-overlap } 
begin 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow =input) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[1]); 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4 [2]); 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[3]); 
getbit(g.filechoice.inputfile,r4[4]); 
end 
else 
begin 
for count := 1 to 4 do refill array } 
r4 [count] .- random(2); 
end; 
if g.usefile and (g.filechoice.flow = output) 
or (g.filechoice.flow = inout) then 
begin 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [1]); 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 (2]); 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 (3]); 
putbit(g.filechoice.outputfile,r4 [4]); 
end; 
inc(g.totalbits,4); 
end; 
pixelcolor := getpixel(next.x,next.y); 
if pixelcolor = gratcolour then 
begin 
restart := true; 
end; 
putpixel(next.x,next.y,tracecclour); 
line{current.x,current.y, next.x,next.y); 
current : = next; 
ch := 'x'; 
end; { while not finish 
g.bluerunnumber := 1; 
cross(next.x,next.y); 
end; { dorun4 } 
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---Simulation of Te;·t~T-------·-·-··· 
program ttest; 
{ 
A program to pet·form the T Test on random nequencea 
test to T4 
} 
uses crt; 
const fore = 2; 
aft = B; 
numtests = 4; 
lowcolour = lightcyan; 
expcolour = white; 
highcolour = lightred; 
textcolour = yellow; 
backcolour = blue; 
type 
onearray array [0 .. 1] 
twoarray = array[o .. 3] 
threearray = array [O .. 7] 
fourarray = array [0 .. 15] 
of longint; { no of 
of longint; 
of longint; 
of longint; 
testarray = array[1 .. numtests] of shortint; 
devarray = 
anyf ilename 
var 
resultfilename 
array[l .. numtestsJ 
string [40]; 
anyfilename; 
outfile : text; 
of real; 
Os and l'S 
one 
two 
three 
four 
onearray; { accumulators to store values in } 
dev 
tests 
testmax, 
twoarray; 
threearray; 
fourarray; 
devarray; 
testarray; 
count longint; 
value 
zc 
integer; 
real; 
} 
{ _____________________________________ } 
procedure continue; 
begin 
Write( 1 Press enter to continue 1 ); 
readln; 
end; { continue } 
procedure shuffle{var a 
v 
var !count : integer; 
begin 
for lcount := 1 to 3 do 
testarray; 
integer) ; 
a [!count] := a [!count + 1]; 
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----- ---------------------------------
a [4] : == v; 
end; { shuffle } 
proceduL-e docountl (var t 
begin 
case t[l] of 
0: inc(o[O]); 
1: inc(o[l]); 
end; { case } 
end; { docountl } 
var o 
procedure docount2fvar t 
var o 
begin 
case t [1] of 
0 : case t [2] of 
0: inc{o[O]l; 
1 : inc(o[l]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t[2] of 
0 : inc(o[2)); 
1: inc{o[3]); 
en::l; { case } 
end; { case } 
end; { docount2 } 
procedure docount3{var t 
var o 
begin 
case t[l] of 
0 : case t [2] of 
0 : case t[3) of 
testarray; 
onearray); 
testarray; 
twoarray) ; 
testarray; 
threearray) ; 
0: inc(o[O]); 
1 : inc(o[l]); 
end; 
1 case t [3] of 
o : inc(o[2]); 
1: inc(o(3]); 
end; 
end; { case t [2] } 
1 case t[2] of 
0 :case t[3] of 
0 : inc(o[4]); 
1 : inc(o[S]); 
end; 
1 case t {3] of 
0 : inc (o [6]); 
1: inc(o[7)); 
end; 
end; { case t [2] } 
end; { end case t[l] } 
end; { docount3 } 
procedure docount4(var t 
var o 
begin 
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case t[l) of 
0 :case t[:!] of 
0 : ca!:le t [ 3] of 
0: case t[4] of 
0: inc(o[O)); 
1: inc(o(l]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t[4] of 
end; 
0: inc(o[2)l; 
1: inc(o[3)); 
end; { case } 
1 case t[3];
1
of 
0 : case t [4) of 
0: inc(o[4)); 
1 : inc (o [5]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t [4] of 
0 : inc(o[6]); 
1 : inc (o [7)) ; 
end; ·{ case '} 
end; , 
end; { case t 'riJ } 
1 case t [2] of 
0 : case t[3] of 
0 : case t[4] of 
0: inc(o[8]); 
1 : inc(o[9]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t (4] of 
end; 
0 : inc(o[lO]); 
1 : inc(o[ll]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t [3] of 
0 : case t[4] of 
o: inc(o[l2)); 
1: inc(o[13]); 
end; { case } 
1 case t[4] of 
end; 
0: inc(o[14]); 
1 : inc (o [15]); 
end; { case } 
end; { case t [2] } 
end; { end case t [1] } 
end; { docount4 } 
procedure displayarray{t testarray); 
var !count : integer; 
begin 
for lcount := 1 to 4 do 
write(t[lcount]); 
writeln; 
end; { displayarray } 
procedure choosecolour(var r,h,l 
begin 
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"--c---"-1f r:. h then textcolor(lowcolour): 
if (r <=h) and (r>"' I) then textcolor(expcolour); 
if r < l then textcolor(highcolour); 
end; { shoosecolour } 
procedure doheade r ( l, e, h 
begin 
real); 
textcolor { lowcolour) ; 
write('Low ',l:fore:aft, 
textcolor (expcolour) ; 
write(' exp. ',e:fore:aft,' 
textcolor(highcolour); 
wri teln (' high ', h: fore: aft) ; 
end; { doheader } 
procedure getresultl(o 
t 
onearray; 
longint; 
z real; 
'J i 
'); 
var f : text ) ;' 
var lresult, !expected, high,low : real; 
begin 
!expected := 1/2; 
low := !expected - z; 
high := !expected + z; 
doheader(low,lexpected,high); 
i:· !result:= o[O]/t; 
choosecolour{lresult,high,low); 
write {' ' :12, 'Os : 1 , !result: fore: aft, ' 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[l)/t; 
choosecolour (!result, high, low).; 
writeln(' ls: ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
textcolor(yellow); 
end; { getresultl } 
procedure getresult2(o twoarray; 
t longint; 
z real; 
var f : text); 
var !result, !expected, low,high : real; 
begin 
!expected := 1/4; 
low := !expected - z; 
high := !expected + z; 
doheader(low,lexpected,high); 
!result := o[O)/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
I) j 
write(' ':ll,'OOs: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[l]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high, low); i( 
writeln(' Ols : ',lresult:foreiaft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[2]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
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write(' ':ll,'lOs: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o [3) /t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln(' lls : ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
textcolor(yellow); 
end; { getresult2 } 
procedure getresult3(o 
t 
threearray; 
longint; 
z real; 
var f : text); 
var !result, !expected, low,high : real; 
begin 
·!expected := 1/8; 
low := !expected - z; 
high := !expected + z; 
doheader(low,lexpected,high); 
!result := o(O]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write{• 1 :10,'000s: •,lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln (f ,!result) ; , 
!result := o[l]/t; 
choosecolour{lresult,high,low); 
writeln(' OOls: ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
lresult := o[2]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' ':10, 1 010s: •,lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o(3]/t; 
choosecolour{lresult,high,low); 
writeln(' Olls : ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[4]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' 1 :10, 1100s: ',lresult:fore:aft,• '); 
writeln(f,lre8ult); 
I·' 
!result := o[S]/t; 
choosecolour{lresult,high,low); 
writeln{' lOla: ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o(6]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' ':lO,'llOs: ',lresult:fore:aft,• '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[7]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln(' llls : ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
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textcolor (yellow) ; 
end; { getresult3 } 
procedure getresult4(o 
t 
fourarray; 
longint; 
z real: 
var f : text): 
var !result, lexpected,low,hlgh : real; 
begin 
!expected := 1/16; 
low := !expected - z; 
high := !expected+ z; 
doheader (low, !expected, high},. 
!result := o[O]/t; 
choosecolour {!result, high, low); 
write(' ':9, '0000s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o(l)/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln('OOOls : ',lresult:fore:aft}; 
writeln(f,lresul~); 
!result := o[2]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' 1 :9,'0010s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln (f ,!result); 
!result := o(3]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln('OOlls : ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[4]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' ':9,'0100s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[S)/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln( 1 0101s: ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[6)/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' ':9, 1 0110s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' 1 ); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[7]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln( 1 Ollls : ',!result: fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[B]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' 1 :9, '1000s : ',lresult:fore:aft,' 
writeln(f,lresult); 
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lresult :- o[9]/t; 
choosecolou r ( 1 result, high, low) ; 
writeln(.'1001s : ',lreault:fore:aft); 
write.ln ( t:·,lresult); 
!result := o[lO)/t; 
choosecolour ( 1 result, high, low) ; 
write(' ':9,'1010s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[ll]/t; 
choosecolour{lresult,high,low); 
writeln('lOlls : ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f, !result); 
!result := o(l2]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write(' ':9,'1100s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[l3]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln('llOls: ',lresult:fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
!result := o[l4]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
write{' ':9,'1110s: ',lresult:fore:aft,' '); 
writeln{f,lresult); 
lresult := o[15]/t; 
choosecolour(lresult,high,low); 
writeln( '1111s : 1 , lresult: fore:aft); 
writeln(f,lresult); 
textcolor(yellow); 
end; { getresult4 } 
function getZ(z,p 
n 
real; 
longint) : real; 
var temp : real; 
begin 
temp := z * sqrt{P * (1- p)/n); 
getZ := temp; 
end; { getZ } 
procedure dodev{var a 
z 
n 
var count : integer; 
begin 
devarray; 
real; 
longint); 
for count := 1 to numtests do 
case count of 
1 a[count] := getz(Z,O.S,n); 
2 a[count] := getz{Z,0.2S,n}; 
3 a[count] := getz{Z,0.125,n); 
4 a[count] := getz(Z,0.0625,n); 
end; { case } 
end; { dodev } 
{----------------------------------------------------} 
begin 
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n· 
If 
textbackground (backcolour); 
textcolor(textcolour); 
clrsct·,· 
clear Screen } 
{ display header } 
writeln(' ':20, 'Simulation of Test-T for 4 Bits'); 
writeln; 
write('What is the name of the File to 
readln(resultfilename); 
'''"' ·~-']~'I 
.,, 
' \ --- \\ 
store results in ? 
// if resultfileriame .: ''then resultfilename := 'dummy.dta'; 
\'/ 
assign (outfi.l~, resultfilename) ; 
rewrite(outfile); 
-,\ 
write('What is the Standard Deviation value ? 
readln{zc}; 
write('What is the number of bits to be tested ? 
readln(testmax); 
dodev(dev,zc,testmax); 
randomize; 
for count := 1 to 4 do { preload array } 
tests [count] := random(2}'; 
perform tests } 
for count := 1 to testmax do 
begin 
{ if count mod 1000 = 0 then write {' *'); 
} docount1{tests,one); 
docount2{tests,two); 
docount3{tests,three); 
docount4(tests,four); 
value := random(2); {get next bit 
shuffle(tests,value); { put next bit into test array } 
end; { for count } 
writeln; 
write('Standard Deviation is 1 ,zc:fore:aft); 
writeln(' Test maximum is ', testmax,' bits•); 
getresultl (one, testmax, dev(1], out file); 
getresult2(two, testmax, dev[2], outfile); 
getresult3(three,testmax, dev(3], outfile); 
getresult4(four, testmax, dev[4], outfJle); 
close(outfile); 
continue; 
end. { ttest 
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Simulation of Maurer's Theoretical Method 
program Maurerl (Input, Output); 
s bit bytes only 
this program .is to take a file of data fcom a binacy tile and 
perform statistical tests on the data. 
performs tests on binary symmetric source using 8 bit non-oveclapping 
pieces'-'· 
} 
uses 
crt; -"-
canst 
bits = 8; 
Values = 256; { 2'bits ) 
type 
tstfile = file of byte; 
filename string[255]; 
var 
infile 
out file 
inpath, 
.inname 
outpath 
file length, 
initsteps, 
numsteps, 
count 
val 
fTU, 
sum : real; 
tstfil~\; 
,, 
text; '\ 
,;, 
filename; 
filename; 
longint; 
byte; 
{ source of binary string } 
{ choice of file names J 
{ length of file in ·bytes } 
{ length of initialising bytes 
{ length of process bytes } 
{ counter } 
{ value from 
avg log2 of 
{ sum of 
source } 
numsteps terms } 
calculated values } 
Table array[O .. 255) of longint; { time index of each char 
finish boolean; 
ch : char; 
{**********************************************************************} 
procedure menu; 
begin 
clrscr; 
writeln ( 1 
writeln ( 1 
Writeln; 
end; 
writeln; 
{ 
TeDeum Text Statistical Program 
8 bit Maurerl Randomness 
menu } 
'); 
I) i 
{*******************************************************************} 
begin { main } 
clrscr; 
menu; 
finish := false; 
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while not(finish) do 
begin 
write('What is the Input f.ile •.??? '); 
readln ( inname) ; 
inpath := 'c:\tedeum\maurt'est\maurtst2\' 
assign(infile, inpath); 
reset (infile); 
•·,filelength 
initsteps 
numsteps 
:= filesize(infile)~' 
:= trunc(filelength/10); 
.- fi!elength initsteps; 
writeln(inpath) ;writeln; 
+ inname; 
outpath := 'c:\tedeum\maurtest\maurtst2\wttrump.res'; 
assign(outfile, outpath); 
append(outfile); 
for count := 0 to 255 do 
table (count] : = 0; 
{ clear the table } 
writeln('Reading Initial Values'); writeln; 
for count := 1 to initsteps do 
begin 
{ read initial values } 
if count mod 1000 = 0 then write('*'); 
read(infile,val); 
table [val] := count; 
end; 
writeln('Performing Test ') ;writeln; 
for count := (initsteps + 1} to (initsteps + numsteps) do 
begin 
if count mod 1000 = 0 then write('*'); 
read(infile,val); 
sum :; sum+ ln(count - table[val)); 
table [val] := count; 
end; 
writeln;writeln; 
fTU := {sum/numsteps)/ln(2.0); 
writeln( 'The Calculated Value For ',inpath,' is 
writeln(outfile, inname,' ', fTU:3:7); 
sum := o.O; 
close (infile); 
close {outfile); 
write('Continue ? spacebar'); 
readln ( ch) ; 
if ch <> chr(32) then finish := true; 
end; { while not } 
end. { main } 
',fTU:3:7); 
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Simulation of Startpoints 
program siml; 
a program to generate a set of random sequences f.rom the following 
1. a set of startpoints 
2. a set of selection sets of varying size 
3. a set of randomisers 
the output sequences will be stored in a file for analysis 
'\, note 1. all data will be short integers :t~hich •Nil) ... limit the 
•\ 
,,. increment steps to range 0-12? 
) 
author 
date 
version 
david shaw 
12aug98 
1.0 initial design and implementation 
{----------------------Declarations---------------------------} 
uses 
crt, 
printer; 
{ use screen character routines } 
{ use output to printer } 
canst errormessagel = •this option is not implemented.'; 
type 
var 
ranf ilename 
opfilename 
spfilename 
ssfilename 
outfilename 
= •0:\programs\simtest\'; 
'd:\programs\simteil:\output\'; 
'd: \programs\simt~'st\spfilel. tst 1 ; 
= 'd:\programs\simtest\sset'; 
= 'd:\programs\simtest\out'; 
randomisersize = 10000; 
noofrfiles ~ 10; 
noofstartpoints :;;,\, 10; 
noofselectionsets = 10; 
maxselectionsetsize = 128; 
maxoutputsetsize = 128; 
{ size of randomiser file } 
{ number of 
{ 
{ 
number of 
number of 
randomiser files 
startpoints } 
selection sets } 
{ largest size of selection set 
out array 
outfile 
array(l .. maxoutputsetsize) 
= file of outarray; 
of integer; 
file 
= file 
sintfile = 
spfile 
of shortint; 
of integer; 
{ a file of 0 
{ a file of 0 
& 1 for printing 
to 255 } 
anyfilename = string[40]; 
rfile 
rfilename 
sintfile; 
anyfilename; 
{ file of random bits } 
{ name of random 'file in use } 
{---------------------- functions ------------------------------} 
function IntToStr(I: Longint): String; 
{ convert any integer type to a string 
var 
s: string [11]; 
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-----------· begin 
Ste(I, S); 
lntToStr := S; 
end; 
{-----"---------------- procedures -----------------------------} 
procedure createrandomi5ers; 
var count, 
countl integer; { loop variable ) 
val shortint; { value to be Btored 
lfname anyfilename; { name of file 
lf sintfile; { short 
begin 
for count := 0 to noofrfiles-1 do 
begin 
{ create file name } 
integer 
) 
file 
in file ) 
) 
lfname := ranfilename + 'rmsr'+ inttostr{count) + '.tst'; 
{ create file } 
writeln('Creating ',lfname); 
assign(lf,lfnamel; 
rewrite (lf); 
{ fill with random data } 
writeln('Filling : ',lfname); 
randomize; { initialize the randomiser function } 
for countl := 1 to randomisersize do 
begin 
val := random(2); 
write(lf,val); 
end; { for countl } 
{ close file } 
wri teln ( 'Closing 
close (lf); 
end; { for count } 
', lfname); 
end; { create randomisers } 
procedure createstartpoints; 
var count integer; { loop variable } 
val integer; { start point } 
lfname anyfilename; { name of file } 
lf spfile; { integer file } 
begin 
{ create file name 
lfname ~= spfilename; 
( create file } 
writeln(•Creating 
assign(lf,lfname); 
rewrite (!f); 
', lfname); 
{ fill with random data } 
writeln(•Filling : ',lfname); 
randomize; { initialize the randomiser function } 
for count := 1 to noofstartpoints do 
begin 
val := random(255); 
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--~~~-,-,----------------~----
write(lf,val); 
end; { for countl 
{ close file } 
writeln ( 'C.losing 
close (lf); 
', lfname); 
end; { createstartpoints } 
·,:, 
procedure createselectionsets; 
var count, 
countl, 
setsize, 
val 
{ number of selection sets needed 
{ size of each selection set } 
{ number of integers in selection set } 
{ set value } 
lfname 
lf 
begin 
integer; 
any filename; 
spfile; 
for count := 0 to noofselectionsets-1 do 
begin { •::reate file name } 
lfname := ssfilename + inttostr(count) + '.tst'; 
{ create file } 
writeln('Creating ',lfname); 
assign(lf,lfname); 
rewrite (lf); 
{ fill with random 
writeln ('Filling 
randomize; 
data } 
', lfname}; 
{ initialize the randomiser function } 
setsize := random(255); { generate size of selection set 
for countl := 1 to setsize do 
begin 
val := random(maxselectionsetsize); 
write(lf,val); 
end; { for countl 
{ close file } 
writeln {'Closing 
close (lf) ; 
end; { for count } 
', lfname) ; 
end; { createselectionsets } 
procedure createoutputfile; 
var 
randomisers, 
startpoints, 
selections integer; 
rfname, 
spname, 
ssname, 
opname 
rf 
spf,ssf 
anyfilename; 
sintfile; 
spfile; 
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opf : outfi le; 
begin 
{ select ri'tndomiser 
for randomisers := 0 to noofrfj les-1 do 
begin 
rfname := ranfilename + 'rmsr't jnttostr(randornjser.s) 
assign(rf, rEname); 
reset {rf); 
writeln(rfnamel; { select randomiser file } 
{ generate a sequence } 
-t ' • tst'; 
ssname := ssfilename + inttostr(selections) + '.tst'; 
assign(ssf,ssname); 
reset (ssf); 
writeln(' ',ssname); 
for selections := 0 to noofselectionsets-1 do 
begin { select selection set } 
{ generate outputfilename} 
opname := opfilename + inttostr(randomisers) + 
inttostr(selections) + '.out'; 
{ create outputfile } 
wri teln (' ' , opname) ; 
assign(opf, opname); 
rewrite (opfl ; 
{ generate outputsequences 
{ select bits using startpoint and selection set } 
{ for each startpoint use selectionset to generate 
128 bits and store as a string in the output file 
{ get start point then with randomiser move to start 
point and select bit } 
:~ 
{ get selection set value and move to next bit and select bit } 
{ ensure if index is greater than file size to return to 
beginning. } 
{ close outputfile } 
close (opf); 
end; { for selections } 
close(ssf); 
close(rf); 
end; { for randomisers } 
end; { createoutputfile } 
{----------------------main program---------------------------} 
begin { siml } 
clrscr; 
{ create files and open for writing 
{ create randomiser files } 
{ createrandomisers; } 
{ create file of startpoints } 
{ createstartpoints;} 
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{ create files of selection sets 
{ createselectionsets; } 
{ create files of outputsequences from each randomiaer and 
selection set with the startpoints provided } 
createoutputfile; 
{ close files 
end. { siml } 
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=,-:-c---c--=---c,.-;-;-,---~~~-~~~~~----· Ordering Paradigm 
program order; 
{ 
a program to test the ordering paradigm on random aequenceo. 
uses crt; 
canst noofbits 50; 
type 
arrayline = {message,key,encryption); 
anyarray = array[arrayline,l .. noofbits] of integer; 
intfile = file of integer; 
filename= string[40]; 
var 
test : anyarray; 
infilename 
infile 
filename; 
intfile; 
{ number 
{ number 
{ number 
{ number 
of 
of 
of 
of 
o•s 
l's 
o•s 
l's 
in key } 
in key } 
in encryption } 
in encryption } 
knumo, 
knuml, 
enumo, 
enuml, 
MEmatch, 
bitstested 
{ match between message bit and encrypted bit } 
kpO, 
kpl, 
epo, 
epl, 
longint; 
psame : real; 
{-------------------------------------------------------} 
procedure 
var count 
begin 
writeln; 
displayarray(var 
integer; 
a : anyarray) ; 
for count := 1 to noofbits do 
write(a[message,countJ); 
writeln; 
for count :~ 1 to noofbits do 
write{a[key,count]); 
writeln; 
for count :~ 1 to noofbits do 
write(a[encryption,countJ); 
writeln; 
end; 
procedure getmessage(var a 
var count : integer; 
begin 
randomize; 
anyarray ) ; 
for count := 1 to noofbits do 
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begin 
a[message,count) := random(2); 
a [key, count) 
a (encryption, 
end; { for } 
end; { getmessage 
:= 0; 
count) .- 0; 
procedure getencryption{var inf 
var a 
var nO, 
nl, 
eO, 
el, 
intfile; 
anyarray; 
bt longint); 
var i, count : integer; 
begin 
if not eof{inf) then 
begin 
gotoxy(75,3); write(' 2 '); 
for count := 1 to noofbits do 
begin 
read(inf,a(key,count]); 
inc (btl; 
{ increment key counts 
if a[key,count) = 1 then inc(nl) else inc(nO); 
{ perform encryption } 
if a[message,count] = a[key,count] then a[encryption,count] := 0 
else a [encryption, count] :: 1; 
if a[encryption,count] = 1 then inc(el) else inc(eO); 
end; 
gotoxy(75,3); write(•U•); 
end; { while } 
end; { getencryption } 
procedure testarray(var a 
var mem 
var count, num : integer; 
Begin 
num := 0; 
anyarray; 
longintl ; 
for count ;= 1 to noofbits do 
begin 
if a[message,count] = a[encryption,count] then inc(num); 
end; { for } 
mem := mem + num; 
end; { testarraY } 
{------------------------------~-----------------------} 
begin 
textcolor(yellow); 
textbackground(blue); 
clrscr; 
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writeln(' ':25, •ordering paradigm program '); 
writeln; 
write('What is the:name of the input EiJ.e : '); 
readln (infilename); 
writeln; 
gotoxy{74, 2) ;write ( 1 Ef»'); 
gOtOXy(74 1 )) ;Write( I a 01 ) j 
gotoxy(74,4) ;write(,'Eh~·); 
assign(infile,infilename); 
reset ( infile) ; 
{ generate a test sequence 
getmessage(test); 
Mematch :== 0; 
knumo := O; 
enumo := O; 
bitstested := 0; 
knuml := O; 
enuml := 0; 
while not eof(infile)do 
begin 
getencryption(infile,test, knumO,knuml, enumO,enuml, bitstested); 
testarray(test,MEmatch); 
end; { while } 
psame := MEmatch/bitstested 
kpO := knumO/bitstested; 
kpl := knuml/bitstested; 
epO := enumO/bitstested; 
epl := enuml/bitstested; 
writeln; 
writeln; 
writeln('The number of bits tested 
writeln; 
writeln(' 
writeln ('Key 
writeln( 'Key 
writeln; 
writeln {' 
writeln( 'Enc 
writeln ( 'Enc 
writeln; 
Key Stream ' l ; 
P{O) :::: ',kP0:4:6); 
P(l) = ',kpl:4:6); 
EncrYPtion'); 
P(O) :::: ',eP0:4:6); 
P{l) = ',epl:4:6); 
1 ,bitstested); 
writeln('The number of matches between Message and encrYPtion 
', MEmatch); 
writeln; 
writeln( 'Proportion of matches bet\'leen Message and Encryption 
',psame:4:6 ); 
close {infile); 
write(•press enter to continue•); 
readln; 
end. { order } 
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9.17. Enumeration of all Samples 
l~andom Number 
QCrcent sum select 0 I 0 I 0 0 
50.001% 2 4 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 I 0 
75.00% 3 4 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
75.00% 3 4 0 I I I 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 1 0 1 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 I 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 I 0 I I 
75.00% 3 4 I 0 I I 
50.00% 2 4 1 0 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 I 
100.00% 4 4 I I I I 
75.00% 3 4 1 1 0 1 
75.00% 3 4 I I 0 I 
75.00% 3 4 I I 0 1 
75.00% 3 4 1 I 0 1 
50.00% 2 4 1 1 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 I 0 I I 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 1 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 I 0 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 1 0 I I 
75.00% 3 4 1 0 1 1 
50.00% 2 4 1 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 I 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I 1 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
75.00% 3 4 0 I I 1 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 1 
50.00% 2 4 0 1 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 1 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 1 0 1 
25.00% I 4 0 1 0 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 1 I 
25.00% 1 4 0 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 I 
0.00% 0 4 0 0 0 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I I 
50.00% 2 4 0 0 I I 
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25.00% I 4 0 0 0 
25.00% I 4 0 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 0 I 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
25.00% I 4 0 I 0 0 
75.00% 3 4 0 I 1 
75.00% 3 4 0 I I 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 1 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 
25.00% I 4 0 I 0 0 
average 25.00% I 4 0 I 0 0 
50.00% 50.00% 2 4 0 I 0 I 
total= 70 
The list above indicates all the possible combinations of four bits taken from the random 
eight bit sequence. The average of each sequence is calculated and the average value of 
the average is equal to the average of the random sequence or population. 
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Figure 9·1 Traces of Ten Single Bit Runs 
9.18. Data Visualisation Results 
In figure 9.1 , each row is 401 elements long, that is, 200 elements either side of 
a central element. The trace for 10 consecutive runs are plotted. The vertical 
dimension is scaled and each trace is offset vertically to display all the traces with 
minimum interference between them. 
It is noted that six of the traces continue to a termination and favour one side 
almost to the exclusion of the other. Three of these traces terminate on the negaive 
side and three on the positive side. 
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This trace is the instantaneous average of the previous ten traces scaled to fit. It 
can be seen that the area under the trace tends to be larger to the left of the central axis 
indicating a preference for O's. 
The location and number of peaks may be used to characterise the output of a 
generator. 
U1 000 001 
1JO Ol.O 
J.QJ. 100 D11 
Figure 9-3 Square 3-bit Pattern 
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NA>t.RUNS 1 
Run NUMber 1 
TARGET 
Rildius 100 
Area 40401 
BLUE 
Count 4432 
ltil>I 4452 
fl,.fg 4452 
Nin 4452 
Area 1983 
.._ l.983 
Au<J l.983 
Nin 1983 
Dansi1Y 2.2431 
ltil>I 2,3431. 
Aug a.a431 
Nin a.a431. 
Direct ion D 
ltax 0 
Aug 0 
Nin 0 
GREEN MIEA 
Per Cent 4.91 
Exp.Blue 1.0000 
-· ~ 44.320D 
Ouerlap Ves 
Tatal Bits 4453 
Filas 
Input 
c:,tenp,tastJ.dat 
Q to quU 
P to print 
liMe 09:49:45 
Data 1BSEP 1.998 
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~M.AUNS J. 
fk.in Nunber J. 
lAAOEl 
Radiu:11 100 
Area 3.1.689 
BLUE 
Count 4177 
Na:11 4177 
Ayg 4177 
N:fn 4177 000 
Area 1963 
Nax .1863 
Avg 1963 
N:in 1963 
Density 2.242J. 
Na:11 2.34ii11 
AU'fl ii!.3421 
Nin ii! ,24-c?l. 
Dir•c:t ion 0 
110 OJO Nall D Avg D 
N:in 0 
OREElt AAEA 
Per Cent 3.FJB 
E><P .e tu• 1.DOOO 
ave :( 4.1.7700 
Overlap Yes 
100 Total Bil5 4.l.7? F lltu~ 
Jn~ut . 
c:,teNp,testl.dat I 
I i 
I 
I 
I i. 
I lQ to qu:it II P ta print Tine OB:52:37 Date l.8SEP1!)9B 
- ---Figure 9-4 Round 3-bit Pattern 
9.19. Determining a Basic Sequence 
The implementation of the test relies on progressively choosing overlapping 
sequences of a particular length and counting the number of 'ones' in the sequence. 
To identify the length of a rotated sequence means being able to determine the number 
of bits per sequence is the same. 
For example, using a sequence t-{' and the number of blocks, k = 2 * n 
note: matching numbers that are n values apart are a possible basic sequence size. 
t-{' = 1ll-11101000-00011101-00111010-01110100-11010001-101 
n = 6, k = 12 
111111, 111110, 111101, 111010, 110100, 101000, 
010000, 100000,000000, 000001,000011, 000111 
bit count per sub-sequence 
6,5,5,4,3,2, 
1,l,O,l,2,3 no matches at interval of6 
n=7 
1111110, 1111101, 1111010, 1110100, 1101000, 1010000, 0100000, 
1000000, 0000001,0000011,0000111,0001110,0011101,0111010 
6,6,5,4,J,2,1, 
l,l,2,3,J,4,4 3 matches at interval 7, generate each 7 bit block and count the bits 
until there is a difference then stop. 
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1111110 1000000 1110100 1110100 1110100 1101000 1101 
1111101 0000001 1101001 1101001 1101001 10/0001 101 
11110!0 0000011 1010011 1010011 1010011 0100011 01 
1110100 0000111 0100111 0100111 01001101000110 1 = 
1101000 0001110 1001110 1001110 1001101 0001101 
1010000 0011101 0011101 00/1101 001/010 001 /OJ 
0100000 0111010 0111010 0111010 0110100 OJ 101 
n=S 
= 
= 
= 
4,3 
= 
= 
6,1 
6,1 
5,2 
3,3,4 
2,4 
1,4 
11111101, 11111010, 11110100, 11101000, 11010000, 10100000, 01000000, 
10000001, 
00000011, 00000111, 00001ll0, 00011101, 00111010, 01110100, 11101001, 
11010011 
7,6,5,1,3,2,1,2, 
2,3,3,1,4,4,5,5 4 matches at interval 8 then try each 8 bit sequence. 
7,2, 
6,3, 
5,3, 
44444 
3,4, 
1111110100000011101001110/00/110/00110/0001/01 
11111010 00000111 01001110 10011/0/ 00110100 01/01 
11110100 00001110 10011101 00111010 01101000 I /01 
11101000 0001110100111010 0111010011010001 101 = 
11010000 00111010 011/010011/01001 1010001101 
10100000 01110100 11/0100/ 11010011 010001/0 I 
01000000 11101001 110/001/ 10/0011010001101 
10000001 11010011 101001110/0011010001/01 
21,45, /" ---- -·<" 
' . '/ '{,',' 
2,5,···t'j'l 
\i i 
The Basic Sequence length is apparently 8 as the value 4 is repeated for each blOck in 
the sequence. It is also shown that the partial block size at the beginning is thr~:e bits. 
n=9 
111111010, 111110100, 111101000, 111010000, 110100000, 101000000,010000001, 
100000011,000000111, 
000001110,000011101, 000111010,001110100,011101001, 111010011, 
110100111, 101001110, 111111010 
7,6,5,1,3,2,2,3,3, 
3,4,4,1,5,6,6,5,7 4 matches at interval9 then try each 9 bit sequence 
111111010 000001110 100111010 011101001 101000110 1 
111110100 000011101 0011/0100 111010011 010001101 
111101000 000111010 011101001110100110 10001101 = 
111010000 001110100 111010011 101001101 0001/01 
110100000 011101001 110100111 010011010 001101 
101000000 111010011 101001110 100110100 01101 
010000001 110100111 01001110100110/0001101 
100000011 101001110 100111010 011010001 101 
000000111 010011101 001110100 110100011 01 = 
n = 10 
= 
= 
5,4 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
3,5 
7,3 
6,4 
4,4,5 
3,5 
2,6 
2,6 
3,5 
1111110100, 1111101000, 1111010000, 1110100000, 1101000000, 1010000001, 
0100000011, 1000000111,0000001110,0000011101,0000111010, 
0001110100, 0011101001, 0111010011, 1110100111, 1101001110, 1010011101, 
0100111010, 1001110100, 0011101001 
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7,6,~,4,3,3,3,4,3,4, 
4,4,.§,6,7,6,6,5,5,5, 5 matches at interval 10 then try each 10 bit sequence 
-.::: 
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9.20. 
Re•ource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
External and Ancillary Systems 
Equipment ID and Automatic Mileage l~cporting 
AT5770 Odometcrjldcntification Tag 
Amtcch Systems Corp . 
Am tech now offers fleets an automatic identification tag with the added 
capability to 9.21.company notes include the ability to prognostically react to the 
maintenance needs of a fleet, as well as to accurately monitor and control fuel costs. 
Contact: Amtech, (972) 733-G600, Fax: (972) 733-6699. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Total Connectivity Solution 
Cadec 4000Plus 
Cadec Systems 
The Cadec 4000Plus information system combines several newly released 
products from Cadec into one "value package" designed to improve virtually every aspect 
of information management \Vi thin a fleet operation. The system can be configured to fit 
a broad range of specific customer needs. 
At the heart of the 4000Plus package is Cadec's Data Bridge technolog_y. 
DataBridge, the company explains, is a communications gateway designed to cost-
effectively link the engine, its subsystems, the driver and vehicle through an on board 
computer to the company's home office and its remote locations. Products such as 
RouteMessenger and RemoteOffice can be used with the DataBridge technology. A 
number of methods for transferring data also are possible, and cellular and PCMCIA 
technologies, as well as ATA J 1587 I 1708 datalink and sensor processing capabilities, 
are also featured. 
Another key element of the Cadec 4000 Plus is OfficeEnabler, which offers a 
range of advanced information management and decision support tools. In addition to 
core analysis capabilities for performance, productivity and regulatory compliance, 
OfficeEnabler features RouteOnBoard, VehicleVision electronic tachograph and Cadec's 
new StepAhead program series. 
New sensor and datalink capabilities of the system, Cadec reports, also add 
dimension to the "connectivity gateway." The 4000Plus's sensor capability, for example, 
allows for on/off status determination and monitors specific information, such as 
refrigeration, power take-off and dual speed on the rear axles. The Cadec 4000Plus also 
reads and monitors the datalink for critical information regarding engine performance, 
including the odometer and tachometer, Fleet managers can use tlie information about 
vehicle and driver performance to maximize the overall efficiency of their operation. 
Contact: Cadec Systems, (800) 25Cadec in the U.S., (800) Cadec20 in Canada, Fax: 
(603) 623-0604, 
URL: http: I /www.cadecsystems.com:8080 
E-mail: 
ReMurce: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
lnfo(fi;cadecsystems.com 
Refrigeration Performance Monitoring 
Data Management System 
Thermo King Corporation 
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Fleets arc assisted in monitoring and controlling wrgo temperature Hnd trailer 
humidity conditions with Thermo King's Data Management System (DMS). The 
microprocessor-based information gathering and storage device cHn be added to 
practically any refrigerated trailer or truck for more efficient ami profitable temperature 
management, the company says. Another benefit is reduced maintenance and operating 
costs, since a review of the data from DMS can point out inefficiencies or trends that 
can be corrected before major problems occur. 
OMS provides fleets managers with a range of information by monitoring, 
recording and displaying temperature readings for up to six sensors, including return 
and discharge air. It also monitors and records six operating functions, including heat, 
cool, defrost, high speed, low speed and Cycle Sentry, and it is equipped to monitor and 
record up to four additional conditions, such as door openings. The result, Thermo King 
states, is a complete record of the trip, from start to finish. 
Desired operating conditions can be programmed in DMS via a keypad on the 
device or with a personal computer. An alarm system alerts the driver should an out-of-
range condition develop during the trip. OMS accumulates data at pre-selected 
intervals, which can range from every two minutes to every four hours. Since data is 
maintained in a non-volatile memory that requires no power supply, stored information 
cannot be erased or lost. 
An internal battery with a life of up to ten years, the company adds, keeps the 
internal clock working even if the refrigeration unit is shut down. A plug-in port allows 
data retrieval whenever desired. Data can be output to a hand-held printer or personal 
computer. 
Contact: Thermo King Corp., (612) 926-3754, Fax: (612) 926-0943. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Yard Management 
Yard*Man I 
Message Xpress 
Installing a radio frequency identification (RFI D) system to monitor fleet assets in 
yards or terminals is simplified with Yard*Man I, a fully integrated hardware, software 
and monthly fleet activity reporting service. The hardware consists of an RFID tag reader 
and tags which can be detected by a single reader at distances up to 1,400 ft. Tags are 
attached to a truck or trailer, and readers are placed in yards to be monitored. The PC-
based software runs on a Windows 3.X operating system. Fleet managers can access 
historical and real-time fleet activity instantly via PC and a modem. Any number of 
locations can be monitored at the same time using just one PC. 
According to the company, Yard*Man I saves fleets time by automatically 
performing yard inventories. In addition to simply showing whether a particular asset is 
in one of the monitored facilities, the software enables daily yard activity reports to be 
produced so fleet managers can track just-in-time performance, reconcile driver logs, 
schedule and track maintenance operations and track leased asset utilization. The 
reporting setvice included with Yard*Man I provides two, complete yard management 
reports per day on all asset activity. Real-time yard inventory inquiries are available at 
an additional cost. 
Contact: Message X press, (8001 637-7248, Fax: (800) 270-2823. 
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Reeource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Vehicle Tracking 
MicroTmckcr 
American Technologies 
The MicroTracker rCmote vehicle-locating system combines a Global Positioning 
System receiver, radio transceiver and HF modem all in one compact unit. According to 
the company, it is an inexpensive, reliable and accurate tracking module. Vehicles, 
trailers and intcrmodal containers in which the device is installed, ATI advises, can be 
instantly located anywhere in North America. When combined with the company's 
LOGITRAK mobile satellite communications software, MicroTracker offers real-time 
communications and vehicle tracking from a local internet connection to the 
dispatcher's computer. 
Contact: American Technologies, (414) 922-7030, Fax: (414) 922-7011, 
E-mail: amtech(i!landnct.com .. 
Re1ource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Rear Vision System 
Surround Sight 
Clarion 
Rear vision cameras and in-cab monitors designed to match a fleet's individual 
needs are available from Clarion. The camera lineup features a waterproofing system 
with an internal 0-Ring seal to protect the connection. A special rain gutter and 
recessed lens, the company states, prevents water from interfering with the 
transmission of a crystal-clear picture. Included on the CC-830050 model is an 
automatic motorized lens cover and built-in heater which prevent the camera from 
fogging up and keep it operational in foul weather. All cameras feature a die cast 
aluminum housing, which makes them resistant to shock and vibration, and a 1 /3-inch 
CCD imager that provides clear views even in low lighting conditions. 
Clarion monitors feature a shock-resistant casing anr1 _;!are-resistant picture 
tube that provides 400+ lines of resolution for greater clarity.~~ n1ght dimmer feature 
enables easy night time viewing. Every system, the company notes, io:: capable of multi-
zone monitoring. Additional camera switchers can be used with any mnnitor to hook up 
multiple cameras. The CJ-770F model, however, includes a built-in two·camera 
switcher for use with rear and right view cameras. This model also features electronic 
on-screen AcuSight markers to help drivers judge backing distances more accurately. 
All Clarion monitors can be adapted for RightSight usage, which automatically turns 
cameras on when a driver shifts into reverse or activates the right turn signaL 
Contact: Clarion, (310) 327-9100, Fax: (310) 327-1999. 
Re1ource: 
Product: 
Suppller: 
Accident Prevention 
Blind-Sight 
Collision Avoidance Systems, Inc 
Comprised of intelligent sensors that are installed in various locations, the 
Blind-Sight collision avoidance system can be equated to electronic eyes watching the 
front, back and sides of a vehicle. Mounted in the truck cab is the command module, a 
microprocessor-based unit that computes all the sensor information and alerts the 
driver audibly and visually when objects are detected in a blind spot. 
When a vehicle is first started, Blind-Sight performs a self-check to verify that all 
sensors and on-board computer systems are working properly. At the same time, it 
checks to see if any objects are in the driver's blind spot in front of the truck. On the 
road, right-side sensors are activated whenever the driver engages the right turn !'ligna I. 
The Blind-Sight backup system is activated when a driver shifts into reverse. On the 
dashboard, the command module features an imbedded outline of a truck \\.'ith indicator 
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lights that correspond to sensors located on the side of the tractor and trailer, as well as 
on the rear of the trailer. When un object is sensed, the location of the object is 
displayed as well as the distance in feet and inches. Optional driver's side coverage is 
also available and is activated hy engaging the vehicle's four-way flasher. 
Also offered with Blind-Sight is an Intelligent Mirror System that consists of 
driver's and passenger side mirrors that arc mounted on standard mirror brackets. 
Information relating to obstacles in the blind spots to the rear and sides of the truck is 
displayed in these mirrors with large numbers and warning lights. 
Contact:Collision Avoidance Systems, (800) 780-9062, Fax: (770) 475-8322. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Accident Prevention 
Echovision 
Armatron International 
To eliminate the risk for accidents associated with lane changes, merging and 
backing maneuvers, the company offers an obstacle detection system featuring 
automatic activation and intuitive audible and visual warnings. Echovision's rear 
system alerts the driver with a low pitched interrupted tone when an obstacle is 
detected at about 10ft from the truck. The tone increases in frequency as the vehicle 
gets closer to the object, changing to a high-pitched continuous tone at approximately 4 
ft. Sensors mounted to the right side of the truck monitor the blind area on this side of 
the vehicle, sending a signal to the small box with warning light that is mounted on the 
right side of the cab where it can be seen when the driver looks at his right-hand mirror. 
If the right turn signal is on while an object is in the driver's blind spot, Echovision will 
also sound an alarm. 
To minimize distractions to the driver, Echovision features a Smart Program that 
enables it to distinguish between true blind side obstacles and false warnings, such as 
from road-side objects, guard rails, Jersey barriers, trees and signs. The system also 
incorporates a continuous self-test for the electronics and actual transmission and 
reception of the sensors to ensure that the entire system is operational. If any part of 
the system malfunctions, the system fault light will warn the driver. A short series of 
tones occur as the system is turned on to verify the audio warning components are 
functioning properly. 
Contact:Armatron International, (617) 321-2300; Fax: (617) 321-2309, 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Trailer Identification 
Tai!Tag 
Navigate International 
With TailTag fleets can obtain the same information about the location and 
status of trailers as they do for tractors. Details about the coupling or uncoupling of a 
trailer are also provided. The information can be relayed to a fleet's home base or 
registered in the tractor. The product does not use radio frequency communication. 
TailTag is easily installed on the tractor, using existing electrical wiring and requiring no 
special skills or tools. The system supports all relevant proposed and existing alpha-
numerical formats for trailer identification. 
Contact:Navigato International, Denmark, +45 9751 3788, Fax: +45 9751 4050 
E-mail:NATOFVM@po.ia.dk 
Web page: http: //www.datashopper.dk/-finth /navigato.html. 
Re.aurce: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Vehicle Tracking 
MIRAS 1100 
SPS Technologies 
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The MIRAS 1100 vehicle remote control and tracking device uses 220M Hz two-
way radio technology for voice capability as well as data transmission. This technology, 
the company explains, replaces the cellular dependency of the originnl MIHAS (Mobile 
Interactive Remote Activated Solutions) unit, saving the end user 40%, or more on 
monthly operating costs. The unit features fully interactive tracking and remote control 
capabilities to allow nccts to track vehicles and take remote control of many vehicle 
operating variables such as turning a vehicle on and off. MmAS uses GPS technology to 
track vehicles within 10 meters and transmit the data back to a ncct's in~house PC. 
Zoom in and out features provided with the street level, detailed map allow users 
to track vehicles along their route on a computer screen. The system also enables fleets 
to monitor a vehicle's engine functions, speed, cargo temperature and security systems 
on the office PC, and it helps drivers in need of directions find their next destination. 
Interactive capabilities include being able to change a cargo's thermostat from the office 
or instantly re~route a vehicle. 
Contact:SPS Technologies, (800) 320-1186, Fax: (954) 677-9132. 
Reaource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Accident Prevention 
Safety Alert 
Cobra Electronics Corporation 
Installed on emergency response, construction or public utility vehicles, Safety 
Alert is designed to improve highway safety by automatically transmitting warning 
signals to the radar detectors of motorists \Vithin a %~mile radius of the emergency or 
potentially hazardous road situation. The Cobra Safety Alert transmitter, the company 
explains, sends out several distinctive signals depending on the situation- one set of 
signals for a stationary road hazard versus another set for a moving emergency vehicle, 
for example. The safety signals, Cobra notes, can be picked up by all radar detectors 
currently on the market. 
In addition, ~intelligent" receivers that display warning messages on special LCD 
screens or by using LED patterns also are available from Cobm. Safety Alert is FCC 
approved. It is currently in use in 30 U.S. states. 
Contact:Geltzer & Company, (212) 575-1976, Fax: (212) 245-2145. 
Reaource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
On-Board Electronic Scale 
Dynaload 
Dynacraft 
The Dynaload on-board scale is designed to help fleets maximize loads for 
greater profitability, while eliminating lost revenues from overweight fines and 
commercial scale fees. According to the company, Dynaload can determine gross, 
payload and axle group weights on all tractor-trailers equipped with air suspensions. 
For axle groups not equipped with air suspensions, the Dynaload system can be 
supplied with load-cell sensors. 
On air-equipped vehicles, the system uses pneumatic sensors to detect minute 
changes in air pressure, Dynacraft notes, and is accurate to within 1%. A sensor 
connected to the air suspension leveling valve relays analog data to a solid-state 
transmitter mounted on the frame rail. The transmitter converts the signal to digital and 
relays the data directly to Dynaload's microprocessor-based meter in the truck's cab. 
Just one sensor/transmitter per axle is required, according to the company. Installation 
takes between three and four hours. Dynaload can be ordered on new Kenworth and 
Peterbilt tractors. It is also available through Kenworth and Peterbilt dealers for 
instaJlation in the aftermarket on any truck make. 
Edith Cowan University 
230 
11/12/99 
Developmenl of a Model for Smart Card Based Access Conlrol in Multi-User, Multi· 
Resource, Multi-Level Access Systems 
Contact:Dynacraft, (800) 532-6550, Fax: (206) 351-3041; or contact a nearby Ken worth 
or Petcrbilt dealer. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Obstacle Detection 
SCAN System 
Electronic Controls Company (ECCO) 
SCAN is an ultrasonic sensory device designed to assist drivers in safely 
changing lanes, backing up or docking. Comprising the system are three primary 
components- the smart sensor, the driver alert module and the main power harness. 
According to the company, SCAN's smart sensors feature state-of-the-art transducers 
which detect vehicles or objects near the truck's perimeter. The software interprets the 
signal received and transmits the data along a single wire to a display module mounted 
inside the cab. The module visibly and audibly alerts drivers to obstacles within SCAN's 
detection zone, 
Ultrasonic transducers, ECCO states, provide broad detection-area coverage and 
are capable of withstanding harsh environmental elements. For trouble-free operation, 
the company adds, the smart sensors perform self-diagnostics and report any 
malfunctions. They are also designed to monitor ambient temperatures and will activate 
a heating element to prevent buildup of ice and snow during winter use. 
Contact:Electronic Controls Company, (800) 635-5900, Fax: (208) 376-3410. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Ergonomic Dashboard 
Driver's Cabin 
Argo Instruments 
In cooperation with VDO Kienzle- developer of the Integrated Driver Information 
System in use on motor coaches in Europe- Argo Instruments introduces a driver's 
cabin designed for improved efficiency and safety of transit bus and motor coach 
operations in North America. The ergonomic cockpit, the company says, includes a 
computerized, integrated driver instrument panel which serves as the central 
information hub. With the exception of the speedometer and prescribed warning lights, 
all other vital display functions are included on one easily readable LCD monitor. Pre-
programmed controls allow information to be prioritized and presented according to its 
importance to the operator. 
The driver's cabin dashboard also is designed to adjust with the steering wheel, 
making it easily adaptable to the needs of different drivers. In addition to improved 
visibility and less information clutter in the cockpit, the company notes, another benefit 
of the dashboard's design is less physical stress on drivers, including reduced incidence 
of back strain, Additional features and options that are being designed for the future, 
Argo reports, include real-time links to fleet headquarters and trip monitoring 
capabilities. 
Contact:Argo Instruments, (540) 665-0200, Fax: (540) 662-2127. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Data Collection 
XATA Distribution Information System 
XATA Corporation 
Four basic components comprise the XATA Distribution Information System 
that, according to the company, can help improve fleet productivity. The Driver 
Computer is the vehicle on-board system, with touch-screen computer, which interacts 
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with the driver to electronically capture and communicate vehicle operating data. The 
Data Station is located at trip origins and destinations, such as warehouses, terminals 
and distribution centers. It is used to download dispatch data to and collect trip 
information from the Driver Keys. 
Each electronic Driver Key carries a driver's individuai!D number and Jog 
records. It is used to exchange dispatch and trip data between the Driver Computer and 
Data Station. The fourth component, the Fleet Management System {FMS), is PC 
software designed to help fleet managers evaluate and report trip details. The FMS 
collects information from Data Sta~tions and sends route dispatch information to the 
Driver Computer via the Data Stations. 
Contact: XATA Corp., (612) 894-3680, Fax: (6121894-2463. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Dispatching 
PEN*KEY 6000 Series 
Norand Corporation 
Using mobile computing technology, Norand's PEN*KEY 6000 Series of products 
are designed to help fleets improve delivery planning and information management, as 
well as increase dock and driver productivity. Fleets can choose between the 22-ounce 
6100 computer or the full-screen 6600 unit, depending on the extent of functions and 
price of system they desire. The complete dispatch system includes P&D route planning, 
graphics maps with driver instructions, strip and load manifests, customer calls for 
pickup, linehaul planning, dock planning, real-time delivery reporting, signature 
capture and driver production management. 
An accurate cross-docking system, Norand adds, eliminates misloads and 
improves efficiency through an optional bar-code scanner, on-line re-weigh program, 
automatic trailer door closing, visual load diagram, and other features. Wireless 
communications to printers via an optionallrDA (infrared link) are also possible. Both 
units are small and easily carried from the truck to docks or delivery sites, the company 
notes, and can also be worn on a belt for even greater portability. 
Contact: Norand Corp., (800) 4-PENKEY, Fax: (319) 369-3453. 
Re•ource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Satellite Communications 
Enhanced Display Unit for OmniTRACS 
Qualcomm 
An enhanced display unit for the OmniTRACS satellite mobile communications 
system is available from Qualcomm. Used to send and receive text messages, the unit is 
mounted in the truck's cab and features a user-friendly keyboard and display screen. 
The enhanced display unit is compatible with the OmniTRACS Mobile Communications 
Terminal (MCT) as well as a new OmniTRACS on-board recor-der, which is planned for 
release later this year. 
A smart card reader/writer feature, the company notes, will allow drivers to store 
and retrieve data on small plastic cards when used with the on-board recorder. The 
display operates over a wide temperature range and is vibration and shock protected. It 
features a IS-line by 40-character screen that permits both text and high definition 
graphics. 
Contact: Qualcomm, Inc., (619) 658-2000, Fax: (619) 658-1578. 
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Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Collision Warning 
Forewarn Side Detection System 
Delco Electronics Corp 
The Forewarn Side Detection System (SDS) is an advanced safety system for 
Class 6 through 8 vehicles designed to warn drivers of vehicles moving in the blind area 
along the right side of their tractor and trailer. SDS, the company explains, uses 
microwave radar technology to detect moving objects and targct~discrimination software 
to minimize false alarms from stationary objects sensed in its path. 
The sensor, mounted on the tractor to the rear of the right-hand door, monitors 
approximately an 8-ft zone. Whenever a moving object is detected in the zone, Delco 
advises, the unit sets off a visual alert via a flashing light located on the outside side-
mirrors of the vehicle. An audible warning, triggered by a lane change signal, alerts 
drivers to moving objects i n the blind spot zone. According to the manufacturer, testing 
of the Forewarn system has proven it reliable even in harsh weather conditions. 
Contact: Delco Electronics Corp., (31 7) 451-5700, Fax: (317) 451-5426. 
Resource: Data Transmission 
Product: Radio Frequency Identification System 
Supplier: Amtech Systems Corp. 
Using Amtech's radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, fleets can 
automate many operations easily and securely, the company says. RFID facilitates 
collecting, tracking and reporting data for maintenance and other fleet management 
areas. Hands-free and paperless data communications applications for the automatic 
vehicle and equipment identification system include gate control access, yard inventory, 
fuel terminal authorization, automatic weigh-in-motion scales, preventive maintenance 
monitoring and intermodal equipment tracking. 
Contact: Amtech, (214)733-6600, Fax: (214)733-6699. 
Resource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
Interactive Fleet Management 
RoadTrac 
RoadTrac, Ltd 
According to the company, RoadTrac integrates Global Positioning Satellite 
tracking technology, proprietary mapping software and state-of-the-art digital cellular 
communications to provide fleets with accurate vehicle locating combined with a truly 
interactive voice, data and vehicle security management tool. RoadTrac features a 
display screen for easy viewing of all critical data, including vehicle latitude, longitude 
and heading; vehicle speed; street address; vehicle ID, license number, make and model; 
and alarm status and security mode. In-vehicle security sensors and enabling device 
options, the company says, are designed to provide instant response to "real-time" 
conditions. 
Programmable command functions include: Lock/Unlock Cargo Doors, Enable 
Flashers/Disable Engine, Audio or Video Monitoring, Voice Recognition, Operator 
Panic/Distress Mode, and PC and Fax Connectivity. Other features include on-screen 
routing, bi-directional text messaging, interactive Key Cards, computer aided dispatch, 
mapping overlays of vehicles and custom report generation, including state fuel tax 
reporting. 
Contact: RoadTrac Ltd., (800)661-4971, Fax: (770)446-3897. 
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Reaource: 
Product: 
Supplier: 
On-Board Recorder with GPS 
DataTraxjGPS 
l~ockwcll Transportation gJcctronics 
The Rockwell DataTraxjGPS combines functions of the 1'ripmastcr on-board 
recorder with a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. DataTraxjGPS, the 
manufacturer reports, can act as a stand-alone recorder of vehicle data or be used with 
a variety of input and display devices, including alphanumeric wired and portable 
keypads, pen-based computers and touch-screen units. The system uses GPS to add the 
date, time and vehicle position to traditional OBC data. According to the company, a key 
feature is the ability to accomplish hands-free recording of state line crossings and 
accurate mileage tracking by jurisdiction for fuel tax reporting. Fleets can also 
incorporate DataTra"X/ GPS data with popular route analysis and planning software. 
Contact: Rockwell Transportation Electronics, (BOO) 997-2595, Fax: (515) 24 7-2812. 
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